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This thesis explores the politics of cinematic realism during the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution. Mao Zedong (&(), the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, 
not only launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 but also acted in an incendiary role 
during the Cultural Revolution with the help of his wife Jiang Qing ('B), his 
collaborator Premier Zhou Enlai ($) and other political allies. In order to 
achieve his personal goals to eliminate his deputy Liu Shaoqi (ǔɺȽ) and to further 
consolidate his political power, Mao instigated students as Red Guards (ħ˸N) to 
attack Liu as well as intellectuals, especially in the realm of literature and arts. He 
then expelled his political opponents and sent the students to the countryside to be re-
educated. The Cultural Revolution not only had a severe impact on Chinese economic 
development, but also hampered literary and artistic creativity, especially in the film 
industry.  
 The thesis examines the impact of Jiang Qing’s Three Prominences Theory on 
film production and the role she played in film censorship during the Cultural 
Revolution. It explains how she ensured film production was in line with the spirit of 
the Cultural Revolution and how it served to strengthen the Cultural Revolution. The 
Chinese film industry produced 93 films among the nine major film studios during a 
ten-year long period of the Cultural Revolution; each film portrays a similar political 
message. 
 This thesis also analyses, through selected films, the major filmic themes of 
class struggle and wartime. Class struggle is the theme of two significant types of 
films: the poor against the rich; the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. Wartime is the 
theme of films on two major topics: the Chinese civil war and the Chinese resistance 
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war against the Japanese invasion. Regardless of theme, all of these films represented 
the social and political ideology of the Communist Party at the time, while also 
serving as popular entertainment. Jiang Qing’s model film style not only dominated 
the film industry but also embodied particular aesthetic characteristics, such as the 
positioning of protagonists as central, bright and lofty in mise-en-scène. These films 
thus had entertainment value as well as pedagogical realism to ensure the engagement 
of audiences in the ideology of the Cultural Revolution. 
 This thesis sheds light on the critical challenges faced during the Cultural 
Revolution by the Chinese film industry. It is hoped that its findings on a much 
neglected field — the influence of the politics of cinematic realism during the 
Cultural Revolution on film production — will contribute to an understanding of the 
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While I was teaching media studies at Jiangsu Teachers University of Technology (ŧ
ʸŭΏŐʦʉÆ́) in China in 2005 and 2006, I read a book called Zhang Yimou: 
Interviews. By chance I also found an old article, ‘Where Control of Literature and 
Art is Too Specific, There is No Hope’ (ć˅Ə˒˹ͩǲ̈˭ ), written by a 
well known Chinese actor, Zhao Dan (ή), and published by People’s Daily (ɤǾ
ɦ>), the official Communist Party newspaper, on 8 October 1980. A note included 
with Zhao’s article indicated that the author died on 10 October 1980, two days after 
his article was published. These writings sparked my curiosity — how and why had 
the Chinese film industry changed little since the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China, even after the Cultural Revolution? 
 Zhang Yimou: Interviews was written by Frances Gateward, an American 
academic, and published by the University of Mississippi Press in 2001. This book is 
based on her interviews with Zhang Yimou (άͩȈ), a fifth generation Chinese film 
director who has directed several films that are well known in the West such as Red 
Sorghum (ħîǁ 1987) and Hero (ͷ̹ 2003); she discusses film production and 
film censorship with Zhang during the post-Mao era, after the Cultural Revolution. 
What fascinated me the most was this remark by Zhang: ‘The trouble is not how 
much I can get to fund a film production. What I have to consider is how I can get a 
film through the censorship; that is my big worry’ (Gateward 2001, 36). 
 Zhao Dan’s article raised several important issues about the Chinese 
Communist Party’s control of literature and art. Zhao questioned how the Communist 
Party could predetermine the literary and artistic content and contexts of creative 
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work, and also pointed out that Lu Xun (ǚ̈́) and Mao Dun (Ǭ·), two well known 
Chinese writers and literary critics, did not write according to some prior external 
direction. Zhao wished to know who had told Karl Marx what to write. He concluded 
that the Communist Party should not specifically control every detail of literature and 
art because that would deprive art of its creative force and deny the egalitarian spirit 
of the communist system. Many newspapers and magazines reprinted Zhao Dan’s 
article and many famous writers, critics and actors in literature and art circles such as 
Ba Jin (0Ÿ), Bing Xin (O̲), Xia Yan (̓͋), Yang Hansheng (͗ĖЊ), Chen 
Huangmei (lĻǱ), Bai Yang (3͔) and Zhang Ruifang (άɬÈ) supported Zhao’s 
views. However, anecdotal evidence claims that Deng Xiaoping (̪ȸ) did not like 
Zhao Dan’s article at all and would not concede that the Chinese socialist system had 
impeded the development of literature and art. 
 When I had finished reading the article and the book, I had a better 
understanding of the political demands that still affect film production and censorship. 
Deng Xiaoping banned the film Sun and People (˅͗ĝɤ), written by a prolific 
military writer, poet and playwright, Bai Hua (3Ѐ), directed by Peng Ning (ȯȜ) 
and produced by the Changchun Film Studio in 1979. After viewing the film in 1980, 
Deng Xiaoping (2001, 391) explained why he had banned it: 
I have watched the film Sun and People and this film is definitely based on the 
film script Bitter Love (ƥƽ). No matter what the motive of the playwright 
was, the film gives a clear impression that neither the Communist Party nor 
the socialist system is any good. Where is the playwright’s Communist spirit 
that he vilifies the socialist system? Some people consider that this film has 
high artistic value, and that is the reason it can cause more damage to socialist 
society. 
 
Furthermore, Deng (2001, 256) explained: ‘Literature and art cannot be separated 
from politics. Progressive and revolutionary literary and artistic authors must cogitate 
 x 
on the social influence of their works, and also consider the benefits to the people, the 
nation and the Communist Party’. Paul Clark (1987, 125-126) pointed out that the 
Chinese Communist Party has always placed these demands on Chinese literature and 
art circles. This thesis demonstrates that the same political tune was sung by Jiang 
Qing during the Cultural Revolution. I came to realise that the Chinese film industry, 
even today, must consider political decisions in regard to film production and film 
censorship. 
After I returned to Perth in late 2006, I started enquiring whether it was 
possible for me to engage in studies on the films produced during the Cultural 
Revolution. When I obtained confirmation from Curtin University in early 2007, I 
embarked on my study journey. However, I found only a few scholarly materials on 
the films produced during the Cultural Revolution in Australia and even fewer 
scholarly and systematic studies on the films made during the Cultural Revolution. 
Therefore, while I was in Shanghai and Beijing during my planned study trip, I 
collected about 70 films and many newspaper critiques about the films of that period 
although I was unable to see certain films at either the China Film Archive in Beijing 
or the Shanghai Library in Shanghai. Furthermore, after I talked to A/Professor Ma 
Ning (ǧȜ) at Shanghai University (ɸĔ́) and Professor Fang Fang (ÉÈ) at 
the Shanghai Theatre Academy (ɸĔ̏Ɛ́Ζ), I discovered that the Chinese 
government has never encouraged the study of the films produced during the Cultural 
Revolution. 
 When starting this research, I struggled to discover relevant material on which 
I could base my inquiries into cinematic realism during the Cultural Revolution 
because most official Chinese media outlets do not sell any films produced during that 
period. However, I discovered that all the films produced during the Cultural 
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Revolution were being sold by street sellers and during my research journey to China 
I was able to obtain what I wanted. Since the development of Internet technology in 
China, I have been able to view, from time to time, a few non-official critiques online 
about Chinese films produced during the Cultural Revolution, as well as works on the 
history of that period.  Some of these critiques have enhanced my understanding of 
how the Communist regime has tried to control the media in general. 
While writing this thesis I presented my research study outline at the 
Southwest/Texas Popular Culture and American Culture Association’s 31st Annual 
Meeting in Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA in 2010. When presenting my topic in 
the Film and History seminar, no questions were asked. Although many people who 
attended knew the history of the Cultural Revolution, no one had seen any of the films 
made at that time. When I showed a few clips of those films, the audience became 
interested and one member asked what particular films were produced in China during 
the Cultural Revolution. I answered that the class struggle-themed opera films were 
dominant because Jiang Qing, Mao’s wife, was directly involved in their production. 
 From a historical perspective it is valuable to revisit the films produced during 
the Cultural Revolution because they not only have entertainment value as cultural 
products with distinct branding and unique artistic features, but also because they are 
useful material sources that reveal important aspects of key social and political events 
during that time in China. A critical study of these films can make an important 
contribution to the understanding of modern Chinese history and the current situation 
of Chinese literature and art, especially Chinese cinema. While I do not claim to 
exhaust the critical and political import of the archive I have assembled here, I hope at 
least to raise awareness of the significant cultural features of the films produced 
during a unique phase in recent Chinese history. Hopefully, in relation to this under-
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researched topic, this study provides meaningful comparative portraits of Chinese life 
and values by using the pragmatic lens of the films produced and shown during the 
Cultural Revolution. I hope, too, that the very assemblage of this archive of the 93 
films produced during the Cultural Revolution will contribute to our knowledge of 
that era. 
 All references are properly noted and indicated in accordance with the 
Chicago Author-Date 16th Edition system. Some Chinese terms have been translated 
or transliterated such as names, original film titles and quotations using the Pinyin 
system with attached Chinese characters in parentheses where necessary. All 
translations in the thesis are mine except where indicated otherwise. When names or 
original film titles are first mentioned, these appear with Chinese characters 
alongside; thereafter the Chinese characters are omitted. A chronological list of the 
films produced during the Cultural Revolution, together with a more general list 





Chinese cinema during the Cultural Revolution differs from its incarnations before or 
after that period. Films produced during the Cultural Revolution not only had unique 
aesthetics and distinctive characteristics, but also were an important cultural product 
with profound socio-political impacts on the Chinese people. The exceptional 
characteristics and special features of these films have evoked many questions with 
regard to how they were produced and for what purpose. It is important to understand 
the extent to which these films realistically reflected the truth of Chinese society and 
culture, or to which they reflected ‘the truth’ according to the Chinese Communist 
Party. 
This study explores the cinematic realism of the films produced during the 
Cultural Revolution and the present chapter provides an overview of this study. It 
includes a critical review of the most important scholarly literature on cinematic 
realism and Chinese cinema during the Cultural Revolution; a statement of objectives 
of this study; an explanation of the research methodology; and an outline of chapter 
proceedings. 
 
A Short History of Cinematic Realism 
When viewing Chinese films made during the Cultural Revolution, even today, it is 
clear how deeply embedded the socio-political agenda was. This embedding was 
largely due to the Cultural Revolution, a political movement that dictated what should 
be shown in the films, thus affecting Chinese people from all walks of life. In other 
words, the films were profoundly influenced by the Cultural Revolution but how 
realistically they reflected the socio-political schemas is a question considered in this 
 2 
section. In order to understand these realistic schemas, this section defines what 
cinematic realism is and how Chinese films during the Cultural Revolution reflected 
realities at that time. 
 Many film scholars have already defined and developed the concept of 
cinematic realism through particular films such as the Italian films Rome, Open City 
(Roma città aperta 1945) and Paisan (Paisà 1946) by Roberto Rossellini, the 
American motion picture Citizen Kane (1941) by Orson Welles and the Soviet movie 
The Battleship Potemkin (1925) by Sergei Eisenstein. The founding critical works of 
cinematic realism were undertaken by French film critic André Bazin and American 
film theorist Siegfried Kracauer. Scholars of Chinese film such as Paul Clark, Chris 
Berry, Rey Chow, Ma Ning, and also many Mainland Chinese film scholars such as 
Zhang Junxiang (άƘ̡), Di Jiannong (ŤȞ) and Dai Jiafang (řϿ) have also 
discussed cinematic realism. Even if the social and political allusions in their writings 
are not always explicit, each of their discussions can be traced back to philosophical 
trends that emerged in Chinese cinema during the Cultural Revolution. 
 In critical discourse on film, the term cinematic realism designates neither a 
genre nor a movement, and has neither rigid formal criteria nor specific subject 
matter. Instead, the term represents a style whose chief elements are the long take, 
deep focus and limited editing, using non-professional or at least relatively unknown 
actors when possible (Stam, Burgoyne and Fitterman-Lewis 1992, 185-186). In 
addition, cinematic realism possesses both the essence of cinematic ontology and the 
impassioned rhetoric of simplicity, purity and transparency (Margulies 2003, 42-46). 
Film critics and theorists have long given their intellectual support to the practice of 
realism in filmmaking. As Rudolph Arnheim (1993, 10), an art and film theorist and 
perceptual psychologist, wrote in the early 1930s, films offer the possibility of 
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mechanical imitation of nature in which originals and copies become 
indistinguishable in the eyes of the public. Yet it was André Bazin, a prolific film 
critic, who first developed a theory of cinematic realism on the basis of the film 
image’s mechanical reproduction. He located the concept of cinematic realism in 
distraction and plotlessness, which he saw as structurally analogous to the unscripted, 
indeterminate, underplotted nature of reality. In other words, what filmmakers as 
different as Robert Bresson, Vittorio DeSica, Jean Renior, Roberto Rossillini, and 
Orson Welles had in common was a desire to put cinema at the service of what Bazin 
called a fundamental faith in reality. Not only did Bazin sketch the history of art in 
film, but he also identified cinema as the fulfilment of human craving for realistic 
representation. 
 Bazin cited examples of cinematic realism such as Italian neo-realistic films 
Rome, Open City and Paisan. These two films portrayed the reality of war. The 
former is set in Rome and is about a young boy, Marcello, who is shocked to see his 
mother, Pina, killed by a Nazi soldier and then secretly participates with other 
children in the resistance against the Nazi occupation. They are following in the steps 
of the resistance fighters: an engineer, Giorgio Manfredi; a priest, Don Pietro 
Pellegrini; and many other resistance fighters who all die in the struggle against the 
Nazi occupation in 1944. Similar in style, Paisan consists of six episodes with each 
being set at a different location in Italy. Each episode incorporates twists and turns in 
a story related to Italians fighting with or assisting foreigners during World War II. 
Both films have a quintessential documentary quality just like a number of classic 
expressionist film masterpieces such as Nosferatu in 1922, Die Nibelungen or Greed 
in 1924 (Bazin 1976, 16). 
 4 
 Bazin (1971, 26) praised Italian neorealism for its aesthetics, great progress in 
expression, triumphant evolution of the language of cinema and an extension of 
stylistics. These features establish the significance of cinematic realism as an 
important approach in the development of filming the socio-political complexity of 
publicly well-known events. A further example of realism supplied by Bazin was 
Citizen Kane (1941). This film displays the fundamental quality of reality using 
cinematographic illusions in terms of space and time although it is a drama. Citizen 
Kane portrays an enormously wealthy media proprietor, Charles Kane, rising and then 
falling from his empire in the early 1910s in the United States. What is clear is that 
the filmmakers Roberto Rossillini and Orson Welles used realistic approaches such as 
truthful artificial settings and accurate performances to increase the credibility of 
complex, delicate and cumbersome events. As Bazin (1971, 38) writes: 
I have arrived at the point of characterising as similar the style of Rossellini in 
Paisan and of Orson Welles in Citizen Kane. By diametrically opposite 
technical routes each arrives at a scenario with roughly the same approach to 
reality — the depth of focus of Welles and predisposition toward reality of 
Rossellini. In both we find the same dependence of the actor relative to the 
setting, the same realistic acting demanded of everyone in the scene whatever 
their dramatic importance. Better still, although the styles are so different, the 
narrative follows basically the same pattern in Citizen Kane and in Paisan. 
 
The elements of reality in cinema can be enriched by a wide variety of possible 
combinations. These combinations can be explicitly and implicitly chosen realities; as 
Bazin (1971, 13) commented: ‘the reality produced by the cinema at will … is the 
reality of the world of which we are part and of which the film receives a mould at 
once spatial and temporal’. This spatial and temporal mould may be achieved through 
the artifices of sound, colour and so forth. 
 Cinematic realism was further defined through the work of Siegfried 
Kracauer, a cultural critic and film theorist. He argued in his book Theory of Film: 
Redemption of Physical Reality in 1960, two years after Bazin’s death, that, although 
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all of the arts and especially film are able to record physical reality, cinematic realism 
should also include realistic tendency and formative tendency. The term realistic 
tendency, according to Kracauer (1965, 33-34), refers to the fact that film not only 
can rush audiences through vast and different expanses of space and time, but it can 
also seize upon physical reality with all its various and multiple movements of the 
impression of actuality; the term formative tendency refers to the fact that film can 
offer extensive experiences of intellectual aspiration and tangible fantasy at the 
expense of the realistic tendency through historical and cultural re-enactments of 
putative events. Kracauer thus explains how a realistic film may none the less contain 
‘unrealistic’ elements (a dream sequence, for example). On the one hand, audiences 
can experience a cognitive concept of realistic tendency when viewing a motion 
picture — that ‘things are there, you may or may not see them’; on the other hand, 
filmmakers could use the formative tendency by combining different shots at various 
times at the expense of realistic tendency. In this regard, filmmakers can render 
dreams or visions, for example, with the aid of appropriate settings which are 
anything but realistic yet still provide an aesthetic validation of reality (Bazin 1971, 
26). 
 Cinematic realism was also defined through its ontological aspects by Stanley 
Cavell (1985, 115-133), an American philosopher, who was concerned about how 
film could reconcile audiences with what they experienced of the world and the world 
shown on film by permitting audiences to view events at a distance. He also insisted 
that, fundamentally, cinematic realism was the art of contemplation, an intellectual 
and spiritual exercise that could bring people back to the world of reality and reaffirm 
the participation of people in the world of actuality (Cavell 1985, 115-133). In this 
sense, cinematic realism can restore the relationship between people and the world. 
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 According to a more recent study by Robert Stam, Robert Burgoyne and 
Sandy Fitterman-Lewis (1992, 185), cinematic realism can be defined with reference 
to French New Wave and Italian Neo-Realism from the critical point of view of 
semiotics. Both styles of film demonstrate how cinematic realism deals with filmic 
representation. The former deploys a stylistic form that is seemingly less articifical 
than traditional cinema and the latter is arranged to show the true face of post-war 
Italy. Although, according to film psychoanalytical theorists such as Jean-Louis 
Baudry and Christian Metz, cinematic realism deals with the correct aspirational 
representation and the correct innovatory representation, it should also encompass the 
metapsychological aspects of spectatorial belief and desire, a realism of subjective 
response and a combination of verisimilar cinematic representation with a fantasy-
induced situation (Cook and Bernink 1999, 348-350). These views are also in line 
with the conclusions of Stam, Burgoyne and Fitterman-Lewis (1992, 185): 
A purely Formalist definition of realism, finally, would emphasize the 
conventional nature of all fictional codes, and would posit realism simply as a 
constellation of stylistic devices, a set of conventions that at a given moment 
in the history of an art, manages, through the fine-tuning of illusionistic 
technique, to crystallize a strong feeling of authenticity.  
 
However, the decisive issue with regard to the semiotic interrogation of cinematic 
realism is seen against the backdrop of these critical views which consider cinema as 
essentially or intrinsically realist. Actually, cinematic reproduction, for both Bazin 
and Kracauer, is the essential or intrinsic objectivity of film. 
 It is evident that using cinematic realism, filmmakers created many influential 
and powerful works often associated with social and political propaganda: for 
example, Sergei Eisenstein in Soviet Russia, Leni Riefenstahl in Nazi Germany, Peter 
Watkins in the United Kingdom, and more recently Michael Moore in the United 
States. Their realistic films, in general, present human rights issues, moral values, 
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socio-economic matters or socio-political agendas assembled from the bare 
documentary facts. In addition, cinematic realism, according to some film theorists 
and critics such as Raymond Williams (1977, 63) and others, tends towards a Marxist 
critique of illusion and is associated with a reflection on democracy, giving equal time 
to ‘anonymous voices and unknown faces’. 
 The Marxist critique of forms from art and film that represent economic and 
social inequalities resonates with filmmakers and writers for whom cinematic realism 
is a way of cutting through the artifice of standard cinema associated with Hollywood 
‘escapism’. This does not mean that communist filmmakers have a privileged 
pathway to the truth, but rather that they devote their faith to what Bazin (1971, 149) 
and Cavell (1985, 113) call the ontological realism of images and realist films. These 
images and films could perform the type of demystification often associated with 
leftist intellectuals’ goals in order to achieve an impact on audiences. For instance, 
Bazin, in his two wittiest articles, ‘Entomology of the Pin-Up Girl’ in 1946 and ‘The 
Myth of Stalin in Soviet Cinema’ in 1950, shrewdly denigrated the ideological 
mystification in films from Hollywood and the Soviet Union, respectively. 
 The desire of cinematic realism to show what has remained invisible 
challenges the realities spoken of by ‘anonymous voices and unknown faces’ in 
democratic society. In this sense, Hollywood films have regularly put ordinary people 
into extraordinary circumstances, but have done so through a codified system of well-
known actors and stereotypes. This cinematic manoeuvre of Hollywood films often 
satisfies the hunger of audiences for the realities occurring in the world. For example, 
the graphic and realistic portrayal of World War II in Steven Spielberg’s film Saving 
Private Ryan in 1998 is remembered especially for its intensity. This film, which 
seems similar to the Italian Neorealist film The Battle of Algiers in 1965 directed by 
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Gillo Pontecorvo, is considered to be one of the last instances of Italian Neorealist 
cinema. It is clear that both Spielberg and Pontecorvo used realist techniques to show 
the faces and amplify the voices of the protagonists who were ordinary people — the 
soldier Ryan, and the Algerian revolutionary men and women in Pontecorvo’s film. 
The realistic tendency of cinematic realism, then, is not in the service of sociology, 
but rather of a democratic art form. 
 
Cinematic Realism in China 
Realistic approaches to filmmaking were also dominant in Chinese films produced 
and shown during the Cultural Revolution. Paul Clark (1987, 63), for instance, a New 
Zealand Chinese film scholar, believes that Chinese cinema had adopted socialist 
realism since the early 1950s following the Soviet Zhdanovian approach. Hence Clark 
(1987, 125) points out: 
The comfortable presumption that the Cultural Revolution that Mao launched 
officially in 1966 was simply a distorted and atypical phase of political 
extremism and forced mobilisation, distinct from the years before and after 
that unfortunate period, is misleading. The Cultural Revolution is significant 
as much for its continuities with the rest of Chinese history since 1949 as for 
its disjunctions with what came before and what followed.  
 
Therefore it could be construed that Chinese films depicted the same realities during 
the Cultural Revolution, and before or even after the Cultural Revolution despite the 
different social and political environment. However, films using the realistic approach 
propagated a nationwide mass culture and created new modified Chinese operatic 
films (Chinese opera in this thesis refers to Beijing opera and other regional operas); 
as Clark (1987, 63) explains, there were several reasons for using these realistic 
approaches: firstly, film was still the main entertainment and educational medium at 
that time; secondly, opera films could be understood by most Chinese as they were 
part of national popular culture; thirdly, the Chinese government had already built 
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many mobile film projection teams to screen films at different locations in rural 
China. 
 Cinematic representations of operatic and feature films, though, were narrow 
and strict when depicting wartime events and class struggles because Jiang Qing, a 
member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and former well-known actress, 
with her political allies, had total control of the Chinese film industry at that time. She 
not only developed model operatic films and model feature films but also 
disseminated her political opinions through her control of the Chinese film industry; 
she also accused the Chinese film industry of carrying out the ‘dictatorship of a black 
line in literature and art in the previous seventeen years’ (ʌȼȘ˹ͩġ̜Ϙξ), 
from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China up to the Cultural 
Revolution. In addition, she denounced many films produced before the Cultural 
Revolution as ‘big poisonous weeds’ (±\) and labelled these films as ‘feudal-
bourgeois-revisionist’ propaganda (Clark 1987, 129). In using realistic approaches, 
the two major film types (on the themes of wartime events and class struggles) 
depicted Chairman Mao and the Communist Party leading poor Chinese people from 
victory to victory, conquering their enemies, who were either Japanese invaders and 
the Kuomintang armies and / or Chinese intellectuals associated with wealthy families 
of the past. 
 The importance of cinematic realism in the realm of political ideology in 
Chinese films is also explained by Clark (1987, 25) as follows: 
The transition to socialism in Chinese filmmaking was a dual process. The 
Party cultural leadership made the transition from Yan’an to Shanghai, 
erecting a system of film production and art designed to serve the policies the 
leaders had articulated in Yan’an. 
 
This realist political framework not only related to films but also shaped the dynamic 
relationship among filmmakers, audiences and political leaderships. This caused 
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tensions between the cultural and political property being represented in Chinese 
films. What Mao had demanded in his Yan’an Talks in 1942 was that literature and art 
must serve workers, peasants and soldiers, and the Communist Party and its policies. 
However, the implementation of this political framework was not as desirable as 
Chairman Mao and his wife, Jiang Qing, in particular, expected, because too many 
literary and art works and especially films portrayed either dead heroes or ghosts in 
ancient or subtle romantic stories; not many works had been undertaken that eulogised 
socialist nation building before the Cultural Revolution. 
 Thus filmic realism was severely censured by Jiang Qing and her political 
clique during the Cultural Revolution. When the film studios resumed production in 
1970 in the middle of the Cultural Revolution, Jiang Qing had absolute control over 
all film studios. As Paul Clark (1987, 63) notes, Jiang Qing at that time implemented 
the so-called combination of revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism in 
terms of reforming nationally popular operatic dramas into relatively modern-style 
opera films; she did this by adapting or transplanting them from novels and local 
operatic dramas. The intense realism of these modern-style opera films was no doubt 
better suited to the needs of the policies of the Communist Party during the Cultural 
Revolution; the Chinese people, moreover, were much more inspired and motivated 
by these kinds of films made during the Cultural Revolution than during the previous 
seventeen years, according to many Chinese film scholars. 
 Chris Berry (2004, 30), for example, an Australian scholar of Chinese film 
who at one stage worked in the Chinese Film Archive in Beijing, writes as follows: 
The Chinese cinema shared didacticism with all the other arts and media in the 
People’s Republic before 1976. As such, these discourses can be compared to 
two other discourses. One is the European tradition of what Susan Rubin 
Suleiman terms ‘authoritarian fictions’ in her study of what are also known as 
romans à thèse. Although Suleiman’s work focuses on late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century French novels, the basic drive towards an exemplary 
 11 
mode of narration designed to demonstrate an argument could also be applied 
to many other works in the Western tradition, including, as she notes, the 
biblical parable. In the cinema, the most proximate discourse would be the 
Soviet socialist realist cinema associated with the Stalin era. 
 
Berry thus shares Clark’s view that realistic approaches in Chinese film production, 
from the founding of the People’s Republic of China to the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, were similar. Berry also agrees with Clark that the realistic function of 
Chinese cinema could be studied through an analysis of Western theories to examine 
the discourses of Chinese films, and that the pedagogical functions of Chinese films 
had the same roles as the Soviet films. Chinese and Soviet cinema both presented 
propaganda features that were concerned with the transmission of communist ideas 
and values. In other words, films were used as an educational tool as well as 
entertainment to disseminate social and political agendas.  
 More precisely, in regard to the films associated with realistic social and 
political agendas, Berry (2004, 77) points out that ‘although the slogan “let themes 
take the lead” was only explicitly used during the Cultural Revolution, it in fact 
described the underlying logic of the Chinese classical cinema between 1949 and 
1976’. This emphasis on film representation revealed the manner of Chinese 
cinematic realism in terms of the changes of artistic discourse (mise-en-scène) and 
narrative discourse (diegesis). The films presented progressively a socialist utopia 
embedded within socio-political propaganda in terms of socialist distanciation. 
 Other scholars like Rey Chow, Ma Ning, Di Jiannong and Dai Jiafang 
analysed more specifically the political representation of the workers, peasants and 
soldiers and their status in Chinese society as well as the crucial relationship between 
film and reality. They argued that films with serious subject matter, aimed at social 
and political criticism or education and propaganda, had nothing to do with 
entertainment but with the political life of filmmakers. According to George Semsel 
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(1990, 25), a well-known film scholar and Chinese official, Zhang Junxiang, argued 
with regard to filmmakers seeking political safety rather than artistic pursuits: 
The work of film directors is indeed very heavy and difficult. Directors must 
be responsible for the political and artistic qualities of their films. In China the 
interface of the left and the right will continue; however, an absolutely secure 
situation may not produce outstanding art. Certainly directors and scriptwriters 
want to have a sense of security, but on the other hand, we must also acquire a 
sense of responsibility — a responsibility to sing the praises of advanced 
persons and events, and to expose and criticise backward thoughts and events. 
 
It is not difficult to see the political reality that was paramount in Chinese films. This 
political reality can be said to have impeded filmmakers from pursuing artistic quality 
in terms of aesthetic reality. 
 Rey Chow (1995, 48), an American Chinese film critic, clarified that the 
image of Chairman Mao was not only depicted as a political presence, but also as an 
image of salvation and enlightenment to the Chinese people in the same way as Stalin 
was depicted in Soviet films. Interestingly, in her view, the Cultural Revolution was 
like the ‘epitome of a big rock-and-roll concert with Mao as the biggest rocker and 
every other Chinese person his fan’; Mao promised the Chinese youth strength, unity, 
power and an infinite sense of hope for the future. The most important portrayal of 
Mao was his image seen on film around the world. This, then, was how cinematic 
realism was used in films to present the political agenda during the Cultural 
Revolution period. 
 Ma Ning, an Australian-educated Chinese film scholar, claimed that ‘The 
Cultural Revolution is a traumatic, cultural regression and social disaster … in the 
cinema during that period when political criteria were the measure for everything’ 
(Semsel 1987, 64). Therefore, the conventions of space and time in the film industry 
demanded an idealisation and stylisation in accord with Mao Zedong’s thoughts of 
revolutionary realism — of wartime literature and class struggle themes. These two 
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major themes were the forms of socialist realism which largely represented the 
revolutionary images of workers, peasants and soldiers, the protagonists of all films. 
The application of these revolutionary images signified the social formation of a 
particular discursive practice, moving the masses closer to the recognition of cultural 
identity and of the reality of the performance. In broad terms, then, what Kracauer 
called the formative tendency (discussed above) was stronger than the realistic 
tendency in the films of the Cultural Revolution. 
 According to Ma Ning (1992, 10), Tony Rayns, in his study of Chinese film, 
highlighted the difficulties of using Western generic categories. In an essay called ‘An 
Introduction to the Aesthetics and Politics of Chinese Cinema’, he argued: 
Outside of very broad categories like ‘opera film’ and ‘national minority film’, 
the notion of genre has little place in Chinese cinema. The structural models in 
force are less ‘purely’ cinematic than their Western equivalents; they seem to 
have deep roots in the traditions of fiction-writing, poetry and drama. One type 
might be described as a juxtaposition of individual lives and the movement of 
history… Another is the ‘before-and-after-Liberation’ story, which elaborately 
contrasts the miseries of life under the Kuomintang with social reorganisation 
under the Communists. 
 
This peculiar situation is clearly due to the socio-political reality and the cultural 
system in China. With regard to the socio-political reality of cinematic representation, 
Dai Jiafang and Di Jiannong, Mainland Chinese film critics, provided very detailed 
accounts from their ideological analysis that drew upon the methodology of 
expressionism and constructionism as well as psychoanalysis and Marx-Leninism 
(Dai 1995; Di 2001).  
 The particular characters of the Chinese films made during the Cultural 
Revolution are discussed by Di Jiannong with many specific references in his book 
Red Past: 1966 – 1976 Chinese Film (ħɱˬʙ1966 – 1976ȘϊĐ¤ͼ ). 
He assesses the political realism of the films, what their ideological functions were 
and examines the political relationship among Mao, Jiang Qing, Zhou Enlai and Deng 
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Xiaoping associated with film content and film censorship. He shows how Jiang Qing 
had absolute authority to pursue her socio-political ideals of artistry and aesthetics in 
the production of the films; he also demonstrates how, despite interventions by Jiang 
Qing, filmmakers improved their techniques and skills as a result of Jiang’s criticism 
in areas such as lighting and filming, and even costumes. The obvious disadvantage of 
his book is that it does not examine the films themselves. 
 For Dai Jiafang, the relevance of the operatic film as a realistic form of 
cinematic representation in the study of Chinese contemporary films is very 
important. He specifically focuses on the formation of aesthetics and politics in the 
operatic films. Although these films were harshly criticised by many, he argues that 
their formation was quite radical, and their ideological functioning was obvious. 
Evidently, these films were an apt form of socialist realism. 
 The important and central issues for scholars, therefore, who engage in 
political film criticism is to ascertain whether the films produced during the Cultural 
Revolution were historical and political products or entertaining and artistic creations. 
By using the concept of cinematic realism in analysis of the Chinese films made 
during the Cultural Revolution, what can be seen is that the critical discourse on 
Chinese cinema not only reflected aesthetic and artistic formations but also revealed 
the political and historical movement. 
 From the historical point of view, the Cultural Revolution was arguably the 
most tumultuous period in post-Liberation China. Domestic chaos and instabilities 
aside, China was also in a very vulnerable position internationally. There was a border 
dispute with the Soviet Union; the Americans were still in Vietnam; China was 
anxious to establish a new relationship with America and become a member of the 
United Nations and so forth. Premier Zhou Enlai died on 8 January 1976 and a short 
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while later on 9 September 1976 Chairman Mao Zedong also died. Three weeks after 
the death of Mao, on 6 October 1976, the ‘Gang of Four’ was arrested. Subsequently, 
the official end of the Cultural Revolution was declared. Peter Zarrow writes that ‘the 
Cultural Revolution exactly fits any definition of holocaust or even belongs in the 
same category as Nazi genocide’ (Zarrow 1999, 165). In particular, many Chinese 
memoirs about, and by, Chinese intellectuals who suffered from the Cultural 
Revolution have been published both in China and the West. Unfortunately very few 
have recorded the experiences of those working in film and the cinema industry at that 
time. So far, few academics or film critics have written systematically and holistically 
about the films produced during the Cultural Revolution. Most researchers have been 
content to investigate triumphal and historical events. Moreover, the government of 
the People’s Republic of China, in effect the Communist Party, has never been 
interested in encouraging anyone to study the whole phenomenon of the Cultural 
Revolution. Indeed as MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 457) have concluded ‘to 
ensure that this version of history remained sacrosanct, academic research on the 
Cultural Revolution was strongly discouraged and university courses on it were 
eschewed’. 
 Many Chinese film scholars such as Ma and Chow primarily concentrated on 
1980s’ Chinese films, namely the fifth generation of Chinese cinema. They did not 
write in detail about films made during the Cultural Revolution, perhaps because they 
were not accessible. For example, Ma wrote his thesis on Spatiality and Subjectivity 
in Xie Jin’s Film Melodrama of the New Period, but he did not mention the film 
Spring Seedling (1975), directed by Xie Jin and produced during the Cultural 
Revolution (see Chapter Five for a discussion), nor did he do so in his doctoral 
dissertation Culture and Politics in Chinese Film Melodrama despite his analysis of 
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Xie Jin’s films. Interestingly, no academics or film critics have properly scrutinised 
the film Spring Seedling, a film which portrays the important theme of class struggle 
at that time. 
 In the last few years some research has been carried out in America about the 
representation of the Cultural Revolution in Chinese films which essentially reflects 
the views of historical and contemporary film arts (Fu 2003; Lu 2004). Besides filmic 
studies, there is a great deal of Western literature about the history of the Cultural 
Revolution (Collier and Collier 1973; Witke 1977; Terrill 1995; MacFarquhar and 
Schoenhals 2006). There is, though, no complete work in English about the films 
made during the Cultural Revolution. 
 Conducting research on cinematic realism in Chinese films made during the 
Cultural Revolution requires an interdisciplinary approach. This study, using such an 
approach, explores the connections between the history of the Cultural Revolution and 
its filmic presentations and representations. In doing so, both primary and secondary 
references are used such as books, newspapers, journals, films and interviews to 
examine the significant implications and intersections in regard to the nature of films, 
the history of the Cultural Revolution and how the theory of film connects with the 
philosophy of filmmaking. Moreover, it unveils how filmic discourse changed to 
carry out the political and social discourse in the Cultural Revolution, serving as a 
political instrument of the Communist Party and presenting to audiences an 
entertaining repertoire with political messages. It investigates the films’ formations 
from the perspective of Chinese film directors, actors, critics and academics, and 
whether or not the Cultural Revolution period is to be seen as a transitional era of the 
Chinese film industry. It also aims to clarify the style of given directors and to show 
what political, social and aesthetic issues were involved in overt and unified 
 17 
expressions on screen. Most importantly, it is hoped that this study will make a 
significant contribution to Chinese film history. 
 The films produced during the Chinese Cultural Revolution are to be viewed 
not just as cultural and artistic products, but rather they are also to be read as 
historical and sociological source materials which portrayed Chinese life and values 
in that unique period. However, these films have been overlooked due to historical 
and political reasons. The historical and political lesson that is learned from the 
Chinese film industry during the Cultural Revolution is bound to provide a useful 
reference point for the assessment of the cultural and artistic work created currently 
and in the future. This study provides the first systematic and comprehensive analysis 
of films production, censorship and film texts against their political background 
during the Cultural Revolution. In doing so, the study offers a historical perspective 
for appreciating how contemporary Chinese cinema has evolved and gained 
international recognition in the current era of globalisation. Through the comparative 
lens, it will also contribute a balanced and nuanced understanding of the changes and 
continuity of the political and ideological function of films made in different periods, 
offering an important contribution to the understanding of modern Chinese film 
history and current Chinese literature and the arts. 
 More specifically, this study seeks to make a fresh contribution to 
international scholarship on cinema by extending and replenishing the theories and 
concepts about film and the Cultural Revolution. Hopefully, it can, as the Chinese 
proverb says, ‘cast a brick to attract jade’ (ȪϙͶΌ) in international scholarship 
about the films produced during the Cultural Revolution because of the dearth of 




The Chinese films produced and shown during the Cultural Revolution period are an 
important component of Chinese contemporary art and culture. These films reflect 
unique and different aesthetics and ideology. The ideological formation of these films 
is very much involved in social and political schemas that had an overwhelming 
impact on Chinese society at that time. These films are understood not only as an 
entertaining repertoire but also as a political instrument of the Communist Party, 
disseminating Party policies and educating the masses about political issues. 
 Within this critical context, this study undertakes an examination of film 
production and consumption in general, and how these films communicated and to 
what extent they were submerged as political vehicles rather than aesthetic works in 
particular. The study’s hypothesis is that, despite the fact that operatic and feature 
films were made for entertainment, they also embodied considerable realism 
reflecting specifically the social and political circumstances of Chinese society during 
the Cultural Revolution. The study aims to trace the narrative structures and artistic 
discourses of these films to identify the realistic themes embedded with the political 
messages and propaganda, and also to examine film theory and film censorship of that 
time, with regard to film aesthetics and ideology. 
 In order to analyse the aesthetics and ideology of the films made and shown 
during the Cultural Revolution, it is imperative to explore what the Cultural 
Revolution was about and how this political movement held sway over the process of 
the Chinese film industry. In other words, the study examines under what 
circumstances the films were produced and how some films, including Chinese and 
foreign films, were selected for Chinese cinemas. Thus, the study first examines the 
motives of Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao during the Cultural Revolution, 
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to examine whether he had been fighting to consolidate his supreme position after the 
failure of his irrational economic policies or had wanted to change the ideology of the 
Chinese people towards socialist nation building. In the realm of literature and art, 
Mao and his wife, Jiang Qing, condemned the fact that too many ancient and 
historical literary and art works were being produced rather than films portraying 
workers-peasants-soldiers in Chinese socialist construction. Therefore, the history of 
the Cultural Revolution is analysed through selected works by different scholars such 
as Roderick MacFarquhar, Michael Schoenhals, Ross Terrill, Jonathan Spence and 
Immanuel Hsü. This analysis has helped assess the social and political encounters and 
consequences of the Chinese film industry during the Cultural Revolution. 
 Chinese cinema was uniquely different during the Cultural Revolution, not 
only reflected in aspects of aesthetics but also in social and political ideology, despite 
claims by Paul Clark and Chris Berry that the Cultural Revolution was part of the 
continuum of Chinese socialism. In other words, the study considers whether the 
political theory and ideology of the films were significant features, by looking at 
elements such as filmic codes, texts and messages. In the process of this examination, 
some film sequences and frames are discussed in order to determine how these films 
were realistically incorporated into the political movement of the Cultural Revolution. 
These films include Bright Sunny Skies (͍͗˓ 1973), The Harbour (Ĕí 1973), 
Undertaking ({͠ 1974) and many others.  
 In addition, film censorship is considered to have had an enormous impact on 
the outcome of the pre-existing cinematic realism of the films made during the 
Cultural Revolution. As Jiang Qing had hegemonic control over film censorship, she 
monitored the films not only from an aesthetic point of view but also from the point of 
view of political standards. The purest ideas of Jiang Qing matched entirely with the 
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purpose of the Cultural Revolution. Sometimes, though, Mao himself was confused 
about the aim of the Cultural Revolution. For instance, the film Song of Teachers (Δ
ªρñ 1974) was denounced as ‘a poisonous weed’ by Jiang Qing when the film was 
sent for censorship, but when Mao saw this film and praised it, the film became ‘a 
fragrant flower’. 
 The specific films chosen for analysis are Scouts (ε_N 1974), Sha Jia Bang 
(ɳŚϺ 1971), and Reconnaissance across the Yangtze (´ŧε_ŕ 1974). These 
films are regarded as wartime literature films (that is, films based on novels set in 
wartime) which were very popular among Chinese audiences at that time. There are 
many adapted, transplanted and reproduced films such as these among the 93 films 
produced during the Cultural Revolution. About twenty films were adapted from 
novels; fourteen films were transplanted from plays; and six films were reproduced 
(i.e. remakes of earlier films). To some extent, these films were well received by 
audiences not only because well-known actors performed in them but also, 
fundamentally, because of their realistic contents. However, the battles between Jiang 
Qing and the political leaders Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping as well as filmmakers 
about film censorship were quite intense in regard to the dialogue and images 
portrayed in the films. 
 The study also focuses on the style of the films made during the Cultural 
Revolution. As Chris Berry (2004, 77) points out, the taxonomies used by the Western 
and Chinese classical cinemas are quite different: Western genre films not only are 
regulated by classification, but also oriented with their marketing value through 
stylistic characteristics, settings, typical characters and so forth; Chinese films were 
organised in accordance with the subject matter. In reality, all film productions were 
planned by Communist Party officials during the Cultural Revolution. 
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 In the detailed formal analysis of the significant themes of cinematic realism, 
special attention is given to particular films such as Spring Seedling (1975), Jubilant 
Small Cool River (Ĺː̪ƿğ 1976), Sparkling Red Star (ɶɶħ̴ 1974) and 
The Red Lantern (ħŕ 1970). These films exhibit a number of distinctive elements 
of cinematic realism. The first two films use the reflexive mode of the class struggle 
theme which depicted peasants in the countryside; one is about class struggle against 
intellectuals between a doctor with a hospital official and the ‘barefoot doctor’, and 
the other is about class struggle against ‘capitalist roaders’ between a county cadre 
and a peasant village head. Both films were heavily criticised after the Cultural 
Revolution, but they had a profound influence on Chinese society during the Cultural 
Revolution. The greatest criticism came from the Communist regime and officials in 
the Chinese film industry. Of the last two films which were typical of wartime-themed 
productions, one was of the Chinese civil war, Sparkling Red Star, and the other was 
of the Chinese resistance war against the Japanese invasion, The Red Lantern. Both Li 
Jun (ƱƗ), the director of Sparkling Red Star and Ah Jia ( Ŝ), the playwright of 
The Red Lantern were entangled in politics in connection with Jiang Qing. After the 
Cultural Revolution, Li Jun was censured because his film was assisted artistically 
and praised politically by Jiang Qing; Ah Jia, unlike Li Jun, was applauded for his 
rebelliousness against Jiang Qing because he fought for the ownership of the creation 
of the opera The Red Lantern. 
 In examining these exemplary instances of Chinese films, this study leads to 
several questions. First of all, what are the dominant political and ideological 
messages embedded in the films which served as educational tools? Second, what role 
did Chinese cinema play in the Cultural Revolution? Lastly, will this study enable the 
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construction of a new concept of politicised Chinese films with styles similar to the 
Western notion of cinematic realism? 
 
The Politics of Cinematic Realism in China 
The central aspect of this study is to explore cinematic realism during the Cultural 
Revolution from 1966 to 1976 in terms of how Chinese cinema as a cultural product 
had politically affected society at that period. In other words, this study aims to 
ascertain whether or not the films produced and shown were truly representative of 
social and political realities in China. A comparative analysis and cross-cultural 
examination of films was carried out to investigate the specific socio-political 
contexts of the films. In order to produce an understanding of the social and political 
cinematic context of the Chinese films, the intrinsic and extrinsic political application 
and theoretical implications of the films were examined by adopting Western 
aesthetic and critical theories and Chinese methods. 
 In order to comprehend Chinese film culture in terms of cinematic forms and 
norms and the role of Chinese cinema played during the Cultural Revolution, some 
important archetypal films produced and shown in the Cultural Revolution period 
were selectively investigated and analysed as well as the filmic philosophies behind 
these films. Thus, some interdisciplinary approaches were employed to examine 
cinematic realism in regard to the styles and content of these films in the historical 
and cultural context. 
 First of all, the data gathering for this study entailed collecting films produced 
and shown during the Cultural Revolution as well as the secondary literature of film 
scholars and critics from the Shanghai Municipal City Library and the China Film 
Archive in Beijing in China. As a result, 70 out of the 93 films produced during the 
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Cultural Revolution were collected as well as others including old Chinese films and 
imported films shown during the Cultural Revolution; a considerable number of the 
film transcripts and critiques were also collected. In the process, this study endeavours 
to tease out what Bazin and Kracauer call the school of cinematic realism reflected in 
these collected films and critiques in which Clark and Berry see the combination of 
revolutionary realism (Kracauer’s realistic tendency) and revolutionary romanticism 
(Kracauer’s formative tendency). The development of this critical combination not 
only took into account the aesthetic practicalities but also reflected on the social and 
political reality of the films.  
 This study focuses on the historical context of the Cultural Revolution by 
examining the pre-existing reality of the social and political atmosphere for the 
Chinese film industry. In other words, the circumstances and conditions in which the 
films were made and shown during the Cultural Revolution are examined through the 
cinematic elements related to socialist realism which largely affected Chinese society 
as a whole. A detailed textual analysis of the film narrative structure of styles rather 
than genres was undertaken because Chinese films are not categorised in terms of 
genre. Thus they are analysed here using a critical methodology called realistic 
narrative diagnosis. This diagnosis is a blend of Rosenbaum-Combs’ method of 
political realism and Walsh-Taylor’s method of factual narrative analysis (Rosenbaum 
1997; Combs 1990; Walsh 1981; Taylor 1979). Rosenbaum-Combs’ method is to 
look at how political films occupy a utopian space and time as well as controlling the 
choice of ideas; and Walsh-Taylor’s method is to focus on the presentation, 
entanglement, influence and aesthetic and political thinking. As Hans Richter (1986, 
23) states: ‘Why and from where the cinema really derived its particular spirit and 
particular artistic, organisational, technological, political and economic form were 
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more important issues than cinematic qualities’. In other words, the filmic themes 
must have the revolutionary spirit associated with socialist society which Chris Berry 
(2004, 27) calls the pedagogical cinema. 
The rationale behind adopting these two methods, namely ‘Rosenbaum-
Combs’ and ‘Walsh-Taylor’, is to examine the films made during the Cultural 
Revolution holistically in terms of cinematic presentations, cultural ideas and political 
formations, and to evaluate the political and cultural influences of their entertainment 
repertoire at that time. There is no single approach that can be drawn upon to examine 
the films produced during that period as they are seen as arid propaganda rather than 
being propitious for film culture by not only the current Chinese government but also 
many film scholars such as Di Jiannong, Ma Ning, Chris Berry and Paul Clark. 
 Jonathan Rosenbaum (1997) specifically engaged in examination of the 
politics of form in film, exploring the spirit and mind of filmmakers and James 
Combs (1990) explicitly identified the different periods of political films. Martin 
Walsh (1981) and Richard Taylor (1979) used the Brechtian prospective to look at 
how radical cinema cemented certain political education and studied the effectiveness 
of socialist film in changing society, respectively. 
 However, political cinema is not an invention of Chinese filmmakers; it has 
existed in the West for a long time. Chinese films made and shown during the 
Cultural Revolution were political and had an impact on the Chinese people although 
these films, to a great extent, were aesthetically unlike Griffith’s film Birth of a 
Nation in 1915, Sergei Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin in 1925, or Leni 
Riefenstahl’s film Triumph of the Will in 1935. The formulation of these Chinese 
films was not only politically charged but also practically incorporated with the 
Cultural Revolution so as to perpetuate revolution, the aim of the Chinese Communist 
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Party. Hence, this study concentrates on the meaning of the political theories and 
images which saturated the films made and shown during the Cultural Revolution to 
determine how these political theories and images motivated the Chinese people to 
participate in this political movement — the Cultural Revolution. 
 The most conspicuous political theory was Jiang Qing’s theory of ‘The Three 
Prominences’ as Chris Berry (2004, 40) and Di Jiannong (2001, 69) have noted. This 
theory was fundamental to film production and created protagonists as major heroes 
among heroes. Hence, this study examines who the heroes were and how these heroes 
fought for the revolution. Furthermore, this study also examines how these heroes 
were depicted in the films and what the implications of these images were under the 
influences of the theory of ‘The Three Prominences’ in Chinese society; as Chris 
Berry (2004, 40) argues, the psychological realism of Chinese cinema concerned film 
characters in terms of their ability to serve as exemplary models for emulation on the 
part of audiences. 
 This study further engages in a detailed formal analysis of the films made and 
shown during the Cultural Revolution with additional documentary analysis involving 
an examination of critiques from magazines and newspapers related to these films. 
First, it examines the styles of the films and film censorship to consider whether these 
two mechanisms caused so-called political reality to influence film production and 
distribution in general. Because opera films rather than feature films dominated 
Chinese cinema during the Cultural Revolution, why these opera films were so 
important at that time is examined from two aspects: the aesthetic and the socio-
political. The aesthetic aspect focuses on the differences between Chinese operas and 
these opera films, how and why Jiang Qing wanted to reform the traditional Chinese 
opera plays into modern Chinese opera films, and whether these reformed opera films 
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emerged as a distinct form in their own right. From the socio-political aspect, the 
study examines the implications of the socio-political ideology of these opera films, 
whether they fitted into the ideology of the Cultural Revolution at that time and how 
they inspired the Chinese people during the Cultural Revolution. 
 Second, the study concentrates on how Jiang Qing was able to control film 
censorship and to what extent she enforced the socio-political reality upon film 
creation in order to strengthen film as a political tool rather than as an entertainment 
device. The battle of film censorship among Jiang Qing, Mao, Zhou Enlai, Deng 
Xiaoping and filmmakers is discussed in its historical and political context. Special 
consideration is given to the question of whether the battle over film censorship 
triggered a check on the selection of the social and political reality in the formation of 
the films. 
 After examining the styles of the films and film censorship, this study analyses 
the four major themes of films in the period of the Cultural Revolution, namely class 
struggle between ordinary people and intellectuals; class struggle against ‘capitalist 
roaders’; the Chinese civil war; and the Chinese resistance war against the Japanese 
invasion. These themes fall into what Ivone Margulies (2002, 2) describes as 
‘performative realism’, a realism that does not simply present a given reality but 
enacts social tension, and these themes appear in both the opera film and the feature 
film. An evaluation of these themes in terms of the formation of Chinese films made 
and shown during the Cultural Revolution leads to a critical discussion as to whether 
they were the main provocateurs and innovators of realist representation, constructed 
uniquely and differently in terms of mise-en-scène, diegesis and distanciation. For 
example, Breaking Up (Ɠǋ), a feature film, not an opera film, directed by Li 
Wenhua (Ʊ˹Ĵ) in 1975, a well-known film director and photographer, is a film 
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with the theme of class struggle. This film depicts how an ordinary student from the 
Chinese countryside went to study at a Commune University. Not only does he study 
but also has to go to work. Due to a lack of study time, he could not do a test and 
handed in a blank examination paper. Consequently, he rebelled against the university 
authorities, which not only won the hearts and minds of other students but also turned 
him into a student leader. This cohort of films made during the Cultural Revolution is 
analysed in detail to verify how this kind of film portrayed the real life of people 
during the Cultural Revolution.  
 At the same time, an interdisciplinary approach examines the films adapted, 
transplanted or reproduced from novels, plays or old films. This approach further 
explains the correlation between the films made and shown during the Cultural 
Revolution and their counterparts such as novels and plays to validate the 
verisimilitude of the social and political realities in the films. Thus, some prototype 
films adapted, transplanted or reproduced from novels, plays or old films were 
selected and analysed for their political content and context as well as cinematic 
developments. The political content means the films contain information on the kind 
of political ideology; the political context concerns how the films related to Chinese 
society; and the cinematic developments signify filmic artistic qualities, aesthetic 
components and camera work in films saturated with social and political discourses. 
 Moreover, some discussions with Ma Ning, a Chinese film scholar at 
Shanghai University, who was educated in Australia, and Fang Fang, a professor in 
film studies at Shanghai Theatre Academy, were carried out in order to determine 
what kinds of cinematic realism were reconstructed realities rather than a reflection of 
putative events during the Cultural Revolution. These discussions included why some 
Chinese people still like to watch the films made and shown during the Cultural 
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Revolution, how the current Communist regime sees the influence of Jiang Qing at 
that period, and what the realities were in these films that inspired many revolutionary 
Chinese people at that time. This study also explores the influence Jiang Qing exerted 
on the Chinese people through these films. 
 In addition, to correlate history with filmic formation, an analysis of some 
seminal works and journal articles produced by Chinese film scholars such as Tony 
Rayns and George Semsel was undertaken alongside some works by scholars of 
Chinese history such as Ross Terill, Roderick MacFarquhar, Michael Schoenhals and 
Immanual Hsü. The aim was to examine how filmic discourse changed to portray the 
social and political ideology during the Cultural Revolution. Further analysis was 
undertaken of the specific entertainment values of the films made and shown during 
the Cultural Revolution.  
 Finally, due to the scope of this study which covers works of oriental and 
occidental film literature, a broad view of Chinese visual culture in terms of narrative 
structures and the artistic discourse of Chinese films made and shown during the 
period of the Cultural Revolution is provided. The framework of this methodology 
provides a useful instrument, then, for explaining the political interventions designed 
to support the interests of the Cultural Revolution in Chinese cinema to promulgate 
the doctrine of Mao Zedong and his Communist Party. The development of that 
framework begins in the following chapter, Chapter One, where it is argued that, were 
it not for the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese film industry would have lacked the 
productivity to develop creatively. What, then, persuaded Chinese Communist Party 
Chairman Mao Zedong to inaugurate a massive political movement, the Cultural 
Revolution, a revolution which affected Chinese people from all walks of life, and 
had significant consequences in the realms of literature and art? This is the guiding 
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question of the first chapter, which situates the Cultural Revolution in a political and 
historical context.  
 Chapter Two, ‘The Three Prominences’, explores how the theory of The 
Three Prominences was the dominant feature of film production during the Cultural 
Revolution. It examines how Jiang Qing’s theory of The Three Prominences 
functioned and how the political narratives were depicted in the films under the 
influence of her theory. It also examines the styles of Chinese films produced and 
shown during the Cultural Revolution, including opera films, feature films and other 
forms of films and, at the same time, compares these differing types of film with 
Western films. This chapter also investigates why, from a political and aesthetic 
perspective, Jiang Qing wanted to promote the opera films. 
 In the third chapter, ‘Diegesis and Censorship’, it is argued that film narratives 
with political figures were key issues for film censorship among Mao, Jiang Qing, 
Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and filmmakers, in order for cinema to become a 
pedagogical tool to promote socialism during the Cultural Revolution. The chapter 
goes on to investigate how the political narratives including cinematic languages and 
filmic images affected the Chinese people, and particularly to what extent the 
languages and images of the protagonists — the workers, peasants and soldiers — 
persuaded the Chinese people to participate in socialist construction and nation 
building. Chapter Three also examines the battle around film censorship among Jiang 
Qing and Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and filmmakers. 
 Chapter Four, ‘Film Adaptation, Transplantation and Reproduction’, argues 
that, through film adaptation, transplantation and reproduction from novels, plays and 
other films, new films were produced to more easily disseminate Chinese socialist 
ideology to the Chinese population during the Cultural Revolution. The chapter 
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explores those films that were adapted from novels, transplanted from plays, and 
reproduced from old films during the Cultural Revolution. It takes up the issues of 
why and how these films were adapted, transplanted and reproduced. At the same 
time, the political content and context of these films are discussed. 
 In Chapter Five, ‘Significant Themes of Cinematic Realism’, there is an 
examination of how the significant themes of cinematic realism (such as class struggle 
between the poor and intellectuals, class struggle against ‘capitalist roaders’, the 
Chinese civil war and the Chinese resistance war against the Japanese invasion) 
reflect the history of modern China during the Cultural Revolution. These four main 
themes of the films produced during the Cultural Revolution are analysed to provide a 
detailed historical account of the realism portrayed in regards to the life of the 
Chinese people. 
 Finally, in the conclusion, the argument points to the films produced and 
shown during the Cultural Revolution as having particular aesthetic and political 
applications in terms of their cinematic and pedagogical realism. The precise 
conclusions can be construed as follows: were it not for the Cultural Revolution, the 
Chinese film industry would have been more productive and creative and would not 
have produced the overly politically-oriented films which it did; the Chinese film 
industry, comprising ten major film studios, only produced 93 films of varying quality 
in total in the ten-year period of the Cultural Revolution; all the films produced 
possess the political hallmark of the Cultural Revolution insofar as they were class 
struggle-themed and war-themed films.  
 In addition, the Chinese Communist regime has always made sure that the film 
industry obeys its literature and art policy (according to the social and political 
circumstances of the time) designed to serve the needs of the Chinese people and the 
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Communist Party; this policy is based on Mao’s speech at the Yan’an Literature and 
Art Forum in 1942. The Chinese Communist Party not only understood the 
importance of visual culture but also actively participated in film production and film 





The Chinese Film Industry during the Cultural Revolution  
 
The Cultural Revolution, short for ‘The Chinese Cultural Revolution’(ϊĐ˹Ĵò
ȃ) or ‘The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ (˾`Ůŏ˹Ĵòȃ), was 
Mao’s last revolution. Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong launched the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966 to reinforce his socialist orthodoxy in order to defend and develop 
his Marxist-Leninist philosophy within the Party and the country by removing 
capitalist and revisionist thinking as well as what he regarded as old culture, old 
thinking, old customs and old habits (ʲƊ%Ɗ˹ĴƊʮ̢ƊÓʹƊ̌Ĉ); he 
wanted to remove these traditional elements from Chinese society because he was 
concerned about the reluctance of the Party ranks to perpetuate the socialist 
revolution. It was an unprecedented socio-political battle rather than a cultural 
movement that lasted from 1966 to 1976. This socio-political battle was completely 
different from some earlier socio-political movements initiated by Mao such as the 
Hundred Flowers Policy in 1956, the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957, and the Great 
Leap Forward in 1958 because it pervasively and forcefully engulfed the whole 
nation and paralysed the superstructure of the Communist Party as well as the 
education system and the realms of literature and art. The aim of the Cultural 
Revolution was to change the political ideology of the Chinese people so that they 
would follow Mao’s version of socialist transformation. In this atmosphere, the 
Chinese film industry was one of the hardest hit institutions because cinema held an 
important role in entertainment and educational systems at that time in Chinese 
society (Clark 1987, 72-81). The Cultural Revolution destroyed the Chinese film 
industry’s productivity and creativity. 
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 This chapter consists of two sections. The first section provides a historical 
background in order to examine how the Cultural Revolution began, the political 
triggers, the cultural fuse and the major targets of the Cultural Revolution. The second 
section examines the setbacks to the Chinese film industry during the Cultural 
Revolution; in particular, it examines the damage to film studios, the fate of the film 
arts community, film productivity and creativity nationally and internationally, in 
order to show how these aspects directly and indirectly affected the cinematic realism 
of Chinese cinema. 
 
Historical Background 
When Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the People’s Republic 
of China was in quite a vulnerable and isolated situation. Nationally, China had 
recovered from the economic disaster of the Great Leap Forward not long before. 
Internationally, the Vietnam War was still going on south of China; there was 
intermittent fighting between China and Taiwan in the east; and there were disputes 
with the Soviet Union in the north. Furthermore, China was not even an official 
member of the United Nations. In addition to these national and international 
circumstances, many Chinese Politburo Standing Committee Members such as Liu 
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping as well as most of the Chinese Military Marshals did not 
support Mao in launching the Cultural Revolution. Mao, in order to achieve his goal, 
acted in an incendiary role in the Cultural Revolution and first started to attack 
intellectuals in the realm of literature and art as he had done during the Rectification 
Campaign (͈+μÓΛ®) of 1942 and the Hundred Flowers Campaign (4ĲȿË
ξ]) of 1956, with the help of his wife Jiang Qing, Defence Minister Marshal Lin 
Biao (ǍI), Premier Zhou Enlai and other Mao enthusiasts. 
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Overview 
Chinese youth who first responded to Mao’s appeal for the Cultural Revolution 
formed different groups of ‘Red Guards’ (ħ˸N) around the country in 1966. These 
Red Guards were student activists in schools and at universities. The different groups 
not only fought each other but also attacked the leaders and the Party administrations 
of schools or universities accusing them of carrying out bourgeois and revisionist 
pedagogy. When the Chinese Communist Party Politburo in May 1966 issued the 
‘May 16 Notification’, Mao’s ideological justification for the Cultural Revolution, the 
Red Guards obtained an official confirmation that student activists could attack 
anyone they thought was hostile to the Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar and 
Schoenhals 2006, 39). Subsequently, the Party Central Committee in August 1966 
passed its ‘Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ which 
defined the Cultural Revolution as a great revolution that touched people to their souls 
and constituted a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in the nation 
of China (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 92). This ‘Decision’ gave the Red 
Guards authority to crush the so-called reactionary bourgeois academic authorities, 
repudiate the prevailing bourgeois ideology in the realm of literature and art, and 
transform the existing revisionist educational system. As a result of this ‘Decision’, 
the first ‘big-character’ poster (Figure 1) appeared on the wall of the main university 
canteen at Beijing University on 25 May 1966 accusing the University President, Lu 
Ping (ǝȸ), and other university officials of doing nothing at the beginning of the 
Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 56). This ‘big-character’ 





Figure 1:  The first ‘Big-Character Poster’ at Beijing University. It was written by Nie Yuanzi  (țΑ
Ђ), Secretary of the Party branch of the Philosophy Faculty with other rebels to attack the University 
President Lu Ping (ǝȸ) and other University officials. 
(http://tupian.baike.com/a3_60_11_01300000342990125759116255452_jpg.html) 
 
 Mao, on hearing Beijing University officials wanted to tear down this ‘big-
character’ poster on the instructions of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping to limit 
rebellious activities, stated that he wished it to remain (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 
2006, 54-58). Subsequently, Mao constructed a ‘Big-character Poster’ (Figure 2) 
entitled ‘My big-character poster: Bombard the Headquarters’ (ȫʰǒV˼
͢άϠ>) on 5 August 1966; then on 7 August 1966, it was published in the 
People’s Daily (ɤǾɦ> ), the official Chinese Communist Party newspaper 
(MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 89). Mao wrote that, despite having undergone a 
Communist revolution, China’s political hierarchy was still dominated by bourgeoisie 
elitist elements, capitalists, and revisionists, and that these counter-revolutionary 
elements were indeed still present at the top ranks of the party leadership itself. This 
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was, in effect, an open call-to-arms against Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and their 
allies. This activity of writing big-character posters spread quickly to people from all 
walks of life. The fanatical workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals, radical cadres 
and rebellious film crews quickly imitated this activity and put ‘big character’ posters 
up everywhere possible to attack and transform the authorities in every part of the 
superstructure of every organisation such as the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Propaganda. Consequently, all 
revolutionary rebels obtained four great rights: to speak out freely (Ȁ), to state 
their views openly (Ë), to write big-character posters liberally (Ϡ>), and to 
hold great debates overtly (Hǡ). 
 Mao’s ‘Big-character Poster’, published in The People’s Daily, motivated and 
mobilised the Red Guards to rally across the nation (Wang 1988, 54-55). Mao not 
only encouraged all Red Guards to travel to see him in Beijing, but also met millions 
of them eight times, ending on 18 August 1966, at Tiananmen Square in company 
with Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai to express his gratitude for exposing Liu Shaoqi and 
Deng Xiaoping (MacFarquhar and Schoehals 2006, 107; Terrill 1995, 324). The Red 
Guards, on the one hand, violently exposed so-called revisionists or ‘capitalist 
roaders’ such as Liu and Deng; on the other hand, they destroyed works of art and 
historical relics, denounced intellectuals, burned books, and attacked those they 
considered elitists, revisionists or anti-Maoists. Through these fights and struggles of 
the Red Guards against old customs, old habits, old cultures, and old thoughts, Mao 
re-established the supremacy of his authority, his revolutionary line and his work 





Figure 2: Mao’s ‘Big-character Poster’ in his own handwriting. 
(Stills from http://www.letv.com/ptv/vplay/322940.html) 
 
 The Red Guards physically attacked school and university officials and took 
their fight into city factories, rural villages and defence establishments by accusing 
most leadership personnel of all kinds of baseless crimes. Millions of people were 
persecuted in the violent factional struggles around China, and suffered a wide range 
of abuses including public humiliation, arbitrary imprisonment, severe torture, 
unbearable harassment, and even seizure of their property. A large segment of the 
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population was forcibly displaced. Even Liu Shaoqi, who was the second in charge of 
the Communist Party and the President of China, was fatally attacked in October 1968 
as a revisionist and a Chinese Khrushchev without his family knowing (MacFarquhar 
and Schoenhals 2006, 273). 
 When the Red Guards rallied across China singing revolutionary songs, 
shouting revolutionary slogans, loudly beating drums against their perceived enemies, 
all they needed in order to have free rides on trains and buses, was to carry ‘A Little 
Red Book’ (Figure 3) — quotations from Chairman Mao (ǭϔ̋Ίǜ); compiled by 
Lin Biao it contained selected extracts from the writings of Mao. ‘A Little Red Book’ 
was almost equivalent to a passport for all the Red Guards as it enabled them to live 
and eat in Beijing. Mao’s personality cult grew to immense proportions during the 
Cultural Revolution. Consequently, all schools and universities were shut down 
 
 
Figure 3: Various editions of ‘The Little Red Book’ compiled by Lin Biao (ǍI) containing selected 
quotations from Mao’s works. Almost every Chinese person had one during the Cultural Revolution. 
(Accessed on 31 May 2013 from http://www.morningsun.org/images/index.html#) 
 
for three consecutive years from 1967 to 1969. In 1969, the Cultural Revolution 
subsided and the Red Guards were mostly disbanded, as Mao feared they were still 
causing chaos that might harm the very foundation of the Communist Party of China. 
In any case, the purpose of the Cultural Revolution had been largely fulfilled, and 
Mao had completely consolidated his political power. Subsequently, Mao also ordered 
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the Red Guards, urban young intellectuals, to be moved from cities to the countryside, 
where they would cause less political and social disruption.  
 Besides the involvement of the Red Guards, millions of factory workers were 
also dragged into the Cultural Revolution in many cities such as Shanghai, Beijing 
and Wuhan. Some factory workers formed rebel factions (ΡÅȤ) and others formed 
scarlet factions (v˸µ), the former supporting the Cultural Revolution and the latter 
fighting against the Cultural Revolution (Hsü 1975, 839). They fought each other for 
a considerable time and many factories had to halt production. Eventually, the rebel 
factions took control of the factories in cities around China. The Shanghai Rebel 
Faction not only removed the Shanghai Mayor, Chen Pixian (lϭ̗), and his deputy, 
Cao Diqiu ([ɔ), but also seized power from the Shanghai municipal government. 
The leader of the Shanghai Rebel Faction, Wang Hongwen (˪Ĥ˹), eventually took 
control of the Shanghai city municipal government when a rebel faction fight, the so-
called ‘January Storm’ took place in Shanghai; he was even promoted eventually to 
become second in charge in the Chinese Communist Party and Mao’s successor after 
Lin Biao died following the failure of an assassination attempt on Mao (MacFarquhar 
and Schoenhals 2006, 155). In Beijing city, the mayor, Peng Zhen (ȯγ), was 
removed and the Beijing Communist Party Committee effectively ceased to function; 
this caused great chaos in the capital city (Hsü 1975, 845). In Wuhan city, Chen 
Zaidao (lΞ ), a general in charge of Hubei province, was also removed 
(MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 199). These phenomena were repeated in many 
cities around China. 
 In comparison with the cities, Chinese peasants did not form any large social 
and political groups and their lives were relatively quiet; however they did rebel 
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against the families that used to own more land before the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949; the members of these families were labelled  ‘Landlords’  
(ϔ) or ‘Rich-peasants’ (âȞ). They were publicly humiliated by being forced to 
wear ‘big character’ slogans on billboards around their necks or on paper hats on their 
heads; they were also dragged into every ‘Class Struggle Conference of Recalling 
Past Sufferings and Thinking Present Happiness’ (Ůŏ¯λͮƥʮ˖Ń) where 
they were made to criticise themselves for how they used to exploit poor peasants. 
Sometimes they were denounced in street parades or sometimes, even worse, they 
were beaten severely at the Class Struggle Conferences. So they suffered just like 
many intellectuals and the ridiculed Party cadres in the cities. 
 In the military, there were no rebellions during the Cultural Revolution 
because the People’s Liberation Army of China was under the control of the Defence 
Minister, Marshal Lin Biao. Even under the experienced leadership of Lin, however, 
the Army was still controlled by Mao. For this reason, the Army was the only 
organisation able to maintain the safety and stability of most sectors of China. As a 
result of this, in 1969 at the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Lin was 
endorsed as the Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and Mao’s 
successor, the second in charge in China. However, Lin accused He Long (ĠǗ), a 
Marshal and Vice Premier, and Chen Yi (lͭ), a Marshal and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, of not participating in the Cultural Revolution (Wang 2009, 371). 
 There was intra-Party opposition to the Cultural Revolution right from the 
beiginning. Neither Liu Shaoqi nor Deng Xiaoping, the Party General Secretary, 
wanted to support Mao’s position, unlike Premier Zhou Enlai who had kept Mao 
informed of everything at all times. So, on the one side was the Mao-Lin Biao group, 
supported by the PLA; on the other side was a faction led by Liu and Deng, whose 
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strength resided in the regular Party machine. When the Cultural Revolution began in 
February 1966, Liu Shaoqi was still on a diplomatic mission visiting foreign countries 
and consequently, after returning to China, he did not intuitively see through Mao’s 
plot for ‘great disorder under heaven’. Premier Zhou Enlai tried to reconcile the two 
factions, but failed. 
 Mao’s decision to launch the Cultural Revolution in 1966 was not something 
ephemeral and impulsive despite no one challenging his position as the Chairman of 
the Chinese Communist Party. He had social and political frustrations in relation to 
the development of socialist construction and nation building as well as feelings of 
dissatisfaction regarding literature and art circles and, in addition, his personal life. 
These frustrations and dissatisfactions were elements of the political triggers, cultural 
fuse and personal targets leading to the Cultural Revolution. 
 
Political triggers 
There were three political triggers leading to the development of the Cultural 
Revolution. The first trigger was in regard to Mao’s political status, occurring at the 
8th Party National Congress in 1956 which virtually weakened the supreme position of 
Mao. This Congress adopted decisions to recognise the Party structure and reduce the 
practices of the Mao cult in a similar way to the denunciation of the personality cult of 
Stalin by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev at the Soviet Party Congress earlier the 
same year (Hsü 1975: 830). In other words, Mao’s previous position as the guide of 
the Chinese Communist Party as described in its 1945 constitution was replaced by a 
collective leadership in the 1956 version.  
 The second political trigger concerned Mao’s economic development policies. 
In 1957 Mao promoted the economic development policies of the Great Leap 
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Forward and the People’s Communes based on his idealistic political aspirations 
rather than on the reality of the then existing level of industrial and agricultural 
productivity. Not only did his policies impede the development of the Chinese 
economy but they also caused a great famine in China in 1959 (Clark 1987, 79-82; 
Hsü 1975, 833). When Peng Dehuai (ȯķ), a Marshal of the People’s Liberation 
Army and Defence Minister, travelled the countryside and witnessed the starvation of 
the peasants, he wrote a letter to Mao advising him of the dishonest reporting of 
agricultural output figures under the policies of the Great Leap Forward and the 
People’s Communes in 1959 (Hsü 1975, 833). Mao was silent. All the senior 
members of the Central Committee of the Party such as Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu 
De and Chen Yun (lΚ) as well as the General Secretary Deng Xiaoping sat on the 
fence and would not criticise Mao’s economic development policies. 
 Furthermore, a ‘Letter of Opinion’ to Mao written by the foolhardy Peng was 
circulated at the Lushan Conference of the Central Committee in August 1959; in his 
letter he vehemently argued that Mao’s approach to, and leadership of, the socialist 
transformation had been hasty and excessive (Hsü 1975, 830; Karnow 1972, 117). 
Consequently, Mao mistakenly thought Peng had the support of the Soviet 
Communist Party leader, Nikita Khrushchev, whom he had met in Tirana, Albania 
when touring in Eastern Europe, because, after Peng had returned to Beijing from his 
trip a week late, the Soviet Union terminated a nuclear agreement with China signed 
two years earlier (Hsü 1975, 832). 
 As a result of this political struggle between Mao and Peng, Mao lost the 
battle but won the war. Mao had to accept responsibility for the initial poor showing 
of the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Communes and placated all the members 
of the Politburo Standing Committee except for Peng, by reluctantly saying: 
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Everybody has shortcomings. Even Confucius made mistakes. So did Marx. 
He thought that the revolution would take place in Europe during his lifetime. 
I have seen Lenin’s manuscripts, which are filled with changes. He, too, made 
mistakes (Karnow 1972, 116). 
 
At the end of the Lushan Conference, Peng was dismissed as Minister of Defence and 
member of the Politburo. Peng apparently had counted on the support of Liu Shaoqi 
and Deng Xiaoping but when neither sustained him, his cause was lost. This was the 
second political trigger for the Cultural Revolution in relation to Mao’s economic 
policy. 
 The last political trigger concerned Mao’s foresight that the Sino-Soviet split 
would increase tension and divisiveness within the Chinese leadership. Mao did not 
like the Soviet model of socialism especially after Nikita Khrushchev withdrew all aid 
to China and demonised Joseph Stalin. Subsequently, Mao named the Soviet 
Communist system revisionist. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, 
were in favour of the Soviet style of five–year plans for socialist construction and 
nation building. Indeed, as the Chinese economy began to recover under the impetus 
of new policies introduced by Liu and Deng, the status of Liu also climbed higher. 
Mao was worried that Liu and Deng had created a new Mandarin class similar to the 
Soviet Communist Party’s apparatchiks (Hsü 1975, 830). This new Mandarin class 
comprised the intellectuals, special individuals such as artists, writers, actors, 
academics, and Party functionaries who had long performed services for the Party and 
the nation. In addition to being protected by Liu and Deng, this Mandarin class sought 
material incentives, wage privileges and other benefits. Mao saw in them a tendency 






In addition to these three political triggers, there was a cultural fuse, involving a 
historical play, which ignited the Cultural Revolution. It was Hai Rui Dismissed from 
Office (Ĕɬ2Ą), written by Wu Han (˿Ѓ), the Deputy Mayor of Beijing, a 
leading historian and former professor at Tsinghua University in 1961. The subject of 
this play was a minister, Hai Rui, in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) who had been 
dismissed for consistently telling the truth. Mao initially approved of this play, but 
subsequently he came to see the innuendo condemning him for dismissing Marshal 
Peng Dehui in 1959. Although Wu Han did not intend Hai Rui to represent Peng 
Dehui, the allegory was very clear — it criticised Mao’s dismissal of Peng. Jiang 
Qing and her coterie had always argued that this play about the dismissal of a 
forthright Ming dynasty official for telling the truth was in fact an attack on Mao in 
the camouflage of a historical event (Mazur 2009, 410). On the eve of the Cultural 
Revolution, Jiang Qing stopped the performance of this play after Mao himself had 
retrospectively condemned it. Mao could not launch a counterattack through the Party 
channels on the play in Beijing, which was why Mao had to secretly dispatch Jiang 
Qing to Shanghai to seek help (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 15). 
  After reading many drafts of a critical ‘Comment on the Newly Composed 
Historical Play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office’ (ȹ̱FƷʒƐĔɬ2Ą ) by 
Yao Wenyuan (͛˹Α ) which was subsequently published in the Shanghai 
Wenhuibao (˹ń>) newspaper on 10 November 1965, Mao was ready to launch the 
Cultural Revolution in order to attack Liu Shaoqi ((Hsü 1975, 840). When Premier 
Zhou Enlai learned on 26 November 1965 of Mao’s role in the writing of this critique, 
he immediately telephoned Peng Zhen, mayor of Beijing and a member of the Party 
Central Committee Secretariat, asking him to publish this critique in Beijing 
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(MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 18). Jiang Qing was successful in achieving the 
publication of this article as Shanghai was familiar territory to her; she had lived there 
as an actress and teacher and was acquainted with many of the cultural and social 
elites in the 1930s (Zhao 1995, 83-84). 
 Mao also felt that few literary and art works were being produced reflecting 
the socialist transformation. Many, in contrast, regressed to old thoughts, old habits, 
old customs and old cultures. He was further displeased that the magazine Frontier 
published more than sixty articles, directly and indirectly criticising Mao and his 
policies by using historical allusions, allegories and analogies co-written by Wu Han 
and others in the Beijing Party leadership. These activities must have further 
frustrated Mao, leading him to demand a revolution in literature and art, and the 
education sector. It was an area in which he had expressed strong views over twenty 
years before at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art in 1942 (Mao 1967, 69). 
 
Major Targets 
The Cultural Revolution was Mao’s last revolution. This last revolution became a 
catastrophic political movement for three main reasons: the first was the internal 
power struggle in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; the second 
was Mao’s injudicious personal vengeance; the third was his unhappy marriage with 
Jiang Qing and the death of his son Mao Anying (ǭ,ͷ). The first and second 
reasons are well known but the third reason has been for the most part overlooked. 
 Power struggles, as in all political organisations around the world, had always 
existed in the Chinese Communist Party since it was founded in 1921. In the official 
history of the Chinese Communist Party, there were ten major Party leadership 
struggles (ʌǛ̜¯λ). However, from the time that Mao Zedong had taken 
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charge of the Party before China’s Liberation, no one had successfully and overtly 
challenged him until Peng Dehuai came into conflict with him in 1959. Mao after all 
was not only one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party but also the most 
important founding leader of the People’s Republic of China after the defeat of the 
former Nationalist Party government in 1949. Mao had an immense knowledge of 
Chinese history, philosophy and literature, but lacked the wisdom of economics, 
foreign cultures and a philosophical understanding of the primacy of the real world 
over ideas (Hsü 1975, 829-832). Under his leadership, China underwent many 
successful and massive economic reforms and political movements in the first decade 
of the People’s Republic of China. Mao understood the Chinese classical and 
philosophical motto — ‘it is much more difficult to consolidate political power than 
to seize it’ (úĂξɚ͜B¹ɘξɚöȒ). Hence he persistently kept up the 
momentum of revolutions till his death. When he implemented the economic 
development policies of the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Communes based 
on his idealistic and political aspirations rather than on the reality of the existing level 
of industrial and agricultural productivity, not only did his policies impede the 
development of the Chinese economy but they also caused a great famine in China. 
He was not an economist nor an agriculturist and no one in the Chinese Communist 
Party dared to point out that his economic development policies were neither suitable 
nor applicable to China. That is why Mao, taking responsibility, told his Party 
comrades: ‘The trouble I have brought on is a great one, and I hold myself responsible 
for it. Comrades, you should also analyse your own responsibilities, and you will feel 
better after you have broken wind and emptied your bowels’ (Solomon 1971, 395). 
 Mao would not forgive Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping for not showing loyalty 
to him at the Lushan Conference. Although they did not oppose Mao they made Mao 
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apologise for the failure of his policies. After the Lushan Conference, Mao became 
rather reclusive while Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping felt confident enough to speak 
out on important political and economic development policies. They also were 





Figure 4: It is believed that this is the last photo of Mao Zedong  (ǭΤ¬) and Liu Xiaoqi  (ǔɺȽ) 
taken together on 19 September 1966, at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Soon after this Liu 
Xiaoqi, until 1966 considered as Mao’s successor, became a victim of the Cultural Revolution. 
(Accessed on 31 May 2013 from http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_3d25c7410101kezv.html) 
 
 The third target involved Mao’s personal life. Mao had multiple marriages and 
his marriage with Jiang Qing was not a particularly happy one. When Mao wanted to 
marry Jiang Qing, he was told by the Party that there would be many restrictions on 
her participation in Party political activities because she was quite a well-known 
actress who already had had several infamous marriages and a troubled life in 
 48 
Shanghai (Wong 1985, 386). After China’s Liberation, Jiang Qing was not well 
enough to accompany Mao at all times and in fact had to go to Russia for cancer 
treatment for a considerable period. Mao lived alone adjacent to Liu Shaoqi who lived 
with his well-educated, English-speaking wife, Wang Guangmei (˪ĉǳ) in elegant 
quarters in Zhongnanhai. Mao was jealous of Liu’s harmonious marriage (Li 1994).  
Being the president of China Liu was a man of immense stature in the eyes of the 
Chinese people and was, in fact, viewed as almost equal to Mao in the Party (Terrill 
1995, 326). Another two familiar incidents might further verify the discontent in 
Mao’s  marriage with Jiang Qing: one was that Jiang moved out of Zhongnanhai, the 
headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party and  home to many top officials, to live 
by herself in Diaoyutai (outside of Zhongnanhai in Beijing) at the beginning of the 
Cultural Revolution; the other was that Jiang Qing was not content to be a housewife 
as she had been in Yan’an before she had a daughter Li Na (Ʊϯ); and, after the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Jiang lived quite a different life style 
from Mao (Xu and Li  2010). 
 More recently, according to Mao’s personal bodyguard, Li Yinqiao (Ʊ͵ɉ) 
and his wife, Han Guixin (ĕČϳ), in their oral account, Mao Zedong was very upset 
by the death of his elder son Mao Anying at the headquarters of the volunteer troops 
of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in North Korea. Mao, on receiving word from the 
Soviet Union that the American Air Force would bomb the headquarters, had 
instructed the commander of Chinese forces in Korea, Peng Dehuai, to shift his 
headquarters immediately; Peng failed to do so. When Mao later learned that the 
headquarters had been bombarded, he angrily muttered: ‘This Peng Dehuai… I sent a 
telegram to get him to shift the headquarters’ (Di 2008, 501). The knowledge of this 
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event has enlightened many Chinese people as to why Peng Dehuai was removed 
from his position in the military and the Party. 
 These political triggers, the cultural fuse and personal targets became more 
apparent after Lin Biao died in an aircraft crash in Outer Mongolia on 12 September 
1971 when escaping after a failed attempt to assassinate Mao. Many Westerners 
confirmed that Chairman Mao was responsible for initiating the Cultural Revolution 
and Premier Zhou Enlai was responsible for its implementation. Furthermore, some 
Western commentators also asserted that ‘1972 belongs to Zhou Enlai rather than 
Jiang Qing’s radicals’ due to the condemnation of Lin Biao as a leftist by Zhou 
(Ladany 1988, 355). Wang Li (2001, 992), a Communist Party member and a Cultural 
Revolution historian, writes: 
Today’s historians have become partial and fail to respect history. Mao 
Zedong is given all the blame for striking people down, while Premier Zhou is 
given all the credit for protecting people. This does not accord with the facts. 
As far as I know, all the decisions to protect people were taken by Mao 
Zedong and executed by Zhou Enlai. Had Mao Zedong not taken the decision, 
Zhou Enlai would not have dared, but not have been able to act either, since he 
was not in a position to decide what was to be done about important cadres. 
One cannot separate Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai — make one into a bad guy, 
the other into a good guy; make one into a muddle-headed person, the other 
into someone with a clear mind; and say that one is wrong while the other is 
right.  
 
What were the achievements of the Cultural Revolution and what price was 
paid to achieve them? Ultimately, Mao reclaimed his supremacy in the Chinese 
Communist Party and revitalised the revolutionary momentum through political 
awareness and the class struggle for socialist transformation. The turmoils of the 
Cultural Revolution impinged severely on the educational area and the realm of 
literature and art as its name implied. As MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 460) 
point out: ‘The Cultural Revolution became the economic and social watershed of 
modern Chinese history’. 
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Chinese Film Industry 
During the first four years of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese film industry could 
not produce any films. The damage to the infrastructure of film studios, the film arts 
community, film productivity and creativity was severe. In addition, distinguished 
world-class filmmakers such as Joris Ivens and Michelangelo Antonioni were 
offended by Jiang Qing’s criticism of their films during their invited trip to China 
during the Cultural Revolution. Paul Clark (1987, 87), explaining the adverse realities 
in the film industry, notes that ‘the Cultural Revolution brought more destruction than 
Wu Xun, Anti-Rightist, and Great Leap episodes combined’. This section analyses 
many works of Chinese film scholars such as Paul Clark, Chris Berry, Rey Chow, 
George Semse, and in particular many mainland Chinese film scholars such as Dai 
Jiafang, Di Jiannong and Zhang Wei, in order to present an understanding of the 
impacts on the Chinese film industry during the Cultural Revolution. 
 
Damage to the Industry 
The film industry sustained significant damage at the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution in February 1966 when Jiang Qing colluded with Lin Biao to convene a 
symposium for military literary and artistic workers in Shanghai (Zhang 2006, 236). 
At the end of this symposium, Jiang asked four military personnel to produce a 
summary of the symposium panel discussions. This summary was called ‘Huiyi Jiyao’ 
in Chinese (ŃͱŘ͜ ). It was sent to Mao who revised it three times. By 19 
March, Mao agreed to send the revised summary of the symposium to Lin Biao via 
Jiang Qing (The History Research Office of CPCCC n.d.). When Lin received it he 
asked the Party Central Committee on behalf of the Central Military Commission to 
approve it. On receiving the approval, he changed its name to ‘The Summary of a 
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symposium for the military literary and artistic workers entrusted to Comrade Jiang 
Qing by Comrade Lin Biao’ (ǍI˛φ˵˥ŧɎ˛φΰƙVµ˹ͩ÷ϫϬˇ
ŃŘ͜ ), and then released it on 10 April (The History Research Office of the 
CPCCC n.d.). This Summary not only denied the achievements of the film industry in 
the entire previous seventeen years from 1949 to 1965, but also confirmed that 
bourgeois thought and modern revisionist thinking on literature and the arts had 
governed the film industry during those years (Chen, Cui, Wang, and Hu 2006, 240). 
On reading the revised Summary, Jiang Qing brusquely denounced about 650 feature 
films produced in that period, calling them ‘poisonous weeds’ and criticised many 
left-wing and advanced films made in the 1930s. Furthermore, according to the 
research work of Chen, Cui, Wang, and Hu (2006, 240), this Summary directly and 
indirectly led to the abandonment of the Chinese film industry’s exchanges with 
foreign film organisations. 
 After this Summary was  broadcast in its entirety on 28 May 1967, Jiang Qing 
reviewed 68 out of 650 feature films related to military stories produced in the 
previous seventeen years and published an article called ‘Talk on the Issue of Movies’ 
(ă΅¤ͼ˺ˑˇĵ ), in which she pointed out that seven of the 650 films, 
Fighting South and North (ȑκ?Ω 1952), Plain Guerrillas (ȸΓ΂ňµ 1955), 
Grow up in the War (Ω¯ϊqd 1957), Seahawks (Ĕ͹ 1959), Shangganling (ɸç
Ǒ 1959), Mine Warfare (ƮΩ 1962) and  Tunnel Warfare (Ω 1966) were 
ideologically strong and all the remaining films had problems (Zhang 2006, 236-237). 
Thus, Jiang Qing avoided acknowledging the outstanding achievements of the film 
industry. The 643 remaining films were then labelled as having four kinds of different 
reactionary problems:  
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The first kind was anti-Party and anti-socialist poisonous weeds; the second 
kind was the dissemination of incorrect political lines to reverse verdicts of 
counter-revolutionary members; the third kind was defaming old army cadres 
with love and romance stories; and the fourth kind was the portrayal of the 
middle personal characters (Zhang 2006, 237; Yu 2006, 110). 
 
Moreover, according to Zhang Wei (2006, 237), a Chinese film scholar at the Beijing 
Film Academy, Jiang Qing especially criticised films such as Forced Recruitment (ϗ
ϛª 1963) and Unwind Trinidad (ȗÓɄƲ 1964) as well as the literary works of Qu 
Baiyin’s On the Issue of Film Innovation Monologue (ă΅¤ͼ{̱˺ˑ²
3 ) and Cheng Jihua’s History of Chinese Film (ϊĐ¤ͼÂΨʒ ) because 
these films and books were either disseminating the wrong political lines or anti-
socialism. As the Cultural Revolution proceeded, all the film studios around China 
were closed down. The studios were unable to produce any films from 1966 to 1969 
and no feature films from 1966 to 1972 (Gong 2006, 177). Moreover, a large number 
of precious art works, historical relics and cultural materials, filmic art props, 
theatrical costumes and film equipment were destroyed (Gong 2006, 177). 
  The Chinese film industry was not only damaged nationally but also 
internationally. During the whole period of the Cultural Revolution, not a single film 
was sent to any international film festival because the artistic quality and political 
content of the films were unsuitable for such events. However, in order to show the 
great results of the Cultural Revolution and to continue to spread the Communist 
spirit around the world, Jiang Qing invited US President Richard Nixon to a model 
ballet, The Red Detachment of Women, at the Great Hall of the People when he was 
visiting China after the opening up of Sino-American relations in 1972 (Witke 1977, 
336). Because President Nixon enjoyed the Chinese ballet, Jiang Qing then decided to 
invite two distinguished world-class filmmakers, Joris Ivens and Michelangelo 
Antonioni, to visit China to make films about China. While both directors took a 
 53 
considerable amount of documentary footage about the Cultural Revolution, their 




Figure 5: Richard Nixon, President of the United States, and wife Pat Nixon were invited by Jiang 
Qing to watch her Model Ballet The Red Detachment of Women at the Great Hall of People on 22 
February 1972 during the Nixon’s visit to China. (R-L: Pat Nixon, Jiang Qing, Richard Nixon and 
Zhou Enlai. Aceessed on 31 May 2013 from http://phtv.ifeng.com/album/private/detail_2012_02/09/ 
12399399_5.shtml#p=3) 
 
 Ivens, an influential and prolific documentary filmmaker, was a devout 
Communist. He had been supporting the Chinese Communist Party since the late 
1930s and had visited China on numerous occasions (Schoots 2000). On his first visit 
to China in 1935, Ivens was brave enough, despite the danger, to smuggle an 
expensive film camera and other film equipment into the Chinese Communist Party 
revolutionary base, Yan’an. Due to this bold feat, some facts about the life of Mao 
and his Red Army in Yan’an were captured on film and subsequently shown abroad. 
His 1939 documentary The 400 Million also reflected the past of China. In Ivens’ own 
words: ‘A fifth of the world population defends their liberty, their wonderful culture’ 
(Böker 1981, 51). 
 On his last visit to China, from 1972 to 1977, Ivens filmed How Yugong 
Moved the Mountain, a 763-minute documentary about the Cultural Revolution. His 
 54 
last fiction film, A Tale of Wind (Une Histoire de vent 1988), inspired by How Yugong 
Moved the Mountain, was set in China’s Gobi Desert. It is about a film crew headed 
by a veteran director who travels through the desert. While the crew waits for the 
wind to pick up, weather reports tell of storms everywhere but in China. The director 
is hospitalised after a fall from his chair and dreams he is part of the Méliès Film, A 
Trip to the Moon (1902). Unfortunately, neither the documentary nor the fiction film 
has ever been shown in China. 
 Apart from discussing the aesthetics of Ivens’ documentaries, Chinese 
officials mostly argued about the ideological content of his film work, in particular his 
representation of Chinese society. His documentary films were understood differently, 
depending on the political or ideological position of the scholars and critics. The 
content was well received by the Chinese government of the time. 
 Antonioni was invited to visit China in 1972 during the middle period of the 
Cultural Revolution. A self-described Marxist intellectual, Antonioni was so 
revolutionary that he was invited by the Chinese government to make a film about the 
new China. Consequently, he went to many places in China, including Beijing and 
Shanghai and their vicinity, to shoot thirty thousand metres of film in twenty-two days 
(Chatman 1985, 170). The result was a feature-length exploratory documentary film 
called Chung Kuo, Cina in Italian. This documentary film concerned the Chinese 
Communist Party because it shows a boatman urinating in the Huang Pu River in 
Shanghai. Hence, after Antonioni released his 217-minute documentary film, he was 
no longer welcome in China. The film was screened in many countries in the world 
but not in China until its screening at the Beijing Film Academy in 2002. As Chatman 
(1985, 175) notes: 
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On 18 November 1980, the Chinese publicly apologized to Antonioni on the 
occasion of the beginning of an Italian film on Marco Polo. Antonioni was 
satisfied, and there was talk of his making another film about China.  
 
The Chinese officials argued at the time that Michelangelo Antonioni had not filmed 
the positive aspects of China, which was what the Chinese government wanted, 
instead capturing undesirable and negative aspects of China and Chinese people. 
Antonioni did not wish to make a propaganda film for the Communist regime. He set 
out to make a film mainly about Chinese people, so he used close-ups to portray with 
realistic gusto the faces of ordinary Chinese people — round eyes, long and bony 
noses, faded faces, thick hair, extravagant gestures and awkward-looking clothes. 
Because of these portrayals, Jiang Qing disliked him and accused him of being anti-
Chinese as well as counter-revolutionary. 
 The intent of the invitation to Ivens and Antonioni had been to encourage 
them to embellish the Cultural Revolution and spread information about it around the 
world through their lenses. However, the objective of promoting the Cultural 
Revolution to the world was not successful as far as the Communist Party was 
concerned and hence the documentaries were never shown in China at that time. Even 
when Antonioni’s Chung Kuo was shown later in Beijing after the Cultural 
Revolution, it was purely for academic purposes and not for the entertainment of 
ordinary Chinese people (Wikipedia, 15 March 2013). What these visits by Western 
filmmakers demonstrated was the failure of the Communist regime as well as Jiang 
Qing, to understand the Western mentality in regard to the Cultural Revolution; these 
visits also highlighted the extent to which the Chinese film industry was isolated from 
the world at that time. 
 The shutdown of all the film studios in China lasted for four consecutive years 
from 1966 to 1969. Chinese cinema had to rely on a limited number of selected old 
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Chinese and several imported foreign films. The old Chinese films were Fighting 
North and South  (1952), Mine Warfare (1962) and Tunnel Warfare (1966) called by 
the Chinese ‘san zhan pian’ (ɯΩȴ) meaning three war feature films, which were 
screened repeatedly. The imported foreign films were the Russian films Lenin in 
October and Lenin in 1918; the Albanian film Rather Die Than Surrender; the North 
Korean film The Girl Who Sells Flowers and the Indian film The Vagabond. 
Remarkably, The Girl Who Sells Flowers had a huge impact on many Chinese 
audiences who watched it (Liu 2002). They wept from beginning to end because of 
the tragic life of the main protagonist, a pretty girl in her early twenties, who was 
exploited by a feudal and brutal landlord to the point that she became blind. This film 
was like a mirror of China in the past, epitomising the life of most people before 
China’s Liberation. That was probably why so many Chinese audiences empathised 
with the main protagonist. The Communist Party and Chairman Mao wanted the 
Chinese people to realise that their lives were better than before Liberation in 1949 — 
at least no ordinary people would suffer like the girl who was selling flowers in the 
film. 
 The Chinese film industry had been through many political and administrative 
reforms since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The 
Communist government firstly established the China Film Corporation for film 
distribution and exhibition in February 1951 (Zhang 2004, 191) and had nationalised 
the entire film industry by January 1952 (Zhang 2004, 190). In addition, the 
Communist regime fully funded the film industry, which consisted of four major film 
studios — Changchun, Beijing, August the First and Shanghai — until after the 
Cultural Revolution. Not only did the film industry go through these fundamental 
changes but it also sustained enormous political interference, which left it devastated 
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by the end of the Cultural Revolution. Comparatively, there was less political stress 
and more creative production during the pre- and post-Cultural Revolution periods. 
However, the film industry has never had political and financial autonomy and 
therefore Chinese cinema has always perpetuated visual clichés that only show the 
positive aspects of Maoism and the Chinese Communist Party. 
 
The Film Arts Community 
As soon as the Cultural Revolution started, the political battles and personal 
encounters in the film arts community immediately followed because most of the film 
directors, actors, cinematographers and other film crews had been involved in film 
production during the previous seventeen years. Jiang Qing and her film critics 
claimed these films had reactionary content and categorised them into the four kinds 
of political problems as noted above. Jiang Qing knew this community extremely 
well, having been an actress herself and a member of the National Film Production 
Bureau. Therefore she also knew many members of the film arts community and 
many controversial details about film production. This is why so many filmmakers 
suffered during the Cultural Revolution. 
 For example, according to the research of three Mainland Chinese film 
scholars, Wang Yang (˩͖ 1984, 72), Su Yun (ʸΚ 1984, 44-45) and Jun Ying (Ɨ
ͷ 1984, 124-125), almost all film artists and technicians who worked at the Shanghai 
film studio experienced retribution. The majority of them were sent to reform camps 
nicknamed in Chinese ‘niu peng’ (ȝȰ) meaning ‘cowshed’. A few of them were 
imprisoned and sixteen of them were fatally attacked. At the Beijing film studio, more 
than three hundred people were, in one way or another, attacked and seven people 
were killed. Among these were some experienced artistic personnel and fine film 
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technical experts. At the Changchun film studio, about 95% of personnel including 
artistic, technical and managerial cadres were harshly criticised and violently 
assaulted; nearly three hundred people were sent to reform camps, more than five 
hundred film artists, technicians and administrators were transferred and sent to the 
countryside and about 55.2% of people were dismissed from the studio. The majority 
of film professional directors and actors were discharged from the August the First 
Studio, a military organisation, or transferred to different work; in addition, almost all 
of the studio leaders were branded as ‘capitalist roaders’, ‘traitors’, ‘spies’ or ‘anti-
revolutionary revisionists’ and they became the targets of ‘the proletarian 
revolutionary dictatorship’ (Wang 1984, 72). At the Xi’an film studio, 130 out of 400 
personnel in total were demonised as ‘revisionists’ or ‘ghosts and monsters’ in 
Chinese ‘niu gui she shen’ (ȝċɾʄ) literally meaning ‘cow-ghost-snake-evil’, then 
incarcerated; some were also physically attacked so badly that they were disabled. 
Similar events occurred in all the other small film studios in China. 
 Many tragic incidents happened in the film arts community during the Cultural 
Revolution; not only were many outstanding film directors and excellent film actors 
unable to work in their professions, but they were also attacked on the direct orders of 
Jiang Qing because they knew too many controversial details about her past. Some of 
the directors and actors were former colleagues or friends of Jiang Qing including a 
fine film director, actor and essayist, Zheng Junli (οƖƲ), and a famous and beloved 
actor, Zhao Dan. Both of them had been very close friends and former work 
colleagues of Jiang Qing in a Shanghai film company in the late 1930s. 
 Zheng, who had directed many notable films such as A Spring River Flows 
East (͢ŧ|ůʫ̥¬Ǖ 1947), Crow and Sparrow (˽ͅΉǥɞ 1949) Lin Zexu 
(ǍΣ̼ 1957) and Nie’er (ț¿ 1959), had won many accolades nationally and 
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internationally. He was fatally attacked in 1969 during the Cultural Revolution (Clark 
1987, 133; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 115-125). The reason for this incident, 
according to anecdotes, was that Jiang Qing demanded some letters back from Zheng 
she had written to him just before the Cultural Revolution (Zhao 2005, 214); one 
letter was about Jiang Qing wanting to know which foreign country her third husband 
Tang Na (ˋȎ) was living in at that time. However, Zheng could not present this 
letter to Jiang because he had lost it at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Jiang 
thought Zheng would make political trouble for her due to the contents of the letter. 
Hence Jiang ordered a search of Zheng’s entire apartment and then his incarceration 
when the Cultural Revolution commenced. 
 Zhao, a leading performer, was also incarcerated for five years during the 
Cultural Revolution because he knew too much about Jiang Qing despite the fact that 
he was one of twenty-two Chinese film stars given star status by the public in 1962 
(Zhao 2005, 211). He not only acted in the film Wu Xun (̀̓y 1951) which Mao 
harshly criticised and about which the People’s Daily newspaper published a critical 
article ‘Pay attention to the discussion of the film Wu Xun’(ͺόʝ¤ͼ̀̓y
ˎǡ ) in 1951, but also performed in many other excellent films such as Li 
Shizhen (Ʊʎβ 1956), Lin Zexu (1958) and Nie’er (1959). His performances were so 
artistically charming, passionately striking and psychologically attractive that he 
received the title of ‘Performing Artist’ (J͌ͩʦŚ). Yet Jiang accused him of 
counter-revolution and anti-socialism (Zhao 2005, 19-22). 
 Many film directors and actors like Zheng and Zhao suffered during the 
Cultural Revolution. According to research undertaken by Zhao (2005) and Clark 







Figure 6: The twenty-two elected Mainland Chinese Film Stars in 1962. Most of them were, one way 




and many others suffered; and most of the twenty-two Chinese film stars named as 
outstanding in 1962 were attacked in some way during the Cultural Revolution 
including Bai Yang (3͔), Yu Yang (΅͖), Wang Xiaotang (˪̩ˊ). Many more 
could not bear the humiliation and committed suicide: for instance, Shangguan 
Yunzhu (ɸĄΚϑ) and Shu Xiuwen (ʢ̻˹). Some were sent to the reform camps 
because the content of the films they appeared in or directed was branded as 
representing ‘feudal, bourgeois and revisionist’ ideas, rather than representing new 
Chinese socialist construction and development (Zhao 2005; Clark 1987). 
 Besides the attacks on film directors and actors, the Beijing Film Academy, 
the only higher education film school in China, was closed down and students had to 
give up their studies. Jiang Qing and her political allies accused the Academy of being 
a revisionist institute and of not training students to develop a good understanding of 
films for more than ten years (Zheng and Gong 2006, 379). Consequently, all the 
lecturers were transferred, the film equipment disappeared and the academy was 
occupied by other organisations. 
 The fate of the film arts community, then, like other groups, encountered 
social and political attacks during the Cultural Revolution. In fact, film directors and 
actors, due to their fame, probably suffered more personal pressure and vicious 




The Cultural Revolution went through a ten-year long period and during those years 
the Chinese film industry suffered from the social and political upheaval; film studios 
were ransacked and all film crews were, one way or the other, sent to reform camps or 
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transferred to other locations. The film industry during the Cultural Revolution period 
yielded the lowest number of films produced in the history of film production in 
China. Ninety-three films in total were produced by about ten major film studios 
during a six-year period of the Cultural Revolution from 1970 to 1976 even though 
film industrial technology had developed during that time. Film production went 
through roughly three different stages. 
 The first stage was in the first four years of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 
to 1969, when the Chinese film industry produced no films apart from newsreel 
footage. This was a stage when the whole nation was engulfed in the intense factional 
struggles and widespread violence as discussed in the previous section. 
  The second stage was from 1970 to 1972. In this stage, the film industry 
produced nine films including seven Chinese opera films and two ballet films; two 
Chinese opera films were produced in 1970: The Red Lantern (ħŕ) and Taking 
Tiger Mountain by Strategy (ψɘ˯Įɵ); two films were made in 1971, the Chinese 
opera film Sha Jia Bang (ɳŚϺ) and the ballet film The Red Detachment of Women 
(ħɱȚϞƕ). Five films were produced in 1971: four were Chinese opera films — 
The Harbour (Ĕí), Long Jiang Song (Ǘŧʵ), The Red Detachment of Women and 
Raid the White-Tiger Regiment (Ƚŉ3Įˤ) — and the fifth was the ballet film The 
White-haired Girl (3ǭȡ). These two categories, Chinese opera and ballet films, 
were, strictly speaking, not proper motion pictures. Although similar to documentaries 
or newsreels, depicting Chinese opera and dance on stage, they were not truly like 
documentaries or newsreels because film directors and cinematographers manipulated 
the stage settings into more suitable scenes for filming in line with Jiang Qing’s idea 
of ‘filming the stage plays and making the stage plays like motion pictures’ (Dai 
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1995, 150). That is why these opera and ballet films were neither plays nor feature 
films but something in between. Jiang Qing wanted to make plays into films because 
first of all, she wanted to show the reformed Chinese opera and ballet to all Chinese 
people in film format, and because plays could be seen only in theatres in cities, and 
not in the countryside; and many well-equipped country projection facilities already 
existed in the mid 1960s as filming industrial technology had developed before the 
Cultural Revolution (Clark 1987, 124; Li, Li, and Zhang 2005, 121). Furthermore, 
film studios at that time had no film scripts and the ransacked film studios were just 
reopening to make films. Jiang Qing, as the person in control of literature and the arts, 
seized the opportunity to publicise her programs. 
 In the third stage from 1973 to 1976, eighty-five films were made in a four-
year period by the ten major studios in China. They included sixty-one feature films, 
six opera films, seventeen Chinese local opera films and a ballet film. Most of these 
films were produced by the four major film studios, namely Shanghai, Beijing, 
Changchun and August the First film studios. After seeing and liking Jiang Qing’s 
model opera film Long Jiang Song in July 1972, Mao subsequently invited the actress 
who performed the female protagonist, Li Bingshu (ƱPʣ), to dinner (Di 2004, 
144). Mao was interested in Li’s views about the status quo of literature and art. From 
Li’s responses Mao realised that few literature and art works were being produced 
that were appropriate to the needs of the Chinese people. Jiang Qing was enraged by 
Li’s revelations but was forced by Mao to allow feature films to be produced for the 
first time during the Cultural Revolution. The first feature film was Bright Sunny 
Skies made by the Changchun film studio in 1973. 
 Compared to the periods immediately before and after the Cultural 
Revolution, the productivity of the film industry was very low during the Cultural 
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Revolution. For example, the film industry produced 105 feature films in the year of 
1958 (Chen 1997, 6). Statistically speaking, the 93 films produced during the Cultural 
Revolution period spread among the ten major film studios indicates an average of 
less than one film per studio each year. 
 
Creativity 
During the Cultural Revolution the most serious problem among the major film 
studios in the Chinese film industry was film creativity. Film scriptwriters, directors 
and actors were extremely apprehensive about whether their scripts, works and 
performances adhered to Communist Party guidelines. As a result the artistic and 
aesthetic creativity of film was insipid, simple and ossified because producers did 
what they had been told to do. Chinese filmmakers at that time were only concerned 
about being in line with Communist Party principles; they thought little about 
aestheticism. Hence films at that time tended to lack any appealing propositions. They 
were all about how Mao and the Communist Party had taught the people to do this or 
that. 
 According to the Mainland Chinese film scholar Yang Yuanying (͔Ε͸
2006, 170): 
Firstly, as far as film creative properties in this period were concerned, films 
were neither art nor commodity but mouthpieces of class struggle; then, in 
terms of the norms of film art, the starting point of film creation was the 
political situation, productive strategy, requirement for leadership and moral 
precepts; and finally, the attitude of filmmakers to the creative status was that 
they did not want to achieve any good results artistically as much as they 
sought to be politically correct. 
 
In these kinds of political circumstances, most films produced held no attraction for 
audiences. Not one film had a trailer to show the dramatic or spectacular scenes, nor 
were there any film credits at the beginning or end. Instead these films incorporated 
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text quotations of Mao Zedong first rolling out with the soundtracks and 
announcements at the beginning of the films. This was a phenomenon of the Model 
Opera films and some feature films as well. 
 In addition, films produced during the Cultural Revolution were leftist and 
propaganda-filled entertainment tools. Jiang Qing’s model opera films and most 
feature films such as Bright Sunny Day (1973), Green Pine Range (ɎʴǑ 1973), 
Break Off (Ɠǋ 1975), Spring Seedling (1975) and Counter Attack (Åň 1976) were 
not as Rey Chow (1995, 22) defined ‘primitive’. According to Chow’s definition, a 
primitive film should not only depict traditional cultures and social events but also a 
sense of phantasmagorical exoticness. Most protagonists in these films were single 
with no wife or no husband, sometimes even with no children. What they did have 
was a belief that they had Mao and the Party behind them. There was never any sense, 
then, that they loved or had been loved. 
 With regard to the film treatment, not only is the protagonist always in the 
centre of mise-en-scène; he (and sometimes she) is also always portrayed in much 
more radiant colours than the antagonist. Wherever the protagonist goes, there is 
always an aura of triumph expressed through some victorious soundtrack in the 
background. In contrast, the antagonist is depicted in unflattering and gloomy colours 
and appears as a shifty character on screen, accompanied by menacing music. This 
treatment pervades all films made during the Cultural Revolution regardless of the 
nature of the film and is only found in Chinese films of this period.  
 In terms of the discourse of film narratives, there are two major themes: one 
derives from wartime literature and the other concerns class struggle. Both themes 
conform equally to the rule that in the plot, the protagonist is absolutely flawless and 
the antagonist is always blemished. The protagonists are workers-peasants-soldiers 
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and the antagonists are the Kuomintang, Japanese invaders, rich people and 
intellectuals. Whatever or whenever the protagonists have problems, all they have to 
do is to recite some words of Mao and the Communist Party, and they will conquer 
the antagonists. In every film, Mao and the Communist Party always win and their 
enemies always lose. It is true that Mao and the Communist Party seized power from 
the Kuomintang government and established the People’s Republic of China. 
However, in the history of the Chinese civil war from 1946 to 1949, Mao’s 
Communist Party did not always win every battle. Hence, Chinese filmmakers during 
the Cultural Revolution only realistically produced the content of films about the 
battles which Mao and the Communist Party had won, as they did during the periods 
before and after the Cultural Revolution. As always it is the victors who write history. 
 Another phenomenon during the Cultural Revolution is that the films to be 
produced were allocated to each film studio, in particular to the four major film 
studios: Shanghai, Beijing, Changchun and August the First. The film subjects pre-
determined before the film scripts were written had to reflect the life of workers, 
peasants and soldiers in socialist construction and nation building. Although all films 
had the same themes of wartime literature or class struggle, the settings of each film 
were often different. Therefore, to some extent, the film content could be said to have 
reflected at least some aspects of Chinese life, if only in terms of locations. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the reality of the Chinese film industry during the Cultural 
Revolution. Mao’s last revolution — the Cultural Revolution — had its own social 
and political agenda. Not only did Mao exaggerate society’s class struggles but he 
also took personal measures to attack the key structures of the Communist Party. He 
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obviously thought that China could not continuously develop according to his version 
of socialism without the launch of the Cultural Revolution. Mao used his wife, Jiang 
Qing, and Lin Biao to set in motion the Cultural Revolution in order to change the 
political ideology of the Chinese people and to defeat the so-called capitalists and 
revisionists. He also used the youth, the Red Guards, as a primary force to attack the 
education system and literature and art circles. Thus, the Cultural Revolution had its 
political triggers, cultural fuse and political targets — the supposed representatives of 
capitalists and revisionists — Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. 
 The chapter also discussed how the Cultural Revolution affected the Chinese 
film industry in terms of film productivity and creativity and the film arts community. 
The film industry was destroyed because it was one of the institutions for promoting 
political ideology; before the Cultural Revolution, the film industry had produced 
many films which were viewed as not being in line with socialist construction and 
nation building. The film industry, including ten major film studios, produced only 93 
films during a ten-year long period of the Cultural Revolution; as a result, the film 
industry was isolated internationally and was unable to develop any relationships with 
world-renowned filmmakers. 
 In the following chapter, Jiang Qing’s theory and film production during the 
Cultural Revolution are examined. An analysis is presented of the circumstances in 
which her theory was created, how this theory had an impact on film production, and 
what kinds of films were produced. This is followed by a discussion of the styles of 
films including opera films, feature films and the other forms of films, as well as the 




The Three Prominences 
 
Before the Cultural Revolution, Chinese cinema seemed to have more entertainment 
value than political value; after the Cultural Revolution, it tended to have more 
marketing value than cultural value. During the Cultural Revolution, however, 
Chinese cinema arguably possessed more political value than cultural or 
entertainment significance due to the socio-political environment which required the 
production of films to serve the needs of the Communist Party; this was carried out in 
the framework of the political principles of the theory of The Three Prominences. 
These principles were inspired by Jiang Qing who played a vital role in the Chinese 
film industry during the Cultural Revolution. In line with this theory, film represented 
China’s socio-political struggle; the socio-political aesthetic strategy of this theory 
required the presentation of political images and movements. Thus, the contention of 
this chapter is that Jiang Qing’s theory of The Three Prominences was the dominant 
framework for film production during the Cultural Revolution.  
 This chapter begins to explore what the theory of The Three Prominences was; 
how Jiang Qing developed it based on her experience at the Beijing opera rehearsals 
for film production with help from her political allies Yao Wenyuan and Yu Huiyong; 
and how it depicted workers-peasants-soldiers. The chapter then moves to an analysis 
of Chinese film styles, comparing these with Western films in order to emphasise the 
realistic and aesthetic strategies employed in the opera films, feature films and other 




The Theory of The Three Prominences 
When the Chinese film studios resumed production in 1970, not only had Jiang Qing 
already risen to be a member of the Communist Party Politburo, but she had also been 
crowned ‘the great flag bearer of literature and art’ (˶˹ͩɀʞ), especially in 
the film industry (Dai 1995, 40). She was virtually the director of every film produced 
at that time due to her knowledge of film production and her politically sensitive 
astuteness. Moreover, she had the final say as to whether the films produced would be 
released. Almost all the films made during the Cultural Revolution under her 
leadership changed from being allegories of ancient ghost and romantic stories to 
being about the realities of workers-peasants-soldiers involved with socialist 
reconstruction and nation building in line with the theory of The Three Prominences. 
 Jiang Qing’s notorious theory of The Three Prominences, in Chinese ‘san tu 
chu’ (.) meaning ‘three-jut-out’, was the dominant principle adhered to in film 
production during the Cultural Revolution. This theory demanded political loyalties 
from the socialist characters. Directors had to present positive characters prominently 
among all characters; present heroic characters prominently among all positive 
characters; and present the major heroes prominently among all heroic characters (Ο
ˁ΃ɤ̄ϊˠwνǼɤ̄ ΟνǼɤ̄ϊˠwͷ̹ɤ̄ Οͷ̹ɤ̄ϊʐwϔ͜
ͷ̹ɤ̄Dai 1995, 123; Di 2001, 69; Berry 2004, 40). The theory was arguably 
important as it framed film production in such a way as to eulogise Chinese socialist 
heroes — workers-peasants-soldiers — as well as Mao and the Chinese Communist 
Party. As the theory was developed in practice, it completely changed the landscape 
of Chinese cinema from the ancient ghost and romantic films produced before the 
Cultural Revolution to films of socialist distanciation during the Cultural Revolution. 
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 This changing landscape was encouraged by Mao because he was dissatisfied 
with the status quo of literature and art up to the early 1950s (Dai 1995, 5). Following 
the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao was very critical of 
the film industry, and especially after watching the film Wu Xun (̀̓y 1951); he 
then presented his critique — ‘Pay Attention to the Discussion of the Film Wu Xun’    
(ͺόʝ¤ͼ̀̓yˎǡ ), published on the first page of the Communist 
Party’s official newspaper People’s Daily on 20 May 1951, where he argued as 
follows: 
The film Wu Xun raises some fundamental issues. At the end of the Qing 
Dynasty when the Chinese people rose up against foreign invaders and 
engaged in a great struggle against the feudal rulers, people like Wu Xun 
simply did not touch on the feudal economic base and its superstructure, but 
fanatically propagated feudal culture and publicised the scandalous behaviour 
of the reactionary feudal rulers in order to obtain status in the feudal culture. 
Should we celebrate such servility? Should we praise his base behaviour under 
the revolutionary banner of ‘serving the people’, by using the failure of the 
revolutionary peasant struggle to contrast his behaviour in chanting praises to 
the masses? Can we tolerate this? To acknowledge or tolerate this kind of 
reactionary propaganda as legitimate publicity is to slander the peasants’ 
revolutionary struggle, distort Chinese history and defame the Chinese nation. 
 
This film was seriously criticised by Mao and many other Chinese officials and film 
critics; even the film’s American-educated director, Sun Yu (ʿϾ), and its well-
known actor, Zhao Dan, who played the role of Wu Xun, were made to present self-
criticisms. Until the Cultural Revolution the film industry had never had any 
conscious policies concerning the production of films reflecting Chinese socialist 
construction and nation building, and the industry was not conspicuously 
‘nationalistic’ in nature. 
 Mao had acknowledged much earlier that history was created by the working 
class; therefore, he believed they should be the main characters in literature and art. 
Mao had clearly pointed this out in his Yan’an Talks  (Ο6</9
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; ) in 1942 before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. After 
watching a performance of their new historical play, Forced to Climb Liang Mountain 
(Aɸǀɵ ), in 1944, Mao wrote a personal letter to the playwrights Yan 
Zhaoxuan (͔ɽϸ) and Qi Yanming (ȿ͎ȁ): 
On stages in the past, the old literature and art were played far from working 
class people due to their status in old society. The stages were mainly 
occupied by the characters of lords, ladies, young masters and young ladies. 
History was turned upside down. But now you have reversed this history, 
recovering the true face of history from old plays to start the new plays. That 
was worth celebrating. You reformed the old revolutionary plays that have 
demarcated a new starting time. When I thought of this move, I was very 
happy for you. I hope that before long you can not only write more scripts but 
also have more performances, and make these become more common practice 
as well as advocating these activities to the whole nation (Dai 1995, 5). 
 
It is clear from this letter that Mao wanted the literature and art circles to produce 
more works about working class people instead of about ancient and feudal 
aristocracy. However it is also clear that from 1949 up to the Cultural Revolution, 
Mao did not see many literature and art works about working class people being 
created in the new China — certainly not along the lines of the play he had seen in 
1944, Forced to Climb Liang Mountain. Consequently, when Mao met the Lao 
Patriotic Front Party Art Troupe on 4 September 1964, he said to them: 
I am a person who has faults and makes mistakes. I talked about literature and 
art serving workers-peasants-soldiers twenty years ago. But we did not get this 
right during the last fifteen years. Should I be blamed? From now on I will 
correct my mistakes (Bo 1993, 1227). 
 
This conversation took place about two years before the Cultural Revolution proving 
that Mao was determined to correct his mistake. The ‘mistake’ (according to him) was 
that he had let the literature and art circles indulge in too many feudal, bourgeois and 
revisionist cultural activities and he wanted them to present works about workers-
peasants-soldiers instead. As Mao himself could not initiate these changes because 
Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and other leaders controlled the levers of power, he 
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secretly sent his wife, Jiang Qing, to Shanghai to organise a counter critique of the 
play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office, and to denounce its playwright, Wu Han, as the 
play had indirectly criticised him just before the Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar 
and Schoenhals 2006, 15-16). 
 In order to portray workers-peasants-soldiers as being clearly affiliated with 
the Communist Party, the theory of The Three Prominences, according to Chinese 
film scholars such as Berry, Yu, Zhang and Yang, directed that the majority of space 
and time be given to socialist heroes. Under the guidance of the theory of The Three 
Prominences, Xie Jin (̯ż), a famous fourth-generation film director in China who 
produced many outstanding films during his fruitful fifty-year long career, went on to 
state apologetically: 
For many years now, some people in literary circles have used the excuse of 
writing about things with which they are personally familiar in order to oppose 
Chairman Mao’s directives regarding the need for literary and art workers to 
go deep among the worker/peasant/soldier masses, to join in their fierce 
battles, and familiarise themselves with the life of struggle of workers, 
peasants, and soldiers (Clark 1987, 132). 
 
Despite the fact that his Stage Sisters (̂˄ŵǴ 1965), which is a kind of film noir, 
was heavily attacked less than a year later during the Cultural Revolution, Xie strove 
to produce a very leftist class struggle-themed film Spring Seedling in 1975 to meet 
the demands of the Communist Party, which were that literature and art must serve 
the working class — workers-peasants-soldiers — and also must serve the political 
needs of the Party. What was demonstrated in Chinese cinema during the Cultural 
Revolution was that the protagonists must be shown at the centre, large and radiant, 
and the antagonists had to appear off-centre, relatively small and gloomy in the mise-
en-scène, reflecting the realistic and aesthetic strategies employed by the theory of 
The Three Prominences. 
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Genesis of The Three Prominences 
Chinese cinema during the Cultural Revolution differed from the industry’s previous 
and subsequent incarnations. This difference was related to the ideological changes of 
political space and time. The ideology of the films produced during the Cultural 
Revolution had one goal, which was to extol socialist construction and nation building 
under the leadership of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party. These films 
were produced to inspire and encourage the Chinese people to participate in the 
socialist revolution of class struggle and to defend ‘Marx-Leninism and Mao Zedong 
Thought’ (ė˸ǧǊϔͯǭΤ¬ʮ̢). In order to achieve these goals, the theory of 
The Three Prominences gave precise political guidance for depicting the characters — 
workers-peasants-soldiers — in the context of mise-en-scène; the heroes, for example, 
were to be given prominence by being made central, large and radiant so as to 
encourage the Chinese people to participate in the Cultural Revolution. Because of 
their strong appeal to audiences, heroic characters were made to seem ‘humanistic’, 
an effect that contributed to the films’ popularity. As Bordwell, Staiger and 
Thompson (1985, 16-18) explain, realism without the ‘humanistic’ effect would be 
diluted, since audiences would be less engaged by impersonal events. This is why the 
theory of The Three Prominences was vital for film production during the Cultural 
Revolution, helping to explain the ‘romantic’ tone of the films’ realistic style. 
However, in order to comprehend the importance of the theory of The Three 
Prominences, it is necessary to understand its genesis. 
 The theory of The Three Prominences was first generated from the reform 
practice of Chinese opera, and then used predominantly in film production. This 
theory had evolved through two major creations according to many Mainland Chinese 
film scholars such as Dai Jiafang, Di Jiannong and Liu Libing (ǔƹM). The first 
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creation was by the Culture Minister, Yu Huiyong (΅Ń;), a former music theory 
lecturer at the Shanghai Conservatory of Music. The Shanghai newspaper Wenhuibao 
first asked him to write about the revolutionary experience of reforming Chinese 
opera for a special column. He refused to do this because he was busy doing 
administrative work as the director of the Shanghai Literature and Art Revolutionary 
Planning Committee and as deputy director of the Shanghai Conservatory of Music 
Revolutionary Board (Dai 1995, 124). The two literature and art editors of Wenhuibao 
thought Yu was the right person to talk to about the experience of reforming Chinese 
opera because he had previously contributed two excellent essays on the subject, ‘The 
Red Lantern’ and ‘Sha Jia Bang’, and was under the direct leadership of Jiang Qing 
and Zhang Chunqiao (ά|ɉ); he also completely understood Jiang Qing’s literature 
and art revolutionary spirit (Dai 1995, 124). These two editors thought a better idea 
would be to conduct an interview with Yu, who agreed (Dai 1995, 125).  
 On 23 May 1968, the Wenhuibao published his article ‘Let the Literature and 
Art Stage Be Forever Propaganda for the Mao Zedong Thought Front’ (ɡ˹ͩ̂
˄ͿΕq˳̿yǭΤ¬ʮ̢ι ), which was edited by Yu and his secretary 
who added some of Mao’s quotations (Dai 1995, 126). This was the first article 
proposing the theory of The Three Prominences because Yu grasped better than 
anyone else Jiang Qing’s ideas on how to reform Chinese opera to suit the needs of 
the Cultural Revolution. This article not only proposed the theory of The Three 
Prominences but also praised Jiang’s great contribution to the reform of Chinese 
opera and confirmed that her model Chinese operas had been effective in leading the 
Chinese people against capitalism, feudalism and revisionism; in giving Mao Zedong 
Thought access to the revolutionary literature and art stages; and in opening the 
prologue of the political movement of the Cultural Revolution. 
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 Although Yu had already praised the theory of The Three Prominences, Yao 
Wenyuan, a member of the Communist Party Politburo and Jiang’s close ally, further 
modified this theory in a published article ‘Strive Diligently to Portray Brilliant 
Images of Proletarian Heroes’ (ȠƺʻΡ˾`Ůŏͷ̹ɤ̄ĉĿ̶̦ ) in the 
eleventh issue of the Chinese Communist Party’s official magazine Red Flag (ħɀΜ
φ) in 1969 (Di 2001, 69). Yao’s article rigorously modified what had been the third 
prominence, from ‘give prominence to the major characters among the characters’ to 
‘give prominence to the major heroes among the heroes’. This was the second 
creation of Jiang Qing’s theory of The Three Prominences, which became much more 
important to the literature and art circles in creating revolutionary works, especially 
for all film production during the Cultural Revolution. This lexis changed to depict 
‘heroes’ rather than ‘characters’ and progressed the representation of workers-
peasants-soldiers from figurative to realistic heroism, which had a greater effect on 
Chinese audiences. Moreover, Yao’s article also once more mentioned the importance 
of ‘The Summary of a symposium for the military literary and artistic workers 
entrusted to Comrade Jiang Qing by Comrade Lin Biao’ and suggested using a 
combination of revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism to create 
literature and art (Liu 2004, 147). This combination of realism and romanticism, 
which was explored more than a century earlier by Western scholars such as German 
poet and philosopher Friedrich Schiller and Russian literary critic Vissarion Belinsky, 
confused many Chinese film directors and actors in terms of how to create literature 
and art during the Cultural Revolution. Xie Tieli (=?E), a well-known film director, 
for instance, spent more than two years on the pre-production of the Chinese opera 
film Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy which was one of Jiang Qing’s eight model 
opera films (Di 2001, 70). Thereafter, all Chinese filmmakers used centred, close-up 
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shots and bright images to portray the heroes — workers-peasants-soldiers — in the 




Figure 7: Two film stills: above, from the Model Ballet Film, White Haired Girl (3ǭȡ); below, 




Application of The Three Prominences 
The theory of The Three Prominences was successful in building more patriotic and 
political loyalties within the socialist nation of China and the Communist Party 
because the main characters of workers-peasants-soldiers on screen were the Chinese 
people themselves (albeit often in the service of the films’ formative tendency). 
However, this theory, as mentioned, was hard to apply in film production. Filmmakers 
had to think about which realistic and aesthetic strategies to implement; Jiang Qing 
herself was consulted and she discussed the issue with filmmakers, and even Mao 
gave some feedback and had input into opera films such as The Red Lantern and The 
Harbour (Shen 2008; Di 2001). 
 When filmmakers implemented the theory of The Three Prominences, they 
also created relevant terms for techniques to match the words ‘san tu chu’ (Three 
Prominences) in Chinese such as ‘gao qi dian’ (îɁ¡) meaning up-close shot, ‘san 
pei chen’ (ɯȭm) meaning three enhancements, ‘san te ding’ (ɯˏ«) meaning 
three specifications, ‘san dui tou’ (ɯ¶˟) meaning three corrections, ‘yuan pu dian’ 
(ΕȻ£) meaning long-shot, ‘jin pu dian’ (ŽȻ£) meaning close-shot, ‘duo ceng ci’ 
(¸^) meaning multi-dimensions, ‘duo bo lan’ (¸Rƪ) meaning multi-plots and 
‘dui hui he’ (¸ŀĞ) meaning more direct confrontations in reality. They used these 
aesthetic techniques to depict the relationships of heroes and villains, heroes and 
positive figures, major individual heroes among the mass of heroes (Di 2001, 69). 
 Although Yu Huiyong and Yao Wenyuan helped to construct the theory of 
The Three Prominences around Jiang Qing’s ideas, they themselves could not 
implement this theory because neither knew how to produce a film. Yu was a music 
lecturer and Yao was a politician. Therefore, Jiang Qing had to step in to assist 
filmmakers with the production of her opera films. Interestingly, for her opera film 
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production, Jiang used many films which she previously had labelled as feudal, 
capitalist and revisionist poisonous weeds such as Fugitive (͔ǵȡŦ 1960), 
Pandora’s Box (1929), Jane Eyre (1943), The Red Shoes (1948), Knife in the Water 
(Nóz w wodzie, 1962) and The Savage Heart (Corazón Salvaje 1968) to show the 
Chinese filmmakers how to gain inspiration from the colour, lighting and composition 
displayed in these films. Of the six films, one was Chinese and five were foreign. Her 
choice of these five world-renowned films to show the filmmakers demonstrated 
Jiang’s knowledge of the film world. She not only spent many nights with the 
filmmakers watching these films but also, despite their weariness, had energetically 
discussed the films in order to motivate them to improve opera film productions (Di 
2001, 70).  
 Jiang also realised that implementing the theory of The Three Prominences 
was not just a matter of writing enough slogans into the text; it needed concrete 
material provision as well as her husband Mao’s support. Therefore, Jiang went to see 
Mao to explain the importance of her opera film production for the Cultural 
Revolution. From him she obtained support in the form not only of material 
incentives, but also the opera film plots. 
 First Mao ordered the Special Military Group 8341, his personal security unit 
headed by Wang Dongxing (˩¬̵), to enter the Beijing film studio to assist with 
opera film production in 1969 (Di 2001, 73). The studio was virtually made into a 
military camp. All the people working at the Beijing film studio had to live like 
soldiers, under the command of Jiang Qing; they had to work and sleep in the studio, 
and were not allowed to go home. Mao had previously instigated this kind of work 
environment for important factories in Beijing such as the Number Twenty-Seven 
Locomotive Factory and the Xinhua Printing Factory in order to achieve safety and 
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sustainability (Di 2001, 73). For all film crews in the opera film production of Taking 
Tiger Mountain by Strategy, Jiang also arranged very special deals including food, 
working conditions and film equipment; for example, she authorised the use of 
imported Kodak celluloid film for her opera film production because it produced 
better colours (Di 2001, 72-80). Under Jiang’s leadership, the Culture Minister, Yu 
Huiyong, first skilfully used Western musical instruments combined with Chinese 
musical instruments to play Chinese opera tunes making the traditional Chinese opera 
music more enjoyable. For instance, the opera film The Harbour produced in 1971 
has many more melodious operatic tunes than the original opera (Dai 1995, 155). As 
Jiang was very pleased with this opera film music, the songs and melodies of this 
opera film were rehearsed on stage and first broadcast on television; Jiang also 
organised Yu to accompany Mao to watch this opera on television, making Yu 




Figure 8: Mao Zedong not only supported his wife, Jiang Qing, materially but also went to see her 
model operas accompanied by his deputy Lin Biao during the Cultural Revolution. (Accessed on 31 
May 2013 from http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0721/05/112480_134822073.shtml) 
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 Mao not only gave material support to his wife Jiang Qing, but also, as already 
mentioned, contributed his ideas for the opera film productions. Two good examples 
of opera films were The Red Lantern and The Harbour. After Mao watched The Red 
Lantern in January 1971, he rather sarcastically questioned Jiang asking, ‘What is this 
kind of Model Films? All the revolutionaries were killed by enemies, weren’t they?’ 
(Dai 1995, 152). This question irritated Jiang enormously and in fact The Red Lantern 
was the only Model Opera film in which the revolutionaries lost the battle. It was also 
one of the first two opera films produced in 1970. It is clear that even Jiang herself 
found it difficult to implement her theory of The Three Prominences in order to 
achieve an absolutely satisfactory outcome. The second film was The Harbour. Mao 
suggested the plot be changed from small problems among individual workers, Qian 
Shouwei (Ʌʟ˴) and Han Xiaoqiang (ĕ̪Ɉ), to class enmity between them (Dai 
1995, 153). Therefore, Qian became the number one class enemy and Han was just a 
young worker who did not like being a stevedore. In this sense, the opera film was 
made more confrontational and possessed more dramatic effects. 
 Although Mao had offered ideas for the opera film The Harbour, the 
production was not without difficulties. This production was remade three times and 
involved many top Politburo members such as Premier Zhou, Ye Jianying (͡ţͷ), 
Li Xiannian (Ʊ̔ș), Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan (Di 2001, 157-166). Jiang 
Qing was able to get them involved simply because she was Mao’s wife; she wanted 
to put political pressure on the film director, Xie Tieli, and cinematographer, Qian 
Jiang (Ʌŧ), to take the work on the opera film seriously because she had already 
sacked one film director, Fu Chaowu (ßf̀), and cinematographer, Li Wenhua (Ʊ




Figure 9: A still from The Harbour (Ĕí), one of eight Jiang Qing’s Model Opera films. The main 
protagonist Fang Haizhen (ÉĔβ) sings at the dock in support of the African revolution. 
 
the first film production of The Harbour. This was despite Jiang changing the 
protagonist actress from Tong Ziling (˝ϵ϶), a well-known Shanghai Chinese opera 
actress, to Li Lifang (ƱƶÈ), a relatively young Ningxia Chinese opera actress, in 
order to give the main protagonist more of a heroic and youthful status (Di 2001, 
147). In the second film production of The Harbour, Jiang was still not satisfied with 
the work of Xie, the film director, and Qian, the cinematographer, and made many 
suggestions to modify the production. However, Xie and Qian argued with her about 
lighting and the images of the main protagonist, Fang Haizhen (Di 2001, 161). In 
order to satisfy Jiang Qing, Premier Zhou motivated Xie and Qian to work hard on 
The Harbour so as to produce a good quality film like Jiang’s ballet film The Red 
Detachment of Women which was very popular in the USA (Di 2001, 161). Because 
of this, Xie was allowed to have another well-known film director, Xie Jin, from the 
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Shanghai Film Studio involved in the third opera film production of The Harbour and 
they were thus able to finish the production in May 1973. Although Jiang was 
ostensibly satisfied with this third production of The Harbour, she still made 14 
suggestions about the dialogue and the realism of the settings of the rain scenes 
among others (Di 2001, 170). These scenes were re-filmed and the film was 
eventually completed in August 1973, having finally met all of Jiang’s demands (Di 
2001, 170). 
 The use of the theory of The Three Prominences was not simple, for not only 
could the filmmakers not execute it politically and aesthetically according to Jiang’s 
ideals, but also Jiang herself was sometimes confused about how to implement it. 
What Jiang did do was work diligently for the implementation of her theory of The 
Three Prominences in order to motivate and inspire the Chinese people to support the 
socialist revolution. There is no doubt that the major heroes of workers-peasants-
soldiers in her opera films were fully represented and fulfilled the propaganda 
requirements of the Cultural Revolution. 
 
Film Production during the Cultural Revolution 
To understand film production during the Cultural Revolution, it is necessary to 
review the history of the Chinese film industry from the time the Chinese Communist 
Party took power and established the People’s Republic of China in 1949 up to the 
time of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. In this 17-year period, the Chinese film 
industry went through several reforms because the Communist government not only 
recognised the visual supremacy and persuasive authority of cinema but also set a 
new social and political standard for literature and art circles in line with Marxism-
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Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (Mazur 2009, 393). In this new social and political 
environment, the film industry experienced roughly five fundamental reforms. 
 The first reform was to amalgamate many small private film studios into 
several large state-owned film studios such as the Shanghai and Changchun film 
studios by 1955 (Yu 2006, 82). For example, small film studios mainly located in 
Shanghai such as the Kunlun, Lianhua, Wenhua and Tianyi film companies were all 
amalgamated into the Shanghai Film Studio. The Northeast Film Studio, which was a 
significant movie production company in the northeast part of China, and other small 
film studios became the Changchun Film Studio. At the same time, the Communist 
regime also established several new film studios such as the Beijing Film Studio in 
1949, the August the First Film Studio in 1952 and the Xi’an Film Studio in 1958 
(Clark 1987, 59). This reform, then, allowed a number of film studios around China to 
come under the control of the Communist regime. 
 The second reform was to change the film content from romantic films and 
films focusing on moral issues such as A Spring River Flows East (1947) and Myriads 
of Lights (˨ŚŅ 1948) to socially and politically inclined films such as Bridge (ɉ
1949) and White Haired Girl (3ǭȡ 1950). The lessening of film censorship 
restrictions later led to the production of some more ‘humanistic’ films during the 
years 1962-1965, but during the Cultural Revolution these films were harshly 
criticised. For example, Two Stage Sisters, a film in the film noir genre, directed by 
Xie Jin in 1965, was censured for possessing a romantic narrative and a lack of social 
and political content. 
 The third reform was the authorisation for more film production which led to a 
dramatic rise in the number of movie-goers from 47 million in 1949 to 415 million in 
1959 (Clark 1987, 61); after 1959 there were even more movie-goers (Yu 2006, 121). 
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This rise was due to the 589 feature films produced in the 17 years between the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and the Cultural Revolution in 
1966, together with relatively cheap movie tickets (Yu 2006, 115). Even more 
significantly, not only had China established the Beijing Film Institute in 1956, which 
was the first higher education institute specialising in film, but it also set up an award 
for film excellence, the Hundred Flowers (4Ĳũ) award, in 1962. These initiatives 
raised Chinese film arts to international standards in terms of the quantity and quality 
of films and established a theoretical foundation for film development. For example, 
the first wide-screen Chinese film with stereo sound, New Biography of A Veteran (Ƭ
Ṉy), was directed by the prominent filmmaker Shen Fu (ʅÚ) in 1958, and 
received a silver medal for film techniques at the Moscow International Film Festival 
in 1959 (China Cinema Encyclopaedia 1993, 520). 
 The fourth reform involved the creation of a policy for the importation of 
foreign films. Through this policy the Communist regime stopped importing 
Hollywood movies, especially after the Korean War broke out. They not only accused 
Hollywood of exploiting the Chinese economy, but also blamed it for negatively 
influencing the Chinese people (Yan 2006, 523). Films were instead imported from 
socialist states such as the USSR, Poland, Hungary, Romania and North Korea, still 
allowing Chinese film professionals to view the development of some other countries’ 
film industries. Soviet films had a huge impact on the Chinese people (Yu 2006, 92-
102; Gang 2006, 112), especially films such as Lenin in October (1937), Lenin in 
1918 (1939) and The Gadfly (1955), which had similar elements of Communist 
inspiration and social justice as Chinese films. A shortfall of this policy was that the 
Chinese people were no longer able to see and learn from films produced in more 
technologically advanced countries, especially the US, Britain, Italy and France. 
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Historically, most cinemas in China had shown Hollywood films before China’s 
Liberation in 1949 and some Hollywood films were still being shown up to 1955. 
However, due to the deteriorating relationship between China and many Western 
countries, Western movies were banned; this proved to be a direct impediment to the 
development of the Chinese film industry. Hence, Chinese filmmakers had no option 
but to learn film narrative and technology mostly from Russia. For example, in 
celluloid technology, China could not produce celluloid as well as the Kodak products 
made in the US; and the Chinese celluloid with its blurry colour bothered many 
Chinese filmmakers. 
 The fifth reform was the implementation of a set of new policies which 
involved the central government’s Ministry of Culture and Arts handing over direct 
control of film production and distribution to the provincial administrative level. On 6 
March 1957 the State Council released The Provision of Regional Film Distribution 
Enterprises Under the Leadership and Management of Local Administrative 
Authorities of the Ministry of Culture and Arts. This policy stated: 
In accordance with the Report of the Ministry of Culture and Arts, the 
Ministry authorised the China Film Distribution Company to hand over all its 
local branches to local administrative authorities for the enhancement of local 
administrative leadership and management of the film distribution enterprise. 
In order to assist the initiative and enthusiasm of the local cultural department, 
the State Council especially agreed with this report, and attached the Provision 
of Regional Film Distribution Enterprises. This Provision is to be forwarded to 
the Local Administrative Authority of the Ministry of Culture and Arts. The 
hope is to execute this specific report of the Ministry of Culture and Arts in 
conformity with local circumstances (Yu 2006, 100-101). 
 
This reform, which operated until 1993, gave the provincial authorities autonomy in 
terms of how to fund film production and distribution (Yu 2006, 101). It also brought 
about competition among film studios which benefited by being allowed to keep the 
money earned from the box office after the target quota had been achieved. 
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 The success of the reforms was demonstrated by three peaks of artistic, 
excellent and fruitful film production in 1956, 1959 and 1963-1964 (Zheng and Gong 
2006, 255-333). During the first peak there were many good films produced, such as 
Ten o’clock on National Day (Đɒʌ¡ϋ 1956) by Wu Tian (˿˓), Shang Gan 
Ling (ɸçǑ 1956) by Shao Meng (ɳǷ) and Lin Shan (Ǎɴ), from Changchun 
Film Studio, as well as Family (Ś 1956) by Chen Xihe (l̇Ĝ) and Ye Ming (͡ǿ) 
and Railway Guerilla (˗΂ňµ 1956) by Chao Ming (ήǿ) from the Shanghai 
Film Studio. These films were adapted from well-known novels and had artistically 
and aesthetically stylish treatments. The second peak, in 1959, was as a result of the 
cooperation with Russian film experts who taught the Chinese film directors and 
photographers how to use advanced technologies and techniques such as montage, 
and how to explore the performance of psycho-aesthetic characters on screen; the 
second peak produced films such as Song of Youth (Ɏ|ρñ 1959), Lin Zexu (ǍΣ
̼ 1959), Nie Er (ț¿ 1959), Five Golden Flowers (́ºŸĲ 1959) and The Lin 
Family Shop (ǍŚȻϞ  1959). Also during the second peak, the Beijing and 
Shanghai film studios formed several innovative teams with directors, photographers 
and artistic tutors, including Zhu Jinming (ϒŹǿ), Ouyang Hongying (Ȣ͗ħͻ), 
Xie Tian (̯˔) and Shui Hua (ʫĳ) in Beijing; and Shi Hui (ʍľ), Chen Liting (l
Ƴ˙), Xie Jin, Bai Chen (3k), Xu Changlin (̼aǍ) and Shen Ji (ʅŔ) in 
Shanghai (Zheng and Gong 2006, 287) who had gained experience in other countries. 
Hence, the Chinese film industry learned about the teamwork methods of directors 
and photographers such as the British team of David Lean and Freddie Yong, the 
Japanese team of Miyagawa Kazuo and Akira Kurozawa, and the Russian team of 
Sergei Eisenstein and Dmitri Vasiliev, from the directors and photographers working 
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together in the Chinese innovative teams. These innovative filmmaking teams 
provided enormous benefits to Chinese cinema in terms of how to work harmoniously 
and cooperatively. In the third peak from 1963 to 1964, the film industry achieved a 
high level of poetic and aesthetic filmmaking outcomes after many years of socialist 
film production. Films such as Zhang Ga the Soldier Boy (̪Nάã), Early Spring 
February (Π|ÁΘ) and Serfs (Ȟȟ) in 1963, and Dr Norman Bethune (3ɕ¼
×) and The Sentry Under the Neon Light (ȕģ̒ɻN) in 1964, had the greatest 
impact on the Chinese people in terms of socialist education. The treatments of these 
films were simple, authentic and realistic and appealed to Chinese audiences. 
 At the same time as experiencing these peaks, the film industry also had to 
confront specific political campaigns such as the ‘Three Antis’ (ɯÅ) and the ‘Five 
Antis’ (́Å), which not only criticised the film Wu Xun (1951) but also in the years 
1951 and 1952 sought to eradicate intellectuals’ bourgeois habits in the film industry 
by attacking, through literature and art circles, the book by Yu Boping (·Tȸ) A 
Research Study of the Dream of Red Mansions (ħǘǸ͇Ƈ  1951), the 
‘Thoughts of Hu Shi’ (Īʛʮ̢), and the Hu Feng Counter Revolutionary Group (Ī
ÓÅòȃōˤ) in 1952 (Peng 2000, 19-29). This is why most Chinese films made 
during this period did not contain elements of love and romance, elements considered 
to be flirtatious and bourgeois. Also, the 1956 policy of ‘let a hundred flowers bloom 
and let a hundred schools of thought contend’ (4ĲȿË,4ŚλȀ) was part of 
Mao’s political strategy to promote new forms of art under Chinese socialism by 
soliciting new ideologies and criticism from intellectuals in the realm of literature and 
art. Subsequently, however, Mao mounted another political ‘Anti-Rightist’ campaign 
(Å΄¯λ) against these very intellectuals whom he had asked, in 1957, to voice 
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criticism and concerns to the government. As a result, a considerable number of 
intellectuals who had worked in the realm of film arts were prosecuted or 
marginalised (Yu 2006, 98). After this Yan’an style rectification campaign against 
‘rightists’, Mao implemented another politicised economic movement, the Great Leap 
Forward, which resulted several years later in a tragic famine affecting the whole of 
China. Given these catastrophic political and economic upheavals, most filmmakers 
dared not be creative and show any initiative, instead abiding by what they were told 
by the Communist Party. As Paul Clark (1987, 54) concluded:
Cadre[s] and Artist[s] achieved an unstable balance between the political 
concerns of the cultural authorities and the concerns of filmmakers. Even the 
more interventionist wing in the Party could see the unproductive results of 
heightened intervention in the aftermath of the Anti-Rightist campaign and the 
Great Leap Forward. 
 
In other words, film production and distribution were directly affected by this 
uncertainty. Filmmakers thus experienced many undesirable challenges both 
politically and economically. 
 By the time of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the film industry had 
completed all political and administrative reforms since the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China but, because of the Cultural Revolution, it experienced 
considerable damage as discussed in the previous chapter. Not only was there a lack 
of film production generally, there was also a lack of creative film works and a dearth 
of participation in international film events. All film productions were under the 
control of Jiang Qing and her political coterie either in the Politburo or in the film 
industry and were produced to indoctrinate socialist political thought in order to 
encourage and strengthen the revolutionary movement. She played a very important 
role as ‘the great flag bearer of literature and art’ during the Cultural Revolution. 
Jiang Qing might have been a novice at politics but was an expert in film; she not 
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only fully comprehended film techniques but also truly fathomed Chinese operatic 
dexterity. For this reason, she was successful in her endeavours in the film industry 
because, in order to propagate the revolutionary spirit through a nationwide mass 
culture, she first transplanted opera into film. This was both necessary and appropriate 
because films could be screened anywhere in China, whereas operas could only be 
performed in large cities. 
 As Paul Clark (1987, 125) in his study of Chinese cinema argues, the themes 
dominating Chinese film history were ‘the tension between Yan’an and Shanghai, the 
use of film to help shape a mass national culture, and mutual influences and conflict 
among [the] Party, artists, and audiences’. More precisely, the political tension 
involved in the Chinese film industry during the Cultural Revolution reached its 
climax with the interference of Jiang Qing and Mao Zedong. That is why Chinese 
film critic Di Jiannong (2001, 6-7) points out that not only did Jiang Qing directly 
interfere in the Chinese film industry, but also she was openly supported by her 
husband Mao Zedong. In this political environment and under the influence of Jiang 
Qing’s theory of The Three Prominences, Chinese films during the Cultural 
Revolution period were not produced according to a particular genre, as Chris Berry 
(2004, 77) explains: 
The emphasis on representation and political line in the Chinese classical 
cinema meant that theme was the basis of both production and critical 
discussion. Therefore, although the slogan “let themes take the lead” was only 
explicitly used during the Cultural Revolution, in fact it described the 
underlying logic of the Chinese classical cinema between 1949 and 1976. The 
Chinese Film Art Dictionary makes this distinction quite clear in its entries for 
the terms “ticai” (subject matter [D#]) and “leixing dianyinglun” (genre 
theory [2-:]), where it specifies the latter as a foreign system of 
classification. 
 
The taxonomies used by the Western and Chinese classical cinemas were different. 
Western genre films not only were regulated through the production of classifications, 
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but also were oriented according to the marketing value of their stylistic 
characteristics, settings, typical characters and so on. Chinese films, mostly opera and 
feature films as well as a few ballets, were planned and organised in accordance with 
the subject matter by the Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution. 
 
Model Films 
There were two groups of opera films produced during the Cultural Revolution. The 
first group of eight films are called the Model Films because of their quality due to the 
considerable effort put into their production by Jiang Qing (Zhang 2006, 238). These 
eight Model Films were produced between 1970 and 1972, the first group of films 
produced just after the Chinese film studios resumed production. There were five 
Chinese operas — The Red Lantern, Taking the Tiger Mountain by Strategy, Sha Jia 
Bang, The Harbour and Raid the White-Tiger Regiment (Ƚ̊3Įˤ); two ballets — 
The White-Haired Girl and The Red Detachment of Women; and a film called Sha Jia 
Bang, a single symphonic recital.
 According to research done by Zhang Wei (ά˰) in 2006, the second group of 
eight films produced after 1972 was not as popular as the first group of eight films 
because Jiang Qing had put more effort at that time into political work than into the 
film industry. There were five Chinese opera films — Azalea Mountain (³Ƒɵ), The 
Red Detachment of Women, Fighting on the Plains (ȸΓϫΩ), Long Jiang Song (Ǘ
ŧʵ) and Boulder Bay (Ȧʍ˧); one of songs with piano accompaniment — The 
Red Lantern; one piano concerto — Yellow River (ļğ); and one ballet — Ode to 
Yimeng (ͥǷʵ).
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 The reason for the popularity of the first eight Model Films was that Jiang 
Qing first selected more than 30 different shows from all over China and invited these 
troupes to Beijing to perform for Beijing audiences in June and July 1964 before the 
Cultural Revolution (Zhang 2006, 238). After watching these performances of operas, 
plays and ballets, she convened a symposium on how to reform Chinese operas and 
plays; she then published her long speech ‘A Discussion on Revolutionised Chinese 
Opera’ (ˇƀƐòȃ ) on 23 June 1964 (Zhang 2006, 238). In this speech, Jiang 
fervently disseminated her leftist ideas about literature and art and established the 
concept of revolutionary model operas and plays, thus consolidating her leadership in 
literature and art circles. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of Mao’s ‘Talks at the 
Yan’an Conference on Literature and Art’ in 1967, Jiang once again invited the eight 
shows to Beijing to perform and, after providing instruction for some changes, these 
eight shows became the first eight Model Films (Zhang 2006, 238). These eight 
shows, performed over thirty-seven days in Beijing and attended by three hundred 
thousand people, were extremely popular (Dai 1995, 39). On 17 June 1967, Mao, 
Premier Zhou and Lin Biao attended the final session of the eight performances 
watching the Chinese opera Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy which officially 
ended the opera exhibition gala (Dai 1995, 39). 
 The support of many media outlets such as newspapers, radio and television 
all over China helped to increase the popularity of these eight performances. For 
example, the Communist Party’s official newspaper People’s Daily published a 
special editorial ‘Cheer the Great Victory of Revolutionary Chinese Operas’ (Ĺĩ
ƀƐòȃ˶ʈƸ ) praising the triumph of these eight performances and 
calling them the ‘new opening era’ of proletarian literature and art, and the end of 
counter-revolutionary revisionist literature and art (Zhang 2006, 238). These eight 
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shows, once performed in Beijing, helped Jiang secure her place not only in literature 
and art circles but also in the arena of politics in the Communist Party Politburo.
 According to Dai Jiafang (1995, 23), the term ‘model shows’ was used for 
these eight shows because they had been developed through several phases into eight 
Model Films. The first phase was when the Shanghai newspaper Liberation Daily (Ŵ
Ëɦ>) published an editorial on 16 March 1965 stating:  
People who watched this play were profoundly affected by the enthusiasm of 
political fighting and the encouragement derived from the revolutionary and 
artistic momentum, and all chanted: ‘Good Play, Good Play!’ They reckoned 
this revolutionised Chinese opera was an excellent model. The artists working 
in theatres informed each other quickly and they all expressed willingness to 
learn from the Chinese opera The Red Lantern. 
 
The second phase was when Yuan Xuefen (Β͂Í), a famous performing artist in 
Zhejiang Shaoxing opera in Shanghai, published her article entitled ‘An Excellent 
Model’ (ƁͰɕƁ͙5 ) in praise of The Red Lantern in the Beijing 
newspaper Guangming Daily (ĉǿɦ>) on 22 March 1965 (Dai 1991, 23); and the 
third phase was when these eight shows were prepared for film production. Kang 
Sheng (Ɯʇ), a Politburo Standing Committee member and Jiang Qing’s close ally, 
was the first person to ask Chen Bo (lQ), the head of the August the First Film 
Studio, to produce films of these eight shows as Model Films (Di 2001, 11). Jiang 
Qing, therefore, subsequently used this term for these eight shows captured on film. 
 These eight Model Films in terms of their political discourse and artistic 
treatment are very distinct from feature films. Their unique styles can be described as 
‘operatic genre’, ‘balletic genre’ or ‘symphonic genre’. These different types of genre 
— or styles — can be characterised by the following features: first, the protagonists 
are young and flawless heroes in centre stage; second, the antagonists are relatively 
old and powerless; third, the revolutionary struggles by the protagonists are 
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overwhelming; fourth, in terms of personal relationships, the protagonists have no 
spouses or love interest but have family members; fifth, melodramatic strategy is 
employed; and sixth, operatic music, dancing or singing plays a major role throughout 
the film. These elements can be well described by Ma Ning’s filmic term of ‘Yin’ and 
‘Yang’. Yang means heroes, revolutions, victories and all positive events. Yin refers 
to villains, counter-revolutions, failures and all negative issues. The former always 
overcomes the latter in Chinese socialist films. Clearly the diegetic structure of these 
eight Model Films was not sophisticated and did not have complex psychological 
narratives. In portraying the protagonists, most of the films used low-angle mid shots 
in order to show the heroes in the dominant position, demonstrating the theory of The 
Three Prominences. The political message of these eight Model Films is thus 





Figure 10: Two stills from The Red Detachment of Women. The protagonist Wu Qinghua (*ĳ) 
conquers her enemy Nan Batian (7) and leads the Red Army to continue the revolution. 
 
 Although these eight Model Films were criticised very harshly immediately 
after the Cultural Revolution by the Chinese regime and the film industry and in fact 
were banned, the five Chinese operas of these eight Model Films are still quite 
popular today; they are still screened because the songs are liked by many Chinese 
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people who are not familiar with Western and modern music and songs (Dai 1995, 1-
3). The five original operas presented in the Model Films were re-performed in 1982 




Among the 61 films produced during the Cultural Revolution from 1973 to 1976, 
there are two distinct groups. The first group consists of 52 adult feature films; the 
second, of nine children’s feature films. The themes of both groups concern class 
struggle and wartime literature. There were about 36 class struggle-themed films 
produced and 25 wartime literature-themed films. 
 The first film to feature the theme of class struggle was Bright Sunny Skies 
produced in 1973, about peasants in the countryside. The class struggle theme in this 
group of films also depicted workers in city factories such as in The Fiery Year (Ņħ
Ș 1974) and Fights on the Berth (Ωz˄ 1975) as well as in countryside 
villages such as Green Pine Ridge (ɎʴǍ 1973) and Zhan Hong Tu (ΩĤˡ 1973). 
These class struggle-themed films were not as popular as the war literature-themed 
films such as Scouts (ε_N 1974) and Rolling Wheels (hǠĎĎ 1975) made 
during the Cultural Revolution. There were three reasons for this: first, the films did 
not have a spectacular mise-en-scène; second, the diegetic discourse was less 
attractive; and third, the novels on which these films were based were far more 
engaging than the films. For example, the film Bright Sunny Skies had the same name 
as the novel which was written by Hao Ran ()+), a well-known and prolific writer 
at that time. His novel Bright Sunny Skies is in three volumes consisting of more than 
a thousand pages, but the length of the film is an hour and 35 minutes and 27 seconds, 
 95 
limited by the feature film convention at that time, which was that films were not 
supposed to be longer than two hours and thus could not contain all the details of a 
long novel. 
 Scouts, produced in 1974, was the first feature film based on wartime 
literature. The scriptwriter and director of this film were the same person, Li Wenhua, 
a cinematographer at the Beijing Film Studio. He participated in many film 
productions as a cinematographer such as Early Spring in February (1963) and Great 
Wall of the South Sea (ȑĔdp 1965). After being sacked by Jiang Qing for the 
opera film production of The Harbour in 1971, Li, according to the account of Di 
Jiannong (2001, 412), was one day in 1973 reading a novel called Extremely Brave 
Scouts (ʄ΀ε_N ) by Liu Zhixia (ǔπ̑) at the film studio library. Li felt 
this novel about Communist scouts gaining secret information and defeating the 
Kuomintang soldiers during the Chinese Civil War was a good one. He therefore 
decided to turn this novel into a film and started writing the script. While doing so, he 
also visited the head of the Communist scouts in this battle. When Li finished his film 
script he obtained permission for the film production from Di Fucai (ÛX), one of 
the military personnel at the head of the Beijing Film Studio, who thought it would be 
useful for propaganda purposes to produce more films. 
 The production of the film Scouts was carried out quietly. Li Wenhua invited 
two well-known film stars, Wang Xin’gang (˪̲é) and Yu Lan (΅Ƨ), to perform 
the roles as the main protagonists, an advisor to the People’s Liberation Army, Guo 
Rui (ďɭ), and Aunt Sun (ʿȚ). Wang was the only film star who had not been 
harassed at the August the First Film Studio, and Yu (who was a film star) had only 
just been released from a reform camp during the Cultural Revolution. The film was 
finished and released for Chinese cinema in 1974 without Jiang Qing knowing about 
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it; the film censorship personnel, her allies, while knowing about the film, had not 
checked it properly. When Jiang Qing eventually saw this film, she was angry at the 
reality depicted in it. So she asked Yu Huiyong, the Culture Minister, to tell Di Fucai 
that she wanted the film director, Li Wenhua, to write a report on this film. Li thought 
the film was valuable entertainment and politically sound, and found a helper to write 
the report. When he handed it in, Jiang did not wish to accept it as she wanted a self-
critical statement from Li. He had no choice then but to write and submit such a 
statement. When Li was ill in hospital a nurse told him that she had read his self-
critical statement in the Liberation Army Daily (ŴËƕɦ>) reprinted from the 
People’s Daily; and the following day, Li was disappointed to discover that not only 
had his self-criticism been published on page four of the People’s Daily but also that 
the film Scouts had been criticised by Jiang Qing and her political allies as well as 
Li’s colleagues (Di 2001, 414). 
 Unfortunately, the film scriptwriter, director and cinematographer, Li 
Wenhua, was not only criticised during the Cultural Revolution but also reprimanded 
after the Cultural Revolution due to the leftist films he had directed during the 
Cultural Revolution such as Breaking Up (1975) and Counter Attack (Åň 1976). 
Breaking Up was a very well-known class struggle-themed film which was in keeping 
with the political atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution; and Counter Attack was also 
a class struggle-themed film which was not released for Chinese cinema but was pre-
viewed quite extensively. Li, responding to the criticism, claimed that he had directed 
these films as tasks arranged by the Beijing Film Studio during the Cultural 
Revolution and therefore the Communist regime should not blame him for these films 
(Li 2011). 
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 The second group of 61 films comprised nine children’s feature films; four 
wartime literature-themed films — Sparkling Red Star (ɶɶħ̴ 1974), Beacon-
fire Youth (ÔŅɺȘ 1975), Yellow River Youth (ļğɺȘ 1975), and Jinsuo (Ÿˀ 
1976); and five class struggle-themed films — Sunny Courtyard Story (̥͗ΖĀ
ʙ 1974), Red Rain (ħΈ 1975), Ah Yong ( ΀ 1975), Small Conch (̪ǢĚ 1975), 
and The Secret of Ah Xia River ( ̓ğǺǻ 1976). There is no doubt that the 
narratives of these films were designed to eulogise the leadership of the Communist 
Party and to do this, used realistic codes and elements to portray the young people as 
heroes either in the wars or in the social and political class struggle. The film 
Sparkling Red Star was the first archetype of a Chinese Civil War motion picture 
made during the Cultural Revolution depicting the young Pan Dongzi (ȥ­Ϟ) 
fighting alongside his parents and following in their steps. This kind of film was 
needed during the Cultural Revolution in order to encourage the younger generation 
to become the revolutionaries of the future. 
 
Other Forms of Film 
The Chinese film industry not only produced opera and feature films during the 
Cultural Revolution, but also created other forms of film such as the Uyghur opera 
film The Red Lantern (1975) and the film Songs of the Long March (dκϥñħƕ
UȣΕκȒ 1976), neither of which represented the dominant themes of wartime 
literature or class struggle. The former was directed by Chen Ying (qͲ), who had 
directed the Chinese opera film The Red Lantern at the August the First film studio. 
The latter was directed by Wang Ping and Huang Baoshan (ļ=ɷ) and was also 
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produced by the August the First film studio; it comprised a mix of Chinese songs in a 
Western musical style with Chinese poetry recitals. 
 The Uyghur opera film The Red Lantern has several unique characteristics: all 
the actors are Uyghur actors and sing in the Turkic language (the language of the 
people of Eastern and Central Asia); the melodies are mixed, played on Uyghur 
musical instruments such as the Dap, Dutar and Tämbur, as well as on Chinese and 
Western musical instruments; the arias, however, are similar to Chinese opera. In 
terms of the settings and plots the film resembles the Chinese opera The Red Lantern. 
The main purpose of this film was to spread the revolutionary spirit to ethnic 
minorities. 
 The film Songs of the Long March is a stage documentary show and the only 
film Jiang Qing did not interfere with because Premier Zhou himself had fostered this 
play since 1966 with other leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and He Long. It also 
involved many famous musicians such Chen Geng (jõ), Tang He (ˋϰ) and Sheng 
Mao (ʇǯ) as well as many well-known singers such as Ma Yutao (ǧΌˌ), Jia 
Shijun (śʘƘ) and Ma Guoguang (ǧĐĉ). Some montages of the victorious Red 
Army were intermittently added in between the on-stage songs over ten acts that 
comprised static singing scenes and motion fighting mise-en-scène. 
 These two films, produced near the end of the Cultural Revolution, are very 
different from the forms and norms of conventional, classic films. To a certain extent, 
The Red Lantern still possesses realistic codes and elements, but Songs of the Long 
March does not follow a narrative structure. Both films do, nevertheless, manifest 





The theory of The Three Prominences was central to Chinese film production during 
the Cultural Revolution. It is clear that Jiang Qing’s theory was developed through 
two major phases by Yu Huiyong, the Minister of Culture, and Yao Wenyuan, a 
Politburo member, who translated her ideas into words. To a great extent, her theory 
not only affected operas but also had a considerable impact on films in terms of 
composition, framing, lighting systems and camera work. Under the influence of 
Jiang Qing’s theory, filmmakers portrayed the major heroes as distinctively large, 
bright and centred figures in order to evoke more patriotic and political loyalties 




Figure 11: Still from Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy (ψɘ˯Įɵ), one of Jiang Qing’s eight 
Model Opera films. Main protagonist Yang Zhirong (͔φɨ) is centred and wearing tiger skin jacket. 
The main antagonist, Zuoshandiao (Ϭɵ§), is defeated and lying on the ground. 
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 The Communist regime sought to control visual media because it recognised 
the importance of the visual culture of pedagogical realism for the purposes of 
socialist propaganda and nation building. It is in this context that the opera Model 
Films and feature films were produced when the Chinese film studios resumed 
production during the Cultural Revolution. These films had unique styles in terms of 
their political content as well as the aesthetic and artistic formation of mise-en-scène. 
In particular, Jiang Qing’s eight model films had a tremendous impact on the Chinese 
people and were in keeping with the political motivations of the Cultural Revolution. 
 While Jiang Qing’s theory of The Three Prominences was an important 
influence on film production, it was not the only influence; film diegesis and film 
censorship also enabled Jiang Qing to ensure Chinese cinema’s social and political 
purity (its ‘romantic’ realism, as it were) in order to perpetuate the socialist revolution. 
Communist doctrine and ideology also played a significant role. Images of Mao, for 
example, and of other Communist Party leaders, as well as images of workers-
peasants-soldiers, were fully portrayed in films of the time. This, then, was the 
political and thematic background in which the films were produced; the following 
chapter will consider some of the formal elements, including cinematic language and 




Diegesis and Censorship  
 
Chinese cinema was more overtly social and political during the Cultural Revolution 
than before or since. The films during that period concentrated on social and political 
figures such as Mao Zedong, the Communist Party and workers-peasants-soldiers. 
Films promoted the vision and ideology of the emergent socialist society; in order to 
do so, the doctrine of socialist realism was imposed by Jiang Qing and her political 
coterie on all writers, filmmakers and artists, a doctrine similar to that imposed under 
Stalin in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Film censorship in accordance with Jiang 
Qing’s theory of The Three Prominences promoted the adoption of more accessible 
styles of idealised and optimistic images. This chapter thus argues that film narratives 
with political figures were the key issues in film censorship decisions among Mao, 
Jiang Qing, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and filmmakers, in order that cinema could 
be used as a pedagogical and ideological tool to promote socialism. 
 This chapter begins by exploring film narratives in terms of the political 
figures including protagonists and antagonists represented in the films produced 
during the Cultural Revolution. It examines the extent to which these narratives 
illustrated the different codes and elements of realistic contexts which were presented 
in order to encourage the Chinese people to participate in socialist construction during 
the Cultural Revolution; it also examines how these political narratives unfolded in 
films depicting war and class struggle during the Cultural Revolution and how the 
images, juxtaposed in the narratives, achieved perceptual and emotional power. The 
chapter then examines film censorship in relation to the political narratives to 
determine whether the disputes among Chinese Communist Party leaders were 
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justified in terms of their political purposes. The contexts of a few films made during 
the Cultural Revolution were selected for examination in accordance with the political 
criteria relating to the relevant historical socialist period. How Jiang Qing used her 
political intuition to censor films (as there was no blueprint for the content of a film) 
is examined in order to better understand the Cultural Revolution in the context of 
literature and art. Lastly, this chapter investigates the role of Chinese cinema during 
the Cultural Revolution through the interrelation of film distribution and consumption 
with education. In other words, as Thompson and Bordwell (1994, 194-295) suggest, 
this study investigates how positive images of heroes, in this case, the socialist 
protagonists, became significant idols. 
 
Political Narratives and Figures 
Despite some Chinese film scholars such as Paul Clark and Chris Berry claiming that 
the Cultural Revolution was a continuum of Chinese socialism as discussed in the 
previous chapter, other Chinese film scholars such as Li Shaobai (Ʊɺ3), Ma Debo 
(ǧS) and Zhang Yingjin (άͷŻ) viewed it differently and thus categorised 
Chinese film history differently as well. According to Li Shaobai (1991, 43-63), 
Chinese film history was divided into nine periods:  
(1) initial experiment from 1905 to 1923; (2) early artistic exploration from 
1923 to 1926; (3) crisis and turning from 1927 to 1932; (4) revolutionary 
change from 1932 to 1937; (5) war time from 1937 to 1945; (6) artistic 
enrichment from 1945 to 1949; (7) socialist cinema from 1949 to 1965; (8) 
prohibition from 1966 to 1976 and (9) further exploration from 1977 to 1989. 
 
Li divided the film history of the People’s Republic of China from 1949 to 1989 into 
three periods, just two years before his book was published in 1991. Interestingly, Ma 
Debo (1995, 1-32) schematised Chinese film history differently, from 1905 to 1995, 
into eight periods: 
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(1) primitive commercial film from1905 to 1931; (2) leftist film from 1932 to 
1937; (3) realist film from 1947 to 1949; (4) propagandist film from 1949 to 
1976; (5) social film from 1981 to 1982; (6) film of life from 1982 to 1986; 
(7) cultural film from 1984 to 1987 and (8) modern commercial film from 
1987 to 1995.  
 
Ma divided the years 1949 to 1995 into five periods. The differences between these 
two, Zhang Yingjin (2004, 10-11) pointed out, are that Li gave priority to articulating 
artistic concerns and socio-political events rather than arguing for a politicised film 
history because he wished to avoid the official sanctioning of his Chinese film 
historiography written in 1991; Ma simply omitted the war years from 1938 to 1946 
and the immediate post-Mao years from 1977 to 1979, as well as the overlapping 
years in the four periods in order to advance his argument in favour of a cyclical 
model of Chinese cinema development. The period of the Cultural Revolution from 
1966 to 1976 could be described as either a propagandist film period (according to Li 
Shaobai) or as a prohibition film period (according to Ma Debo). Obviously both film 
scholars analysed Chinese film history from their own perspectives; whether or not 
the films were from the propagandist period or from the prohibition period, they were 
still subject to film censorship by the Communist regime. The film narratives and 
political figures were indeed more thoroughly censored during the Cultural 
Revolution than ever before in Chinese film history.  Hence, the Chinese film industry 
at that time produced unique themes and specific styles in order to serve the political 
needs of the socialist nation. 
The construction of film narratives and political figures among the films 
produced during the Cultural Revolution differed significantly from the films made 
before the Cultural Revolution. A number of dramatic decors, for example, were 
constructed around characters — characters confined to the proletarian roles of 
workers-peasants-soldiers as well as the Communist Party instead of the humanistic 
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characters in the films produced before the Cultural Revolution. These depictions of 
aspiring working class characters and the Communist Party, which appeared in the 
whole spectrum of films made and shown between 1966 and 1976, were essential for 
the Cultural Revolution. 
 
Workers 
There were six major films to eulogise workers involved in socialist construction and 
nation building among the 93 films made in total during the Cultural Revolution. Four 
of those were feature films: The Fiery Year 1974), Undertaking ({͠ 1974), The 
Iron and Steel Giant (ê˗Ǝɤ 1974) and Fighting on the Slipway (Ωz˄ 1975); 
two were opera films which were the same film The Harbour, one produced in 1972 
and the other reproduced in 1973 by the Beijing Film Studio in conjunction with the 
Shanghai Film Studio. Undertaking was the only one among these six films included 
in the China New Literature Compendium 1949-1976: Film Volume 1 (ϊĐ̱˹́
̎1949-1976¤ͼƒ1 ), an important scholarly reference book edited by Chen 
Huangmei (lĻǱ) and Luo Yijun (ǣͩƕ) and published in 1997 just after 
Mainland China celebrated the ninetieth anniversary of the first Chinese film made in 
1905. The reason, given in the editorial prologue in that work, for some Chinese films 
not being selected is that they were considered neither artistically or aesthetically 
sound, nor socially or politically correct. 
 However, not only do the four feature films have the same theme of class 
struggle; they also have similar characteristics such as settings in Chinese heavy 
industry: Undertaking in the oil fields, The Fiery Year in a steel refinery, The Iron 
and Steel Giant in a large scale machinery factory, and Fighting on the Slipway in a 
shipyard. The worker protagonists in these four films were all middle-aged men 
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around forty who were not fully qualified in their professional occupations but had 
received some informal education and understood the practicalities of the industrial 
process. They were fighting antagonists who were fully qualified professional 
intellectuals of whom one or another came from, or were associated with, rich 
families in the past. Furthermore, of course, these protagonists were centred in the 
frame, with more close-up shots and extra radiance in the mise-en-scène in 
accordance with Jiang Qing’s theory of The Three Prominences. In contrast, the 
antagonists were portrayed off-centre, with median shots and slightly gloomy colour 
to understate their character, their conspiratorial nature and vicious innermost selves 




Figure 12: Top L-R: main protagonist Zhao Sihai (ήʲĔ) in The Fiery Year (ŅħȘ) and main 
protagonist Zhou Tingshan (ώ˚ɴ) in Undertaking ({͠). Bottom L-R: main protagonist Dai Jihong 
(ŗĥ) in The Iron and Steel Giant (ê˗Ǝɤ) and main protagonist Lei Haisheng (ƮĔʇ) in 
Fighting on the Slipway (Ωz˄). 
 
 The film Undertaking was not only selected by China Cinema Encyclopaedia 
in 1995, but also was the only film made during the Cultural Revolution to be selected 
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by China New Literature Compendium 1949-1976: Film Volume 1 in 1997. Its chief 
editor Chen Huangmei is a contemporary Chinese author and literature and art critic. 
He explained that although the editors had worked very hard on the selection 
processes, not wanting to overlook some good literary works created during the 
Cultural Revolution, Undertaking was, unfortunately, the only film selected from the 
93 films produced during the Cultural Revolution (Chen 1997, 10). For Chen, the 
other films of the Cultural Revolution were too ‘political’ to be considered worthy of 
inclusion. 
 Undertaking is set in the Yumen and Daqing oil fields and covers the period 
from before China’s Liberation to the 1960s. The film plot links American 
imperialism prior to China’s Liberation and Russian revisionism in the 1960s with 
class struggle to counter the thinking of Western petroleum experts that there was no 
oil in China. The ‘positive’ character and principal hero in Undertaking, Zhou 
Tingshan (ώ˚ɴ), the leader of a group of oil workers determined to drill a high-
yield oil well, has no doubts about the correctness of his struggle with the geology 
engineer Zhang Yizhi (Ϊͪρ), and ultimately with Mr Wang (˪Ýτľ), the 
second in charge of the oil field, a class enemy trying to sabotage the newly drilled 
well. Although Zhou is not a geology engineer, he studies Mao’s works ‘On 
Contradiction’ (Ǯ·ǡ ) and ‘On Practice’ (ʐšǡ ) to tackle the problems 
in the oil field. Somehow, Zhou finds that the reason for the failure of the first drilling 
was that a rich peasant had moved the signpost for the original drilling site away from 
his family land because Mr Wang, the second in charge, had deliberately misinformed 
this rich peasant; nevertheless, Zhou still successfully drills the second high-yield oil 
well. This film, to a certain extent, is a more realistic reflection of the People’s 
Republic of China after its establishment during the 1950s and 1960s; it depicts the 
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state oil workers overcoming the difficulties of a lack of crude petroleum and their 
success in achieving oil self-sufficiency, a story based on the real life of ‘Ironman 
Wang Jinxi’ (˗ɤ˪Ż̍). It is interesting politically to question why Jiang Qing 
wanted to ban this film — it seems she believed the film praises Liu Shaoqi rather 
than eulogising Mao’s revolutionary ideas. Mao himself did not perceive the nuances 
and subtleties of the political intertwining in this film, as discussed below. 
 Three other films besides Undertaking were also produced at that time in a 
similar manner. For example, Zhao Sihai (ήʲĔ), the main protagonist of The Fiery 
Year in his late 30s and the head of a team of steelworkers, was determined to 
produce good quality alloys. He vividly recalled how Chairman Mao visited the steel 
factory four years before and how Mao’s visit inspired him to do his best; with his 
work colleagues he fought against the factory director, Bai Xianzhou (3̗ύed); 
and he defeated Ying Jiapei (ͺŚȬ), the class enemy, an old engineer; finally he 
produced good quality alloys instead of imported alloys for use in naval vessels. This 
film with its anti-revisionism theme attracted some interesting questions; according to 
Di Jiannong (2001, 252), some audiences wrote to the main performer, Yu Yang (΅
͖), to ask him why Zhao Sihai, who was well over 40 and still lived with his mother, 
was not married. Yu, for the sake of portraying a positive image of Zhao Sihai, 
humorously replied to the audiences that Zhao and his wife lived in two different 
places and they had not yet managed to work and live in the same place. Actually, the 
truth was far from that — no romantic elements were allowed at the time the film 
studios resumed their productions during the Cultural Revolution. 
 Although Rey Chow (1995, 36-37) notes that Chinese films produced during 
the Cultural Revolution had no ‘primitive passion’, the element of ‘primitive passion’ 
did appear in two other films, The Iron and Steel Giant and Fighting on the Slipway. 
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The main character, Dai Jihong (ŗĥ), is married and his wife works alongside 
him to build a giant steel-rolling machine in The Iron and Steel Giant. In Fighting on 
the Slipway the principal hero, Lei Haisheng (ƮĔʇ), is married with a young 
daughter; his wife supports him in the building of a large vessel. Both films have 
almost identical plots: the main protagonists are newly selected team leaders who lead 
a band of workers to build a machine or a vessel; although they work in an 
undesirable environment they eventually accomplish the tasks despite attempted 
sabotage by particular engineers, who are class enemies. Their accomplishments win 
honour for Chairman Mao and are portrayed as being a consequence of the Cultural 
Revolution. The themes of these two films reflect Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line 
of self-determination and self-reliance, at the same time opposing the revisionist line. 
 The plots of these six major ‘worker’ films follow three stages according to 
Chris Berry (1982, 37-72): ‘the first crisis might cause some peripheral heroic 
characters to waver; the second confirms the rightness of the central hero’s line; and 
the third ends in exposure of the enemy and victory for proletarian forces’. However, 
Di Jiannong (2001, 252) notes that Chinese audiences who at first had liked these 
kinds of film came to loathe them over time because of the recurring narrative; that is, 
all the films were based on people in rural areas while there was a dearth of films 
about workers in the cities.  
 
Peasants 
There were certainly more films produced to extol peasants than workers during the 
Cultural Revolution, because there were more peasants in the countryside than 
workers in the city. Another explanation could be that peasants needed more 
entertainment related to their lifestyle. At any rate, more than 20 films were produced 
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representing peasants during the Cultural Revolution. Among these films, five had a 
particular influence on the Chinese people: Bright Sunny Skies (1973), Green Pine 
Ridge (1973), Golden Road (Ÿĉ 1975), Spring Seedling (1975) and Jubilant 
Small Cool River (Ĺː̪ƿğ 1976). Bright Sunny Skies was the first feature film 
to be made during the Cultural Revolution as noted in the previous chapter; Spring 
Seedling and Jubilant Small Cool River will be dealt with in Chapter Five. Thus, this 
section explores only the themes of Green Pine Ridge and Golden Road in order to 
understand the pedagogical structures of Chinese films which represented peasants 
and class struggle in the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. 
 Green Pine Ridge is not only a remade film but also a transplanted film from a 
play. The first version of Green Pine Ridge was produced in black and white in 1965; 
then it was reproduced as a colour film in 1973 with the same director, Liu Guoquan  
(ǔĐɚ), the same band of actors, and using the same film studio, the Changchun 
Film Studio. The film is set in a mountain region in the north-east of China and its 
theme is one of opposition to capitalism; it depicts some individual peasants who 
want to earn extra small amounts of money by selling agricultural products privately 
and who, in so doing, ignore the commune’s collective work in the fields. From 
today’s perspective this is a very trivial matter and could be considered as an 
important initiative for the peasants to undertake. However, at that time, such 
behaviour was treated as a very serious matter under the Communist regime of the 
day. The plot of this film, then, is about class struggle against capitalism in rural areas 
in China. 
 The main protagonists include Zhang Wanshan (ά˨ɵ), an old retired horse 
cart driver; Fang Jiyun (ÉŘΚ), the Party secretary; and Xiumei (̻ǰ) and Dahu     
(Į), two young, eager horse cart driving trainees. They are all striving to achieve a 
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successful harvest in the commune village. The middle person is the village head 
Zhou Cheng (ώq), who is busy looking after the sale of agricultural products to the 
government agent and managing the harvest work and personnel arrangements in the 
fields. He is also Xiumei’s elder brother. The antagonist is Qian Guang (ɅĊ), a 
newly selected horse cart driver who hides his original family identity as a rich 
peasant, a position which was classified as class enemy at the time; he also helps 




Figure 13: Main protagonist Fang Jiyun (ÉŘΚ), the Party secretary, advises village head Zhou 
Cheng (ώq) in Green Pine Ridge (ɎʴǑ). 
 
 One morning, Xiumei and Dahu practise driving the horse cart without 
permission. The cart, pulled by three horses, is driven without incident out of the 
village but when they arrive at a T-junction in front of a large elm tree, the horses 
suddenly start to run fast and Xiumei and Dahu lose control over them. A village 
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peasant, Laosi (Ƭʲ), on seeing Xiumei and Dahu driving the horse cart, tells Qian 
Guang, the newly selected horse cart driver, about Xiumei and Dahu driving the horse 
cart out of the village and asks Qian where they are going. Qian replies that he knows 
Xiumei and Dahu do their horse cart training in the area of the dangerous T-junction 
but he cannot stop them because Xiumei and Dahu are supported by Zhang Wanshan. 
Laosi becomes anxious and immediately goes to see Zhang and tells him about the 
direction in which Xiumei and Dahu are going. Zhang instantly realises the danger 
and takes a short cut across the mountain to the T-junction. When he sees Xiumei and 
Dahu and the out of control horses, he jumps down the mountain path and bravely 
stops the running horses. Xiumei and Dahu are surprised to see Zhang. Unfortunately, 
one of the horses breaks loose and runs away and Xiumei and Dahu cannot catch it. 
Then they see a man in the roadway and yell at him to capture the runaway white 
horse; the man catches it easily and rides it back to them. During their conversation, 
they find out he is the Party secretary, Fang Jiyun, who has come to work at their 
village. 
 The struggle between Qian Guang and the two learner drivers, Xiumei and 
Dahu, is a regular occurrence. Qian secretly drives the horse cart for his own business; 
in order to do this he bribes some of the village peasants but he fails to bribe Zhang 
Wanshan. Eventually, Fang and Zhang find out that Qian Guang has deliberately set a 
trap using three whips on the horses in order to go through the T-junction without 
telling anyone, and purposely has caused a horse to be sick in order to blame Xiumei 
for not looking after the horse properly; they also find out that Qian is a rich peasant. 
Therefore, Zhou Cheng, the head of the village when faced with these facts, is no 
longer able to support Qian. After Qian is taken away, Zhou happily assists the people 
of the commune village to resume their agricultural activities harmoniously. 
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 The characterisation and plot in Green Pine Ridge are quite weak and not 
particularly influenced by Jiang Qing’s theory of The Three Prominences. There are 
four protagonists who are portrayed on an equal footing. More importantly, the film 
exaggerates anti-capitalism in the class struggle theme to meet the needs of the regime 
even though it is a remake of a film produced before the Cultural Revolution. 
 In comparison with Green Pine Ridge, the film Golden Road was slightly 
more popular because the characterisation and plot were more sophisticated. Golden 
Road has two episodes. The first episode was made in 1975 and the second in 1976. 
This film is set in a rural area just after the land reform of the 1950s. At that time, 
poor and ‘middle’ peasants (ȵ̒ϊȞ) were classified as socialist contributors and 
received land during the land reform; rich peasants (âȞ) and landlords (ϔ) were 
rated as class enemies (Ůŏɤ) and their land was expropriated and distributed to 
poor and ‘middle’ peasants. The main protagonist, Gao Daquan (îɛ), a poor 
peasant who is a well nourished and handsome man in his 30s and also a member of 
the Communist Party, encourages all the poor peasants in his village to work 
collectively and to participate in socialist construction and nation building. However, 
the head of their village, Zhang Jinfa (άŸÂ), who is also a member of the 
Communist Party, wants to make himself rich quickly and does so by tricking some 
poor peasants out of their land and colluding with the rich peasant, Feng Shaohuai (Õ
ɺķ), the counterrevolutionary, Fan Keming (ÆƠǿ), and the rice shop owner in 
the nearby town to push up the price of rice; in this way he gains a profit due to a 




Gao builds the roads. 
Figure 14: Main protagonist Gao Daquan (îɛ) in Golden Road (20) above. 
Gao educates peasants. 
Gao criticises individuals. 
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Caifeng (ɅZÖ), to incite her boyfriend, Gao Erlin (8$), to leave his elder 
brother, Gao Daquan, and his family. Gao Daquan, with the support of his wife Lü 
Ruifeng (ǞɬÍ) and their young son, has no choice but to let his brother Gao Erlin 
leave their home. Thus, Gao Daquan, without his brother’s help, becomes very busy. 
Feng also uses Gao Erlin and other poor peasants to make a profit but does not care 
about the peasants’ welfare. Gao Erlin works so hard in the bad weather that he 
almost dies. When injured, he thinks of his brother, Gao Daquan, and wants to go 
back and live with him. Gao Daquan rescues his brother and takes him home to his 
wife, Qian Caifeng. Eventually, Gao Erlin and his wife Qian Caifeng realise that 
Gao’s brother-in-law, Feng Shaohuai, has exploited and deceived them. Finally, the 
activities of Zhang Jinfa, Fan Keming and Feng Shaohuai against socialist 
construction are exposed and the three are taken away from the village. Gao Daquan 
is then able to continue to lead all the peasants according to Mao’s revolutionary line 
of socialist construction. 
 This two-episode film is quite different from the previous films which had 
been made in 1973 and 1974 without ‘primitive passion’ — spouses or family 
scenarios. Golden Road not only uses ‘primitive passion’ in the treatment of the film 
plot but also, more importantly, deploys it as a primary intrinsic motivator to 
humanise the characters. Thus it adds an element of realism to the film. 
 Depicting peasants striving for Chinese socialism, no doubt, was useful during 
the Cultural Revolution. Not only were the peasants the largest section of the 
population in China but also they were faithful socialist contributors in the rural areas 
in China at that time. The films, to a great extent, realistically reflected the life of the 




During the Cultural Revolution the Chinese film industry not only made films about 
workers and peasants but also produced many films about soldiers. Fifteen films 
depicted soldiers either in the Chinese civil war or in the war against the Japanese 
invasion. These films about soldiers were much more popular than the films about 
workers and peasants because they provided more action and drama. Some were more 
popular than others, though. The most popular films included Scouts (1974), Fighting 
North and South (ȑκ?Ω 1974), Reconnaissance across the Yangtze  (´ŧε_ŕ 
1974), Unforgettable Battle (ȒˮΩ¯ 1976), and South China Sea Storms (ȑĔ
ÓΚ 1976). Scouts has already been discussed in the previous chapter. Fighting North 
and South and Reconnaissance across the Yangtze are two remade films which will be 
further examined in the following chapter on film adaptation, transplantation and 
reproduction. This section examines the film narratives of Unforgettable Battle and 
South China Sea Storms. 
 Both Unforgettable Battle and South China Sea Storms were produced in 
1976. The former was made by the Shanghai Film Studio and the latter was produced 
by the August the First Film Studio. They were popular because they were not only 
based on wartime literature but also had handsome young actors, Da Shichang (ʕ
c) and Tang Guoqiang (ˋĐɈ), who attracted an enormous following. Da Shichang 
performed the main character, Tian Wenzhong (˕˹ϊ), in Unforgettable Battle and 
Tang Guoqiang acted the principal hero, Yu Hualong (΅ĴǗ), in South China Sea 
Storms. Anecdotal evidence states that there were massive numbers of film fans 
waiting at the gate of the Shanghai Film Studio and the August the First Film Studio 
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to see these two actors when they finished work each day in spite of the strictures of 
the Cultural Revolution. 
 The film Unforgettable Battle is about a small group of the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army led by Tian Wenzhong, a young army officer in his 30s, who tries to 
buy grain from peasants for the city dwellers; he is also fighting Kuomintang spies 
and bandits in a small city in Southern China in 1949. These Kuomintang spies and 
bandits are led by a covert senior Kuomintang army officer who pretends to be a 
general manager of the Rich Country Rice Company, Chen Futang (lÛˉ), 
performed by a well-known actor, Bai Mu (3ȍ). Chen impedes the People’s 
Liberation Army’s purchase of grain from the peasants and organises attacks on the 
grain-carrying barges of the People’s Liberation Army when they leave the 
countryside in order to destabilise the new establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China. Chen also extorts information through direct threats about the arrival dates of 
the grain-carrying barges from a deputy district chief, Liu Zhiren (ǔφɣ). Chen 
portrays himself as a supporter of Tian and his army by buying grain from the 
peasants, but secretly he tries to buy grain from the peasants at high prices despite the 
new grain price policy issued by the local authority. In addition, the Kuomintang spies 
and bandits from time to time pretend to be part of the People’s Liberation Army so 
that they can go into the countryside and attack the peasants and rob them of their 
grain, causing great difficulties for Tian who then goes into the countryside and 
discovers the deception for himself; Tian then considers all the problems together and 
eventually solves them. In the coda of this film, Tian sees through another trick set up 
by Chen when he invites some businessmen to a banquet one evening in a town 
restaurant. The trick is that Chen planned to open the restaurant window curtain 
during the evening as a signal to the Kuomintang spies and bandits that they can come 
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down from the mountain and attack the People’s Liberation Army in the town. Tian, 
however, goes to the restaurant and opens the curtain himself despite Chen’s efforts to 
stop him. When the Kuomintang spies and bandits see the light, they come down from 
the mountain. The People’s Liberation Army, which has been waiting for them, wipes 
them out. Tian thus successfully accomplishes the mission set by Chairman Mao and 




Figure 15: Main protagonist Tian Wenzhong (˕˹ϊ) performed by a handsome young actor, Da 
Shichang (ʕc), fights main antagonist Chen Futang (lÛˉ) performed by a well-known actor, 
Bai Mu (3ȍ), bottom right, in Unforgettable Battle (ȒˮΩ¯). 
 
 Unforgettable Battle was adapted from the novel Grain Purchasing Brigade  
(ƾʏYýµ ), written by Sun Jingrui (ʿƃɬ), who was also the film’s 
scriptwriter. According to Mao’s secretary, Wu Xujun (˿̾Ɩ ), Mao’s other 
personal secretary, Zhang Yufeng (άΌÖ), knew Mao liked to watch new films so 
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she obtained Unforgettable Battle for him; when Mao watched it, he broke down in 
tears and his mournful mood affected all the members of his staff watching the film 
with him (Quan 1998). Many years later, when the film director’s wife, Lan Weijie     
(Ƨ˳Ų), read the description of Mao’s story from Quan Yanchi’s book Mao Zedong 
Stepped Down from the Gods (ϣ̒ʄˆǭΤ¬ ) she told her 80-year-old 
husband, Tang Xiaodan (ˈ̩), about Mao crying while viewing the film; when 
Tang heard this, he too broke down in tears. 
 South China Sea Storms, however, is very different to Unforgettable Battle 
despite both films being based on wartime literature. South China Sea Storms is about 
a real event — South Vietnam and China fighting for the Paracel Islands in the South 
China Sea in 1974, just a year before the Americans left South Vietnam. The Chinese 
navy and militia not only won the battle and reoccupied the Paracel Islands but also 
captured an American advisor, Gerald Emil Kosh, seconded to the Republic of 
Vietnam. Although the Republic of Vietnam requested United States’ help, the 
American President Gerald Ford declined, possibly because the Watergate case had 
just finished; under the leadership of the former American President, Richard Nixon, 
America and China had just begun developing a diplomatic relationship; and America 
did not want another war with China since America had lost many soldiers in 
Vietnam. South China Sea Storms, based on this event, has as its main hero Yu 
Hualong, the captain of the Chinese warship, who led the Chinese forces against the 
warship from the Republic of Vietnam in the South China Sea. In addition, this film 
also depicts intermittently, through flashbacks, how Yu grew up from being an 





Figure 16: Main protagonist Yu Hualong (΅ĴǗ) performed by a handsome young actor, Tang 
Guoqiang (ˋĐɈ), in South China Sea Storms (ȑĔÓΚ). 
 
 Although this film was not as popular as Unforgettable Battle, it reflects a 
historical event that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Both films were much 
loved by Chinese audiences at that time not only because of the appearance of new 
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young actors such as Da Shichang and Tang Guoqiang, as well as older actors such as 
Bai Mu and Cheng Zhi who had just returned to work, but also because the themes of 
these two films were completely different from other films representing workers and 
peasants. In addition, the filmic techniques and narratives of these films had improved 




As noted above, there was no absolute blueprint for film content during the Cultural 
Revolution. What Jiang Qing did in her role as ‘the great flag bearer of literature and 
art’ was to rely on her political intuition, her cinematic knowledge and her political 
allies when examining the films produced by the Chinese film industry. The political 
pressure exerted by film censorship on the Chinese film industry was much worse 
than that which Hollywood suffered during the McCarthy era of the late 1940s and the 
early 1950s. The film censorship battle during the Cultural Revolution was similar to 
the direct interference by the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence and even by 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson in the UK in the 1965 British documentary film, The 
War Game, by Peter Watkins. Not only did Jiang Qing directly control film 
censorship, but so, too, did her husband Mao from time to time, as did many other top 
Chinese leaders such as Premier Zhou and Deng Xiaoping. In addition, Jiang Qing 
and her political allies such as Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Yu Huiyong and Liu 
Qingtang (ǔɒˊ), the deputy Culture Minister, had more direct confrontations with 




Figure 17: Jiang Qing’s political allies from left to right: Yao Wenyuan (͛˹Α), Hao Liang (ěǄ), 
Jiang Qing (ŧɎ), Liu Qingtang (ǔɒˊ), Yu Huiyong (΅Ń;) and Zhang Chunqiao (ά|ɉ). 
(Gained on 31 May 2013, http://image55.360doc.com/DownloadImg/2012/11/1122/28159443_10.jpg) 
 
Mao and Jiang Qing 
It is true to say that, during the Cultural Revolution, Jiang Qing had more political 
intuition about film censorship than did Mao. Jiang could see the innuendoes, for 
example, in the historical play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office — innuendoes that Mao 
was unable to see initially, as discussed in Chapter Two. This was possibly because 
Mao was aging and suffering from motor neurone disease and Jiang Qing, by contrast, 
was relatively young, in her late 50s at that time. Ultimately, though, Mao’s word was 
final in regard to film censorship; so even Jiang had no power to stop a film being 
released for Chinese cinema if Mao approved it.  
  Mao did in fact order two films to be released against the wishes of Jiang 
Qing. These were Songs of Teachers (1974) produced by the Central News 
Documentary Film Studio in 1974 and Undertaking, about the workers in the 
oilfields, as discussed earlier. Songs of Teachers was the only film which exalted the 
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role of a teacher — to help students to study hard; most teachers were criticised and 
attacked during the Cultural Revolution. The theme of this film was completely 
different from Jiang Qing’s model film and it was transplanted from a local Hunan 
opera (̞Ɛ) which was in Mao’s hometown local dialect. Actually, the Hunan opera 
Songs of Teachers was captured on celluloid because it had been successfully 
performed and welcomed by many audiences in 1973. 
 When the production of Songs of Teachers was sent for film censorship, Jiang 
Qing said: ‘This film is a poisonous weed!’ In particular, she criticised the dialogue in 
which the main protagonist, the teacher Yu Ying (·ͷ), says: ‘How can illiterate 
people undertake revolutionary responsibilities?’ (ǲ΃˹ĴΥȔ1òȃόƦt
 ). In response, Jiang Qing asked: ‘Why can’t illiterate people undertake 
revolutionary responsibilities? Is our old generation of proletarian fighters also 




Figure 18: Left: Zuo Dafen (Ϩϻ)’s family photo. (http://res.news.ifeng.com/e96a0c81baf9e6df 
/2011/0813/rdn_4e45d3d175233.jpg) Right: her performance as the main protagonist, the teacher Yu 
Ying (·ͷ), in the Hunan opera film Songs of Teachers (Δªρñ). 
 
Eventually, Jiang also criticised the actress, Zuo Dafen (Ϩϻ), who played the 
main protagonist, the teacher Yu Ting, because she performed like a young mistress 
in the film (Li n.d.). Jiang Qing criticised this film because it contradicted the ethos of 
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the political hero of the Cultural Revolution — an old student called Zhang Tiesheng  
(ά˗ʇ), who was a Red Guard had gone to the countryside (as Mao had told 
students to do) and had handed in an almost empty test paper at a university entrance 
examination when Chinese universities resumed teaching and recruiting workers-
peasants-soldiers in June 1973. On the orders of Jiang Qing, the People’s Daily 
newspaper published a critique called ‘Criticise Thoroughly the Big Poisonous Weed 
Songs of Teachers’ (ʃɪȱȨ±\Δªρñ ) on the front page on 4 
August 1974. All the other newspapers around China then followed the People’s 
Daily in criticising the film.  
 However, when Mao watched Songs of Teachers while he was visiting his 
hometown Changsha (dɳ) in November 1974, he immediately recognised the 
performer on screen and said, ‘Is this big baby, Zuo Dafeng?’ (Li n.d.). Mao 
applauded this film after watching it, but when his staff quietly told Mao that this film 
was a big poisonous weed which was being criticised all around China, he was piqued 
and said, ‘What big poisonous weed! Where is the poison? In my opinion it is very 
good!’ (Li n.d.). While he was saying this, he stood up and applauded the film again. 
Everyone watching this film with Mao applauded as well. Therefore, Songs of 
Teachers turned from being a poisonous weed into a fragrant flower, and the actress, 
Zuo Dafen, avoided personal and political harassment during the Cultural Revolution. 
 In addition to applauding the film, Songs of Teachers, Mao also applauded on 
25 July 1974 the film Undertaking after receiving a letter of complaint from the 
scriptwriter, Zhang Tianmin (ά˓Ǿ), of the Changchun Film Studio. Mao stated: 
‘This film has no major blunders, I recommend its release. Do not demand perfection 
in films. More than ten criticisms of this film are just too many. This is no good for 
the adjustment of the inner Party policies on literature and art’ (Di 2001, 369). 
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However, Mao did not notice, as Jiang Qing did, that the film depicts (especially in 
close-up shots) booklets of his two articles ‘On Contradiction’ and ‘On Practice’ 
which had been sent to the workers in the Daqing oil fields by Liu Shaoqi; the fact 
that Liu Shaoqi, one of the major targets of the Cultural Revolution, had sent the 
articles to the workers, was deemed to be a political gesture to eulogise Liu Shaoqi. 
Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, among other reasons, to get rid of Liu Shaoqi 
even though he was Mao’s deputy. Jiang Qing considered that Undertaking, one way 
or the other, not only extolled Chinese oil workers but also praised Liu Shaoqi 
politically. Since Mao had already instructed the release of this film, and Deng 
Xiaoping had immediately passed on Mao’s instruction to the Culture Ministry and 
the Changchun Film Studio, he could not change his instruction. In addition, Hu 
Qiaomu (ĪɊȋ), one of the organisers and a former political secretary of Mao, first 
asked Zhang Tianmin to write to Mao, then asked Zhang Tianmin’s wife, Zhao Liang 
(ήǄ), to write ‘A Letter of Appreciation to Mao’ (Zhang 2010). 
 These two cases of film censorship demonstrate two possibilities: either Jiang 
Qing had more political consciousness about film content and context in regard to the 
Cultural Revolution than her husband did, or Mao, having achieved his main goal 
with the Cultural Revolution, no longer cared about censoring to the extent that he 
had previously. However, Mao did change his approach in dealing with film 
censorship when he received another letter of complaint from the film scriptwriter, 
Xia Tieli, and film director, Qian Jiang, about the censorship by Jiang Qing of the 
film Seaside Rosy Cloud ()6 1974). A face-to-face battle then ensued between 




Jiang Qing and Deng Xiaoping 
Jiang Qing wished to ban Seaside Rosy Cloud because she considered the actress Wu 
Haiyan (˿Ĕ͎), who performed the main protagonist, Haixia (Ĕ̐), to be like a 
‘city miss’, and not like a female militia leader; Jiang Qing believed Haixia’s 
portrayal would destroy the proletarian images of workers-peasants-soldiers; 
moreover, Yu Huiyong and Liu Qingtang maintained that this film was against Jiang 
Qing’s theory of The Three Prominences and did not reach the status of her Model 
Films. In addition, Jiang Qing and Yu Huiyong were not satisfied with the modified 
version that had been made of Seaside Rosy Cloud after the criticisms and, as a result, 
the film scriptwriter Xia and film director Qian wrote to Mao (Di 2001, 373-376). 
Their letter to Mao was organised by He Jiesheng (Ġűʇ), an Army Major General 
and daughter of Marshal He Long, and first sent to Deng Liqun (ƺɟ), the key 
political consultant at the State Council and the Minister of Propaganda, then to Hu 
Qiaomu and finally to Deng Xiaoping who eventually passed it to Mao. This was the 
second letter about film censorship which had been handed to Mao by Deng. As 
mentioned before, Mao asked that the letter of complaint be sent to each member of 
the Politburo on 29 July 1974 (Di 2001, 382). 
 When Deng Xiaoping learned about Mao’s instruction, he immediately 
convened a Politburo meeting on the evening of 30 July 1974 at the Great Hall of the 
People to watch the film. Deng also invited the Culture Ministry’s key personnel and 
the film scriptwriter and director (Di 2001, 382). At the meeting to watch the film, 
Deng Xiaoping sat in the middle; on his right, there were Li Xiannian (#), Hua 
Guofeng (ĳĐÒ), and Yu Qiuli  (-1); on his left were Zhang Chunqiao, Yu 
Huiyong and Zhang Weimin (ά˴Ǿ), the deputy Culture Minister; Xie Tieli and 
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Qian Jiang sat behind Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian; Wang Hongwen (˪Ĥ˹) was 
absent; and Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan refused to participate. After more than four 
hours watching the first version and then the third version of the film, Seaside Rosy 
Cloud, Deng asked Yu, Zhang Weimin, Xia and Qian to leave early and let all 
Politburo members discuss the film (Di 2001, 383). 
 The following day, the Politburo decided that the third version of Seaside Rosy 
Cloud should be released for cinema exhibition (Di 2001, 383). The Culture Minister, 
Yu Huiyong, complained to Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao but they could not do 
anything since the Politburo had made the decision. Fundamentally, no one dared to 
go against Mao, not even Jiang Qing. 
 As a result of this decision, Yu Huiyong had to apologise indirectly to the 
Beijing Film Studio. Consequently, Yu became ill and his white blood cells became 
so depleted he had to stay in bed (Di 2001, 386). When Jiang Qing heard that Yu was 
sick, she rang him immediately on 5 August 1974 to urge him not to succumb; in 
particular, she urged him not to be defeated spiritually. Although he might have had 
faults and shortcomings related to his work, no one could deny that he had carried out 
her wishes with regard to the revolution in literature and art over the previous ten 
years (Di 2001, 386). 
 Despite the Politburo’s decision to release Seaside Rosy Cloud for cinema, the 
Culture Minister, Yu Huiyong, and the deputy Culture Minister, Liu Qingtang, with 
the support of Jiang Qing, impeded the release process and warned the film 
scriptwriter, Xie, and film director, Qian, at the Beijing Film Studio that they would 
be disciplined by the Culture Ministry for writing to Mao (Di 2001, 388). Yu and Liu 
were thus able to resist the Politburo’s decision because they had the support of Jiang 
Qing and another two members of the Politburo, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, 
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who were the most prominent political critics in China at that time and controlled 
most official Chinese media outlets such as newspapers and magazines. 
 There is no doubt that the film censorship of Undertaking and Seaside Rosy 
Cloud was handled quite differently in each case; the political struggle relating to film 
censorship was much more severe on Seaside Rosy Cloud than on Undertaking on 
account of Mao having changed his way of dealing with the letters of complaint from 
filmmakers. Clearly, Jiang Qing not only examined the appropriateness of the filmic 
diegesis for the Cultural Revolution but also considered the suitability of the 
cinematic aesthetics for the political images of workers-peasants-soldiers. The battle 
with Deng Xiaoping was a political challenge to her concept of the Cultural 
Revolution. Deng dealt with her views on censorship by strategically enlisting Mao’s 
support. 
 
Jiang Qing and Premier Zhou Enlai 
The political tension surrounding film censorship between Jiang Qing and Premier 
Zhou Enlai was weak in contrast to the tension between Jiang Qing and Deng 
Xiaoping. Zhou always made concessions to Jiang Qing, possibly due to his loyalty to 
Mao or to calm down the political tension between filmmakers and Jiang Qing, or 
perhaps because he was suffering from cancer during the last few years of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
 For example, when the film production of The Fiery Year, which has been 
discussed previously (see Chapter Three), was complete, Xu Jingxian (̼ƃ̖), the 
Secretary of the Shanghai City Committee of the Communist Party, who was in 
charge of Shanghai City, cleverly changed its name from Steel Torrent (ê˗ĤǕ) to 
The Fiery Year to differentiate it from the stage play; this meant it was better suited to 
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the political needs of 1974, the year in which it was produced. When the film’s 
director, Fu Chaowu (ßf̀), took it to the film censorship committee in Beijing, 
Premier Zhou Enlai and the other Politburo members watched it and approved it for 
release. However, when Jiang Qing watched it she demanded that two segments be 
modified, one where the protagonist Chao does not have enough strength to fight 
against the ‘middle’ person, the factory director, Bai; and the other where steel 
workers should call the Party Secretary Wong ‘Old Wang’ instead of ‘Secretary Wang’ 
because the title of the Party Secretary is the Party post, not an administrative position 
(Di 2001, 249). Fu Chaowu had no choice but to make the modifications; even though 
he had permission from Premier Zhou to release the film, this did not guarantee its 
release. He took it back to the Shanghai Film Studio and made the modifications 
demanded by Jiang Qing. After hearing about Jiang Qing’s demands, Premier Zhou 
angrily muttered: ‘Do not send any films to me for approval in the future’ (Di 2001, 
250). 
 It is clear from these incidents that Jiang Qing had absolute power over 
literature and art products; by the same token, the filmmakers had direct links with the 
top Chinese Communist Party leaders such as Premier Zhou and Deng Xiaoping, and 
even with Mao. These phenomena which were unprecedented in the history of the 
Chinese film industry reflected the fact that Jiang Qing was not only Mao’s wife and 
an eager politician, but also an actress who possessed great knowledge of film arts 
and was able to influence the outcomes of film production to ensure that film products 
followed the political line and the spirit of the Cultural Revolution. However, when 
the Cultural Revolution reached its later stages, Deng Xiaoping, because Mao and 
Premier Zhou were experiencing deteriorating health, took charge of the Central 
Committee after the Lin Biao incident in 1971; and he tried to strengthen his 
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leadership position by fighting with Jiang Qing and her political allies more directly 
over film censorship issues. 
 
Interrelation of Film Distribution and Consumption with Education 
Because of the importance of films for mass political education, censorship and 
control over film distribution were extremely important. For this reason Jiang Qing 
and her political allies scrutinised film productions thoroughly and meticulously. The 
Chinese film industry, from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949 to the post-Cultural Revolution era beginning in 1980, was never regulated by 
the market economy but by the political economy, as Yan Yuanying (2006, 69-74) 
notes. The workers-peasants-soldiers were depicted through the political value system 
as supporting socialist construction and nation building, unlike Hollywood motion 
pictures which were created for the entertainment of the populace and to make profits 
in accordance with capitalist ideology. The Chinese film industry, in order to educate 
the Chinese people about socialism, had to produce movies reflecting the abstract 
ideology of socialism with objective instead of subjective reality, in order to portray 
revolutionary reality. To achieve this goal, the Communist regime produced 
educational movies and maintained low prices of movie tickets for Chinese people 
until after the end of the Cultural Revolution. 
 
Low Price of Movie Tickets 
Realising the importance of visual culture, the Communist regime maintained low 
prices of movie tickets until 1984; as Yu Li (2006, 125) explains: ‘Film ticketing 
prices had been consistently maintained at RMB 0.20-0.35 (about 5 cents in US 
currency) for 35 years; then the prices rose due to the sustainable market economy’. 
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During the Cultural Revolution the Communist regime kept the price of movie tickets 
low; at the same time, it managed to produce films for both education and 
entertainment that depicted both political and realistic truth. The Chinese government 
took several measures, according to Yu Li (2006, 14), to enable wide circulation of 
movies at that time; it made many copies of films and let all cinemas screen films; it 
made a few copies of film and let cinemas take turns to screen films for a long period; 
and it screened films in huge venues. For important movies, the Chinese government 
used several strategies: it intermittently screened these films; it required particular 
cinemas to screen these movies; and it controlled their screening. Through these 
measures, then, the Communist regime effectively and efficiently maintained movies 
as educational tools. 
 In 1984 these measures and strategies were abandoned because the market 
economy developed due to a policy change in 1978 which mirrored the Russian 
approach to management of the studios in terms of film production, distribution and 
exhibition. The State Council approved the policy change in The Application Report 
of Reforming the Management of Film Distribution and Exhibition (ă΅åò¤ͼ
Â̷Ëͽćư˒χɑʖ>ð ) and handed it down to the Ministry of Culture 
and Arts, and the Ministry of Finance (Yu 2006, 123). In this report, the central 
government agreed to re-introduce the management system which was in place before 
the Cultural Revolution. According to this system, government-provided capital for 
film production was deducted from box office returns; the profits were divided into 20% 
for the Ministry of Finance and 80% for the development fund. This system of 
funding allowed the Chinese film industry to introduce a new ticket pricing system 
regulated by the market economy. Low prices for movie tickets, therefore, officially 
ended in the post-Cultural Revolution era in 1984. 
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Movies as Educational Tools 
The affordability of movie tickets before 1984 enabled movies to be used as 
educational tools by the Communist regime. During the Cultural Revolution, the film 
industry produced many politically charged films such as The White-Haired Girl (3
ǭȡ), and children’s films. These films, even children’s films, were not produced 
particularly for entertainment purposes because their themes were very political; they 
were produced instead to raise the morale of the Chinese people. 
 For example, the tale of The White-Haired Girl was about how old Chinese 
society forced human beings to become ghosts and the new socialist society forced 
ghosts to become human beings. The story, according to He Jingzhi (ĠƆρ2002, 
14), originated from Pingshan County in Hebei province China, and the white-haired 
girl was called ‘White-Haired Fairy Lady’. In 1940, the Eighth Route Army of the 
Chinese Communist Party had a difficult time working in a village near the mountain 
region although it had been liberated for several years. When a cadre of the Eighth 
Route Army from the district decided to gather all villagers for a meeting, no one 
attended. A village cadre prevaricated that all villagers had gone to make an offering 
to the White-Haired Fairy Lady because it was the fifteenth day of the month. This 
district cadre then pressed for details of the White-Haired Fairy Lady. He presumed 
that the White-Haired Fairy Lady was a wild animal which had been misunderstood 
by the rural population, or the White-Haired Fairy Lady had been constructed as a 
plot to prevent the villagers from attending the meeting. The district cadre in the 
village decided to catch the White-Haired Fairy Lady. So one night this cadre, 
carrying a weapon, went and hid with some villagers in the Goddess’ temple. Just 
after midnight, when the wind was blowing quietly and there was dim light from the 
moon, they heard the sound of footsteps approaching and suddenly a vague white 
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shape entered the Goddess’ temple and grabbed the food on the altar table; when what 
appeared to be a ghost was about to leave, the district cadre leaped up and shouted 
loudly: ‘Are you human or ghost?’ 
 The White-Haired Fairy Lady, having been startled, shouted wildly and then 
turned on the cadres. The district cadre shot her and she fell to the ground. She got up 
and tried desperately to run away, but the cadres and villagers tracked her down to a 
deep gloomy cave in the mountains. The sound of a child weeping could be heard 
indistinctly in the cave. The district cadre went into the cave and saw the White-
Haired Fairy Lady tightly embracing a pale child who was cowering in a corner. The 
district cadre at first hesitated, then said: ‘What are you, human or ghost? You must 
tell me! I will forgive you and rescue you from this cave’. Suddenly, the White-
Haired Fairy Lady knelt down in front of the cadres and villagers and choking back 
tears, said that about nine years ago (before the Sino-Japanese war), a despotic 
landlord who had seen her as a beautiful and intelligent girl wanted to have her. He 
conspired to prosecute her father, a tenant farmer, who was sent to jail and died there 
because he could not pay his debts. As a result, the landlord took advantage of her for 
his temporary obscene desires and made her pregnant. When this landlord was going 
to marry another girl from a rich family he decided to kill the White-Haired Girl on 
his wedding day. A benevolent female servant found out about the plot and told her to 
leave. Although she escaped from this despotic landlord and his family, she had 
nowhere to go. She eventually had found this cave where she had given birth to a 
child and where she had continued to live. Due to the lack of sunlight and salt, she 
and her child had become pale. The cadre and villagers listened to this tale and then 
burst into tears. 
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 The White-Haired Girl epitomises the genre of the time; it was created as an 
opera in Yan’an in 1945, and captured in film in 1950, then transplanted into a 
Chinese opera in 1958, finally being filmed as a Model Ballet in 1970. When Jiang 
Qing transplanted the story for her Model Ballet film, she removed the segment 
relating to the sexual relationship between the white-haired girl Xi’er and the despotic 
landlord because she did not want Xi’er to be tainted by something unmentionable. 
Jiang Qing also considered that, if this segment remained in the movie, it would 
damage the reputation of Xi’er as a heroine and it would not fit in with her ‘three 
prominences’ political theory. 
 For this reason, Paul Clark (2008, 109) remarked in his recent publication The 
Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History, ‘More Chinese probably saw the eight 
“model performances” not live on stage, but as feature films’. The films proved to be 
enormously popular then, despite not being produced as popular entertainment in a 
Western or Hollywood sense: ‘These fifty old-style operas were made for an audience 
of one — Mao Zedong’ (Clark 1987, 128). 
 Movies as educational tools were not only limited to films like The White-
Haired Girl but also extended to children’s films which had various class struggle 
themes. Ten children’s films were made during the Cultural Revolution, more than 
one tenth of the total film productions. Nine were feature films and one was a stage 
documentary, Prairie Children (\Γ¾ȡ1975). Three of these films have been in 
the top ten of the best-loved Chinese children’s films made since the Liberation of 
China; they are Yellow River Youth (ļğɺȘ1975), Beacon-fire Youth (ÔŅɺȘ 
1975) and Sparkling Red Star (1974). The ten children’s films had enormous effects 
not only on Chinese children, but also on Chinese adults at the time. They 
 134 
demonstrate to Chinese children what the class struggle and the war of resistance 
against the Japanese invaders were about. 
 One of these ten films, Prairie Children, is about a Chinese Mongolian boy 
and girl heroically fighting heavy snowstorms and class enemies to protect their 
commune’s flock of sheep. The subject of the ballet first emerged in a 1964 animated 
cartoon recounting the real-life drama of two Mongolian sisters, Heroic Little Sisters 
of the Grasslands. The ballet which actually combines ballet steps and Mongolian 
dance was created by the China Singing-Dance Troupe (ϊĐñ̂Ɛˤ), which, in 
line with ballet conventions, not only changed the two female characters into a male 
and female but also inserted a class enemy to dramatise the story in order to better 
serve the ideals of the Cultural Revolution. 
 Unlike Prairie Children, whose theme is class struggle, the theme of Yellow 
River Youth and Beacon-fire Youth is China’s war of resistance against the Japanese 
invaders. Yellow River Youth is about the main protagonist, Zhao Zhiyan (ήφ͎), a 
teenage boy who actively participates in the fight against the Japanese invaders and 
protects wounded Chinese fighters near the Yellow River region. Beacon-fire Youth is 
about the principal hero, Xiao Song (̪ʴ), also a teenage boy, who energetically 
takes part in fighting the Japanese invaders and cleverly becomes a secret agent for 
the Red Army in the Japanese-occupied areas of the north of China. Both films were 
produced in 1975 and were possibly influenced by Sparkling Red Star (a film 
discussed in the following chapter) produced in 1974. 
 There is no doubt that the role of Chinese cinema during the Cultural 
Revolution was to educate and inform the Chinese people through realistic films 
(where the realism conformed to a certain political ideal). At the same time, the 
Communist regime used Chinese cinema for entertainment but incorporated the 
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underlying political agenda through eulogising the revolutionary struggle and socialist 
construction of a unified China. 
 
Conclusion 
The film narratives and film figures among the movies produced during the Cultural 
Revolution were unique in Chinese film history. Workers-peasants-soldiers were the 
main characters captured on celluloid, and film diegesis was about wartime literature 
and class struggle. The films reflected Chinese socialist construction from the early 
days of the Chinese war of resistance against the Japanese invaders and the Chinese 
civil war between the Kuomintang government and Communist Party to the period of 
nation building of the People’s Republic of China. Although all the films are deemed 
realistic, it is sometimes difficult nowadays to fully appreciate the significance and 
impact these films had. What is clear is that the war-themed films were slightly more 
popular than the class struggle-themed films due to the spectacle of dramatic action. 
 In order to depict workers-peasants-soldiers on the screen in a socially and 
politically appropriate way, the censorship decisions made by Mao, Jian Qing, 
Premier Zhou and Deng Xiaoping were very complex. Jiang Qing and her political 
coterie made intuitive film censorship decisions which accorded with their views on 
political correctness. However, Deng and Zhou often had strong disagreements with 
Jiang Qing when dealing with film censorship. While Mao had overall control over 
film censorship, he was not as politically astute as Jiang Qing, who was more adept at 
keeping the spirit of the films in line with the political goals of the Cultural 
Revolution. It is clear that Jiang Qing possessed not only political astuteness but also 
filmic knowledge. She certainly ensured that films served what she judged to be the 
best interests of the Chinese people at that time. 
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 Besides an examination of film diegesis and film censorship, this chapter also 
explored the interrelationship of film distribution and film consumption in terms of 
low-price movies and films used as educational tools. These films, one way or the 
other, not only had entertainment value but also, and more importantly, possessed 
educational functions; they disseminated the political ideology of the Communist 
regime such as the class struggle during the socialist construction by exalting 
workers-peasants-soldiers. These themes were not only depicted in ordinary films but 
also, significantly, were depicted in children’s films.  
 The following chapter will examine film adaptation, transplantation and 
reproduction during the Cultural Revolution. The focus will extend to an analysis of 
the content and contexts of the films (including a comparison with the novels, plays 
and movies from which they were derived) in order to determine the impact on 




Film Adaptation, Transplantation and Reproduction 
 
Film adaptation, transplantation and reproduction have taken place in many countries 
around the world. While Hollywood has often carried out these practices to meet the 
demands of existing commercial audiences, the Chinese film industry used them for 
social and political purposes during the Cultural Revolution. More than 40% of all 
Chinese films made during the Cultural Revolution were adapted, transplanted or 
reproduced, and most of them reflected Chinese socialist ideology. 
 This chapter begins by exploring film adaptation during the Cultural 
Revolution in terms of how many films were directly adapted from novels and to 
what extent the interpolated scenes and invented characters met the social and 
political agenda concerning the Communist Party’s socialist construction. This 
exploration involves comparing the realistic elements and the expressive norms and 
forms of films with the novels on which they were based; it also involves exploring 
the use of interpolations and elisions of film diegesis as well as examining the social 
and political implications for Chinese society at that time. Furthermore, this chapter 
examines, from a realistic perspective, the idiosyncratic film patterns adapted from 
novels for the screen. 
 The analysis of adaptation is followed by a discussion of film 
transplantation, with reference to films transplanted from plays and operas rather than 
novels. Attention is paid to the number of these films that were transplanted and how 
their content and contexts portrayed the truth or otherwise of what took place during 
the Cultural Revolution. In order to understand the differences between transplanted 
films and their sources in the form of plays and operas, this chapter examines the 
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process of cinematic homogenisation; that is to say, the manner by which scenes were 
created to serve the social and political agenda. The chapter also examines the 
tensions and ideologies that were reinforced in the transplanted films. 
 Finally, this chapter examines film reproduction during the Cultural 
Revolution. This requires several steps: first, a verification of the extent of 
reproduction (e.g. some films were adapted and then reproduced); second, an 
identification of the themes of the reproduced films according to their diegetic 
elements; and third, an analysis of the structure of the reproduced films. Each of these 
practices — adaptation, transplantation and reproduction — is discussed below. 
 
Film Adaptation 
Before analysing the Chinese films adapted directly from novels during the Cultural 
Revolution, definitions of film adaptation are discussed. In addition there are 
discussions of the practices of film adaptation and the reasons why filmmakers 
wanted to translate novels into films. 
 Thomas Leitch (2007), an American film expert and English professor at the 
University of Delaware, defines film adaptation as the transfer of a written work or 
works in whole or part to a feature film, a type of derivative work; a common form of 
film adaptation is the use of a novel as the basis of a feature film. Moreover, film 
adaptation includes the use of non-fiction writing such as journalistic work, 
autobiography, scripture, historical sources, and even other films. Clearly, adaptation 
uses diverse resources (including, for example, diaries and comic books). 
 In addition, Linda Hutcheon (2006, 15-16), another American film scholar, 
explains that it is difficult to define the seeming simplicity of the word ‘adaptation’ 
because the means of adaptation are complex: ‘As a product, an adaptation can be 
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given a formal definition, but as a process — of creation and of reception — other 
aspects have to be considered’. This explanation obviously encompasses several 
meanings: a media product can refer to films, plays, operas or even paintings, and the 
process of creation and reception refers to the practice of adapting novels to films as 
well as the way that audiences engage with such adaptations. According to Robert 
Stam (2010, 3-5), the practices of film adaptation and their transitions have four 
consequences: a loss or a gain in positive tropes because of the persuasive force of the 
putative superiority of literature versus film; a dichotomous thinking that often 
reflects a presumed bitter rivalry between film and literature; a film’s provocation of 
an outrage not provoked by the literary source; and a hostility to adaptation due to the 
cultural prejudice prevalent at that time against the visual arts portraying images of 
the Judaic-Muslim-Protestant prohibitions or causing an erosion of the power of 
literary fathers and patriarchal narrators. 
 Besides understanding the practices and consequences of film adaptation, it 
is also important to understand why filmmakers want to translate novels into films in 
the first place. As the film critic and semiotician, Christian Metz (1974, 44), explains: 
‘cinema tells us continuous stories; it says things that can be conveyed also in the 
language of words; yet it says them differently. This is a reason for the possibility as 
well as for the necessity of adaptations’. In other words, film has in its grasp, for 
example, innumerable symbols for emotions that cannot be expressed simply through 
language. An analysis of some Chinese adapted films produced during the Cultural 
Revolution will lead to further understandings of how these films relate to the literary 
works on which they were based. 
 Twenty-six films were directly adapted from novels among the 93 films 
produced in total during the Cultural Revolution. They included 22 feature films and 
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four operatic films; they were either war-themed or class struggle-themed features 
except for one, the Hebei Clapper opera film The Magic Lotus Lantern (=ƻ 
1976), which had as its theme a well-known ancient love story. The 22 feature films 
included 20 adult movies and three children’s movies. Some of the adult feature 
movies were more popular than others, for example, the war-themed Scouts (1974) 
and Unforgettable Battle (1976) as well as the class struggle-themed Sunny Bright 
Skies (1973) and Golden Road (1975). These popular movies have been discussed in 
previous chapters. The three feature movies for children were Sparkling Red Star 
(1974), Sunny Courtyard Story (̥͗ΖĀʙ 1974) and Hong Yu (ħΈ 1975). The 
movie Sparkling Red Star has already been mentioned in the previous chapter and 
will be discussed again in Chapter Five. The four opera films include three Chinese 
opera movies — The Red Lantern (1970), Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy   (ψɘ
˯Įɵ 1970) and Fighting on the Plains (ȸΓϫΩ1974) — and the Hebei Clapper 
opera movie, The Magic Lotus Lantern. The Red Lantern will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 Besides the adult adapted popular feature movies such as Scouts (1974), 
Unforgettable Battle (1975), Sunny Bright Skies (1973) and Golden Road (1975), the 
adapted children’s feature movies, Sunny Courtyard Story (1974) and Hong Yu (1975) 
are worthy of discussion because, to a great extent, these two films depicted the class 
struggle which touched the lives of Chinese children. Sunny Courtyard Story was 
directed by Yuan Naichen (Βȏj) and produced by the Changchun Film Studio in 
1974. Yuan was not only a film director but also an actor and film translation director. 
In addition, he won the Golden Rooster Lifetime Achievement Award at the 2008 
Golden Rooster and Hundred Flowers Film Festival. The movie Sunny Courtyard 
Story was adapted from the long novel Sunny Courtyard Story written by Xu Ying (̼
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Ͻ), a prolific writer, in 1973. Not only was this novel adapted into a movie in 1974; it 
was also translated into English and published as A Real Good Holiday by Beijing 
Foreign Language Press in 1977. The movie was not as exquisite and affective as the 
novel; as Robert Stam (2010, 3) explains, the film adaptation lost positive tropes 
because of the putative superiority of the literature source. However, the essence of 




Figure 19: Grandfather Shi (ʍ͞͞), a sub-protagonist, mentors Tiezhu (˗ϕ, the main protagonist), 
Heidan (ġ), Xuehua (͂Ĳ), Shanhuzi (ɵĮϞ) and Xiaogang (̪ê) in the courtyard in Sunny 
Courtyard Story (̥͗ΖĀʙ). 
 
 It is set in a country town in the north of China. The main protagonist, 
Tiezhu (˗ϕ meaning Iron-pillar in English), a teenager, lives with his grandmother, 
the old head of the local residents’ committee, who shares a housing compound called 
Sunny Courtyard with several householders. Schoolmates of Tiezhu such as Heidan 
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(ġ), Xuehua (͂Ĳ), Shanhuzi (ɵĮϞ) and Xiaogang (̪ê), a younger brother 
of Heidan, all live in the compound. These children are led by Tiezhu who organises 
their participation in volunteer labour on the first day of the school holidays; this work 
involves digging rocks in the area near the mountains for the construction of roads. 
 These children, responding to Chairman Mao’s call to ‘learn from Comrade 
Lei Feng, serve the people wholeheartedly’ (̥ƮÒ˛φ́̌ɜ̲ɜͬ˳ɤǾÙ
̅), go along to do the volunteer work quietly without telling their parents. However, 
Hu Shouli (Īʟƴ), an antagonist who is a former schoolteacher and now a travelling 
salesman, also lives in Sunny Courtyard. When he finds out the children are out doing 
voluntary work, he slyly mumbles that the children will have no chance of going to 
the key provincial senior high school the following year if they do not review their 
school work during the upcoming summer holiday. Also, when he learns from 
Tiezhu’s grandmother that he has not been selected to be the mentor for the children 
during the summer holiday, he is very angry but he can do nothing. 
 Instead of the antagonist Hu Shouli, Grandfather Shi (ʍ͞͞), a sub-
protagonist who is a retired worker and a member of the Communist Party, is selected 
to be the mentor for the children. He also lives in Sunny Courtyard but he is not 
related to any of these children although they call him Grandfather Shi. He thinks 
children should do some physical work as it will help them grow up and have a 
concept of what working people do. Grandfather Shi not only organises these children 
to take part in the roadwork building but also takes them to the countryside and 
teaches them what class struggle is in terms of socialist construction. 
 The film has four dramatic conflicts and each conflict is more serious than 
the previous one. All conflicts are triggered by the antagonist, Hu Shouli, rather than 
the protagonist, Tiezhu, who creates positive outcomes in the film. The first conflict is 
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that Hu Shouli tells Xuehua’s mother, Yuxiu (Ό̻), that she should tell her daughter 
to stay home to study as this is the way to be admitted to the key provincial senior 
high school and to subsequently become a medical doctor. Yuxiu tries to force her 
daughter to study at home but Xuehua does not want to study at home; instead she 
wishes to participate in the social volunteer work. Xuehua has been advised by Tiezhu 
and others that if her mother does not allow her to take part in the social volunteer 
work she should refuse food in protest. Yuxiu then has no choice, and eventually 
allows her daughter to do the social volunteer work. This first conflict depicts Hu 
persuading Yuxiu to tell Xuehua to study, instead of participating in the social 
volunteer work; this element is different from the novel in which Xuehua herself 
wants to study to be a doctor and her mother wants her to take part in social volunteer 
work. This difference between the film and the novel reflects the rivalry between film 
and literature, explained by Robert Stam as dichotomous thinking in two different 
media. Xuehua is part of the new generation of Chinese and if she is portrayed as not 
wanting to engage in social volunteer work in the film, this might be seen as 
politically incorrect; or more seriously this could be seen as denigrating the new 
generation of Chinese during the Cultural Revolution. Hence this scenario was 
forbidden by the film censorship group at that time. 
 The second conflict occurs when Hu tells Heidan how to cheat in the social 
volunteer work competition; the film depicts Heidan cheating in the competition to 
win the banner for being an excellent volunteer youth worker. In the novel, this 
conflict is described differently — Heidan cheats to have more time to carve cigarette 
holders which he can use to exchange for an aluminium water bottle from Hu Shouli. 
This difference shows that, as Robert Stam explained, a film may provoke an outrage 
not provoked by the literary source. More importantly, this difference exaggerates 
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what was essentially the rebelliousness of a child into what Chinese society at that 
time called class struggle. 
 The third conflict in the film, as opposed to the novel, is that Heidan became 
lost in the Da Xi Mountain; in the book, Heidan, a typical young teenager, became 
lost in the provincial capital city because he was captivated by city life and the 
products of carving skills to be seen there. The film shows Heidan alone in a 
dangerous mountain rather than wandering and lost in a safe city in order to show 
clearly that class struggle affects not only Chinese socialist society generally, but also 
young people as a whole. 
 The final conflict arises when Hu Shouli removes the placard placed by 
Tiezhu outside a cave near where the children are doing social volunteer work — a 
placard indicating that this cave is dangerous. Therefore, the dangerous cave becomes 
a safe cave in the eyes of these children. Afterwards, Hu Shouli comes to realise that 
he has lost the cigarette holder Heidan made for him; the sky gets dark and swiftly it 
starts raining heavily. To avoid the rain the Sunny Courtyard students, Xuehua, 
Shanhuzi and Xiaogang, run for shelter into the cave which now seems safe. Suddenly 
the cave starts dropping mud and leaking water from its ceiling. At this perilous 
moment, Grandfather Shi and Tiezhu come to save the children. Grandfather Shi 
jumps into the cave and pushes Xuehua, Shanhuzi and Xiaogang towards the exit of 
the cave; and at the same time, Tiezhu pulls them up out of the cave. Just before 
Tiezhu and the other children pull him up out of the cave before it collapses, 
Grandfather Shi accidently steps on a cigarette holder which he picks up. This is the 
conflict which leads to the climax of the film. The climactic scene is not as nail-biting 
as in the novel which locates the children inside the cave as the entrance to the cave 
collapses. In the novel, therefore, the children face possible death. Their teachers, the 
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principal and the children’s parents, as well as the Communist Party secretary and 
masses of the country township, take turns to dig soil out from the cave entrance one 
shovelful at a time because they cannot use any earth-moving equipment in the 
torrential rain at night and because tremors caused by such equipment could cause the 
entire cave to collapse. Had the scenes described in the novel been included in the 
film, child audiences may have been psychologically traumatised by viewing this 
film. This is an example of the dichotomous thinking explained by Robert Stam. 
 When Grandfather Shi takes out the cigarette holder, Heidan immediately 
recognises it and tells Grandfather Shi that he himself had carved this cigarette holder 
and had given it to Hu Shouli as a present some time before. Grandfather Shi links all 
the adverse incidents together and concludes that Hu Shouli has tried to harm these 
children through the use of all kinds of tricks. These incidents portray the class 
struggle existing in Chinese socialist society at that time. When Grandfather Shi also 
learns that Hu Shouli was from an impoverished landlord family, he, with the support 
of the township Communist Party leaders, gathers together everyone at the Sunny 
Courtyard to criticise Hu Shouli. In the meeting, Grandfather Shi declares that the 
great leader, Chairman Mao, taught that they should never forget that class struggle 
exists in socialist society; children should learn from Comrade Lei Feng to serve 
people wholeheartedly; and children should be trained to be the successors of the 
proletarian class. At the end of the film, Grandfather Shi and Tiezhu, together with 
many other students, march forward to music proclaiming the triumph of socialism. 
 Sunny Courtyard Story was not only suitable for children but also for their 
parents because it showed how class struggle activities could be classified and how 
children could be educated about class struggle in a socialist society during the 
Cultural Revolution. The differences in terms of a loss or a gain of positive tropes 
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between the novel and the film were not important; the representation of class 
struggle was the main concern in this film. 
 The film Hong Yu is similar to Sunny Courtyard Story in that it is about class 
struggle but is set in the countryside and is about Hong Yu (ħΈ literallymeaning 
‘red rain’ in English), a sixteen-year-old who is determined to become a ‘barefoot 
doctor’ (vūͣʇ) to serve poor and middle-class peasants during the Cultural 
Revolution. This was at a time just before the Cultural Revolution in June 1965 when 
Mao Zedong had promised ‘to establish key medical and health centres in the rural 
areas of China’ (1ͣǆ˸ʇ÷ϫό¡ËȞə). This film was directed by Cui 
Wei (), a well-known actor and one of 22 film stars named by the Chinese film 
industry in 1962 in China. Hong Yu was produced by Beijing Film Studio in 1975 and 
adapted from the novel also called Hong Yu, which was written by Yang Xiao (͔̬) 
in 1973. 
 Both the novel and the film record mostly the same historical moments of the 
Chinese health system reforms during the Cultural Revolution. Many young selected 
workers, peasants and soldiers were trained at that time in short-term intensive 
medical courses to be ‘barefoot doctors’ at general hospitals across China. They were 
not trained by medical schools, colleges or universities because these institutions had 
all been closed down at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. The ‘barefoot 
doctors’ did solve the problem of the lack of medical health professionals around 
China, especially in the rural areas of China. 
 There are a number of differences between the adapted film Hong Yu and the 
novel it is based on. The first difference is that after Hong Yu finished his ‘barefoot 
doctor’ course he comes back to his village, Qingshanpo (ɎɵȺ). The film depicts 
how Hong Yu successfully treats peasants for common diseases such as respiratory 
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infections, fevers and sprains by using a combination of Chinese medicine and 
acupuncture and Western medicine. On the way home, for example, at the 
construction site of a reservoir, he uses acupuncture to successfully treat the shoulder 
sprain of a peasant, Wang Laoqing (˪Ƭɒ). Consequently, all the villagers get to 
know that Hong Yu has good medical skills and they cheer for him. Just after setting 
up a simple clinic in the village, Hong Yu wants to use acupuncture to treat another 
peasant, Zhao Laohuan (ήƬĹ), who has suffered from stiff knees for a long time; 
however Zhao is terrified of needles. Persuaded by his wife, Zhao does go to see 
Hong Yu to seek acupuncture treatment; however, Zhao’s muscles contract because of 
his nervousness and, as a result, the acupuncture needle breaks inside his muscle. 
Fortunately, Hong Yu is able to use another acupuncture needle to relax his muscles 
and get the broken needle out. This incident is observed by the antagonist, Sun Tianfu 
(ʿ˓â), who has been a herbal medical practitioner for 30 years in the village and 
who is from a former rich family; he exaggerates the incident around the village in 
order to defame Hong Yu. Consequently, the villagers stop coming to see Hong Yu in 
his clinic although the incident was not life-threatening. However, Hong Yu has a 
passion for helping the peasants and, in time, with the support of the village secretary 
of the Communist Party he wins the peasants back. This incident is portrayed in the 
film differently from the novel. In the novel, Hong Yu does not remove the 
acupuncture needle from Zhao Laohuan’s muscle; Zhao is sent instead to hospital in 
order to have the acupuncture needle removed. 
 The second difference is that after Hong Yu conducts emergency treatment 
on an infant who has suffered from food poisoning outside the village, he comes 
home and hears that the condition of another peasant, Grandpa Shi Jiang (ʍŪ͞), is 
deteriorating since taking the Chinese herbal medicine he has prescribed. When Hong 
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Yu arrives at Grandpa Shi Jiang’s home, he checks him and immediately finds that 
Grandpa Shi Jiang is indeed suffering from the side effects of Chinese herbal 
medicine. But Hong Yu does not know why the Chinese herbal medicine is poisonous 
because he has obtained this medicine especially from an experienced and well-
known Chinese herbal medical practitioner. At the same time, Sun Tianfu, the 
antagonist, goes to Grandpa Shi Jiang’s home and insists on saving him; he asks the 
village leader, Erhuai (ÁĶ), to send Grandpa Shi Jiang to the county hospital. Hong 
Yu immediately points out that Sun’s plan will lead to Grandpa Shi Jiang dying on the 
way to the county hospital. Hong Yu also thinks over why Sun Tianfu wants to save 
Grandpa Shi Jiang now, when, in the past, Sun Tianfu never wanted to treat him 
because Grandpa Shi Jiang had criticised him before China’s Liberation for not being 
a good herbal medical practitioner. Eventually, Hong Yu finds out that Sun Tianfu has 
put a poisonous herb in the medicine used to treat Grandpa Shi Jiang. This is 
confirmed by the doctor in the county hospital and by the Chinese medicine shop 
where Sun Tianfu bought the poisonous ingredient. Sun Tianfu had tricked the 
peasant, Sun Fugui (ʿâč), into buying the Chinese herbal medicine for Hong Yu 
to treat Grandpa Shi Jiang. After the exposure of this crime, Sun Tianfu tries to kill 
Hong Yu but Hong Yu is able to protect himself and arrests Sun Tiafu. This act is 
only slightly different from the novel in which Grandpa Shi Jiang is sent to the county 
hospital and diagnosed as suffering from the side effects of Chinese herbal medicine; 
on checking, the hospital discovers that Sun Tianfu added the poison. The interpolated 
scene in the film, which shows that Hong Yu knows the side effects, is a political 
decision, not a dramatic creation, because it proves that Chairman Mao’s policy to use 
‘barefoot doctors’ is correct since it demonstrates that ‘barefoot doctors’ are as good 
as formally trained doctors. 
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 From these two examples in the film Hong Yu, it is not difficult to see how 
film adaptation was used for the pragmatic necessity of cutting a sprawling novel to 
make it fit the screen to suit the needs of Chinese society at that time. Similarly, other 
adapted movies from around the world, including those adapted from novels such as 
Gone with the Wind (1939) and The Great Gatsby (1974) in the US, had a 
considerable impact on audiences at that time. Linda Hutcheon (2006, 37) explains 
how this phenomenon is not necessarily negative: ‘Most of the talk about film 
adaptation, however, is in negative terms of loss. Sometimes what is meant is simply 
a reduction of scope, of length, of accretion of detail, of commentary’. 
 Besides these two adapted films, Sunny Courtyard Story and Hong Yu, another 
two adapted opera films are worth mentioning — Taking the Tiger Mountain by 
Strategy (1970) and The Magic Lotus Lantern (=ƻ 1976). The former is a 
Chinese opera film directed by Xie Tieli and produced by the Beijing Film Studio in 
1970 and the latter is a Hebei Clapper opera film directed by Chen Huaiai (lķ)) 
and Chen Fangqian (lÉɄ) and also produced by the Beijing Film Studio in 1976. 
 Taking the Tiger Mountain by Strategy was adapted from the novel Linhai 
Xueyuan (ǍĔ͂Γliterallymeaning ‘snowy forest’), written by Qu Bo (ɖR), who 
took five years from 1952 to 1956 to complete it. Interestingly, it was first adapted 
into a feature film called Linhai Xueyuan with the subtitle Taking the Tiger Mountain 
by Strategy by film director Liu Peiran (ǔȮɠ) and produced by the August the First 
Film Studio in 1960. When the novel was adapted into a Chinese opera film in 1970, 
the name taken was Taking the Tiger Mountain by Strategy. This novel was also twice 
adapted for a television series directed by Zhu Wenshun (ϒ˹ʬ) and produced by 
Jilin Television Station (ŋǍ¤ʝ˄) in 1986, and directed by Li Wenqi (Ʊ˹Ⱦ) 
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and produced by the Literature and Art Centre of the Propaganda Department of 
Shenzhen City (ʃϲʜ̿yV˹ͩ{ϫϊ̲) in 2003. Furthermore, this novel is 
going to be adapted as a 3D film in 2013 by Hark Tsui (̼Ơ), a Vietnamese-Chinese 
and American-educated film director (Chen 2011, 102; Baidu Encyclopaedia 2012). 
 There is no doubt that the novel Linhai Xueyuan has been extremely popular. 
These five adaptations listed above have spanned more than five decades since the 
novel was published in 1958. Four of these five adaptations were entitled Linhai 
Xueyuan after the novel; the opera film, however, was named Taking the Tiger 
Mountain by Strategy. Not only is the opera name different but so, too, is the format 
in terms of the accretion and elision of cinematic elements. 
 The opera film is set in the northeast of China in 1946. When the Chinese 
Communist Combined Army liberates the northeast region of China, a group of 
bandits hides in difficult terrain on the mountain called Tiger Mountain (˯Įɵ); this 
location is easily guarded but hard to conquer. The head of the bandits is Zuoshandiao 
(Ϭɵ§, a nickname literally meaning ‘seated mountain eagle’), who had been 
associated with the Japanese before 1946 and is now known as the leader of the 
Kuomintang fifth security brigade. A reconnaissance platoon leader in the Communist 
Combined Army, Yang Zirong (͔Ϟɨ), under the leadership of a regiment chief of 
staff, Shao Jianbo (ɺţR), eagerly pleads to be allowed to pretend to be a bandit in 
order to join the group of bandits entering Tiger Mountain. He is allowed to present a 
map obtained by the Communist Combined Army from a real bandit, a map of spy 
and bandit locations and contacts, to Zuoshandiao as evidence of his contribution. 
Zuoshandiao is eager to have the map because whoever has it can control the region. 
Yang Zirong passes tests set by Zuoshandiao and is thus able to send out information 
about Tiger Mountain to the Communist Combined Army. Yang, however, is 
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recognised by a bandit, Luan Ping (Ёȸ), who had escaped from the Communist 
Combined Army and now has come to the Tiger Mountain. Yang cleverly conquers 
Luan with his knowledge of the bandits’ contacts; in any case Luan will not admit he 
was a prisoner of the Communist Combined Army — if he does, he will be 
immediately killed because Zuoshandiao never trusts a prisoner. When Shao Jianbo 
receives information from Yang about the fiftieth birthday banquet of Zuoshandiao 
being held at the Tiger Mountain hall on the eve of Chinese New Year, he leads a 
group of ski-trained soldiers and the militia to the hall to wipe out the bandits. The 
opera film Taking the Tiger Mountain by Strategy is a greatly reduced version of the 
novel due to its nature as an opera. Although there is considerable loss of quality and 
quantity in time and space, many opportunities have been taken to present the opera 
film for political purposes. 
 The major loss is the dramatic reduction of the novel; for example, the novel 
has 36 chapters while the opera film has ten acts due not only to the feature film 
length limitation requiring the compression of the details of the novel but also to the 
operatic style — it takes much longer to sing than to say a line of text. The particular 
scenes of the novel lost in the opera film were Chapter 2, Xuda Mabang and Butterfly 
Puzzle (̽ǧ9ĝī©ǹ); Chapter 11, The Miscalculation of the Old Taoist Priest 
(Ƭʊʼ); and Chapter 28, Assassin and Traitor (ơĝȩˢ). 
  Chapter 2 is about how Xuda Mabang, a cruel bandit, and his wife Butterfly 
Puzzle, exploit the Chinese people who are working for the Japanese invaders. Xuda 
and his wife take strong measures to prevent the Chinese people from escaping from 
the work place where they are required to sleep naked (their clothes are taken away to 
be guarded by fierce dogs). 
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 Chapter 11 is about an old Taoist priest in a temple. Although the 
Communist Combined Army sees some bandits enter the temple, the old priest denies 
that anyone entered the temple but concedes that someone might have walked in and 
out again. Actually, the priest is a secret liaison officer of the Kuomintang. The 
Communist Combined Army does not arrest him because they want to see who enters 
the temple so they can arrest whoever comes out. By doing it this way, the 
Communist Combined Army can obtain more information about where the bandits 
and spies of the Kuomintang are, and what activities they are conducting. 
 Chapter 28 is about an assassin, Yang Sanleng (͔ɯƯ) and a traitor, Yu 
Dengke (΅ƞ). Yang, a former Kuomintang Army Officer, stabs Shao Jianbo, a 
regiment chief of staff of the Communist Combined Army. Yu, a businessman born 
into a rich family, informs the bandits that there are only 36 Communist Combined 
Army soldiers. Taking advantage of this information, the bandits attack those soldiers 
causing the loss of eight army soldiers. 
 These three chapters were not presented at all in the opera film and the fact 
that they were not presented does elevate the essence of the novel; the protagonist, 
Yang Zirong, became much more dominant in the opera film following the political 
directions of Jiang Qing. Moreover, the operatic music delighted Chinese audiences 
during the Cultural Revolution; the audiences could easily remember and sing the 
songs. Thus, this opera film brought enjoyment within the political narrative of 
eulogising the Chinese Communist Party’s Liberation War. This was the first film 
produced when the Chinese film studios resumed their film production. To a great 
extent, this opera film is very similar to the feature film Linhai Xueyuan produced in 
1960 and discussed previously (Zhang 1995, 1346). 
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 In comparison with Taking the Tiger Mountain by Strategy, The Magic Lotus 
Lantern was different because it was not an overtly political film. It was adapted from 
a Hebei Clapper opera produced by the Beijing Film Studio in 1976 incorporating 
ancient Chinese myths and legends. It was also known as Save the Mother from the 
Mountain (ȲɵƉȉ), which is set in ancient China. A goddess is married to Liu 
Yanchang (ǔ͐a), a scholar, and she gives birth to a boy called Chen Xiang (k̝). 
However, the goddess’ brother, Erlangshen (Áƫʄ), steals her Magic Lotus Lantern; 
as a result she has no power to defend herself and her brother ends up burying her 
under Hua Mountain. When Chen Xiang is fifteen, he not only learns some excellent 
martial-art skills under the guidance of the Master Great Immortal but also learns that 
his mother has been buried under Hua Mountain. He uses a powerful sword to cut 
Hua Mountain open, saves his mother and also recovers the magic lotus lantern from 
his uncle Erlangshen. After this his family gathers together to watch the magic lotus 
lantern being lit again. 
 Although this film, adapted from the Hebei Clapper opera, was clearly 
produced to extol love, there was no film critique about it during the Cultural 
Revolution. What is demonstrated here is that, while Chinese audiences were eager 
for political films, they also looked forward to non-political films. Since filmmakers 
could not make modern films about love, they used an ancient fairy tale instead. In a 
similar way, even contemporary Chinese filmmakers such as Zhang Yimou and Chen 
Kaige (lƚñ), who like to depict ancient love affairs, use this method to avoid film 
censorship. But such adaptation can result in significant changes: ‘When filmmakers 
and their scriptwriters adapt literary works, in particular’, as Linda Hutcheon (2006, 
85) comments, ‘we have seen that a profoundly moralistic rhetoric often greets their 
endeavours’. In other words, although the Chinese film industry has practised film 
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adaptation, often adapting novels for films, the question inevitably arises: how 
realistic are the adaptations when one considers the factual accuracy and precision of 
representation? Realism was achieved through a selective political process to portray 
the elements of class struggle and war during and before the Cultural Revolution. 
 
Film Transplantation 
There were fewer transplanted films produced during the Cultural Revolution than 
adapted ones; eight films were directly transplanted from plays — seven feature films 
and one opera film. The seven feature films transplanted from plays were 
Acupuncture Needles Praised under a Shadowless Lamp (˾ͼ̒ʵ͵δ 1974), 
Fighting on the Slipway (1975), The Second Spring (1"1975), The Young 
Fellow (̪Ŧ 1975), South China Sea Great Wall (ȑĔdp 1976), Newcomers to a 
Mountain Village (ɵ̱ɤ 1976) and Maple Valley (Ñʨ˧ 1976); one, Safety Belt 
(͢Ý<̘ 1974), was transplanted directly from the Huai Opera (ĸƐ), a local 
opera performed around the Shanghai region. 
 Fighting on the Slipway, which depicts how shipyard workers build a ship in 
an undesirable environment, has already been discussed in Chapter Three. The Second 
Spring has a similar theme to Fighting on the Slipway; it is also about how shipyard 
workers build a warship designed by naval engineers while facing steel quality 
problems. Both Maple Valley and South China Great Wall are war movies. Safety Belt 
is a class struggle-themed movie against corruption. Acupuncture Needles Praised 
under a Shadowless Lamp, The Young Fellow and Newcomers to a Mountain Village 
are films which praise new emerging events (̱ʇʙ̄, xin sheng shi wu) during the 
Cultural Revolution.
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 These eight transplanted films, in contrast to the adapted films, interpolated 
scenes rather than just eliding scenes from long novels. In other words, the 
transplanted films depicted vividly and dynamically many more events, through the 
use of cinematic techniques, than stage performances could, due to the limitations of 
time and space for stage productions. Cinematic representation which transformed 
more observations or ideas into a finished manuscript was, broadly speaking, also the 
practice of film adaptation in order to fulfil the needs of the Cultural Revolution. 
Acupuncture Needles Praised under a Shadowless Lamp, The Young Fellow and 
Newcomers to a Mountain Village, in particular, reflected this type of cinematic 
practice. 
 Acupuncture Needles Praised under a Shadowless Lamp was directed by 
Sang Hu (ɰĭ), a well-known and prolific director and scriptwriter, and produced by 
the Shanghai Film Studio in 1974. It was transplanted from a play Acupuncture 
Needles Praised under a Shadowless Lamp written by the Amateur Literary and 
Artistic Creation Group of the Shanghai Chest Hospital in 1974. The film is not a 
conventional feature length of between one-and-a-half and two hours, but is only 42 
minutes long. Although the theme is one of class struggle between Mao’s 
revolutionary medical health system and the revisionist medical health system, the 
fight between the protagonist and antagonist is not posed as a struggle among class 
enemies. This was quite unusual in the films made during the Cultural Revolution. 
Possibly there were too many films about struggle against a class enemy and Chinese 




Figure 20: Dr Li Zhihua (Ʊφĳmiddle, female) and Dr Ding (middle, male) with two nurses treat 
Lao Yang (͔ʉß), a factory worker suffering from heart disease, in Acupuncture Needles Praised 
under A Shadowless Lamp. 
 
 Set in a Shanghai hospital, Acupuncture Needles Praised under a Shadowless 
Lamp is about a young female anaesthetist, Li Zhihua (Ʊφĳ), the main protagonist, 
who wants to use acupuncture anaesthesia for the heart surgery of Lao Yang (͔ʉ
ß). When Dr Li is making her rostered visit to a steel refinery, she is called to deal 
with a medical problem relating to Lao Yang’s heart. Dr Li organises an ambulance to 
take Lao Yang to her hospital. When he is admitted to the hospital, the deputy head of 
heart surgery, Dr Luo (ǣͣʇ), the antagonist, sees Lao Yang’s condition improving 
and suggests he go home and have nutritious food and a good rest to help him 
recover. However, Dr Li disagrees with Dr Luo and tries to stop him discharging Lao 
Yang. Consequently, Dr Li puts the case to the Party branch members for discussion. 
Lao Chen (lʉß), the head of the hospital and the secretary of the Party branch, 
supports Dr Li with Dr Ding (ªͣʇ). As a result Lao Yang continues to be 
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hospitalised. Although Dr Luo is an expert in using acupuncture anaesthesia for heart 
surgery, having already carried out 92 successful operations, he believes Lao Yang is 
unable to be treated surgically. In order to achieve his goal of 100 patients being 
operated on using acupuncture anaesthesia, Dr Luo prioritises the entry of some 
patients with minor heart problems. Dr Li points out that Dr Luo wants to be famous 
but does not really care for patients with severe problems on account of revisionist 
and capitalistic thinking; it is important, she says, that Mao’s revolutionary medical 
health system serves workers, peasants and soldiers.
 When Lao Yang’s condition worsens, Dr Luo insists that he cannot guarantee 
the success of the operation nor can he take responsibility for the outcome because 
Lao Yang is allergic to common anaesthesia which may have to be used if the 
acupuncture anaesthesia fails. To ensure a successful heart operation Dr Li tries the 
acupuncture anaesthesia on herself and as Lao Yang’s condition deteriorates, she 
advocates immediate surgical intervention. However, Dr Luo wants to transfer Lao 
Yang to an internal ward to receive conservative treatment. Dr Li insists that Lao 
Yang must be saved by surgery; otherwise, she states, he will not survive. The case 
once again is referred to the Party branch for discussion. Chen, the secretary of the 
Party branch, and Dr Ding, the main surgeon, support Dr Li. Lao Yang knows about 
his heart condition and, in a letter to the Party states he has absolute confidence in Dr 
Li and Dr Ding; if the operation fails he will not blame either of them and all he wants 
doctors to do is to summarise the causes of the failure so that they can better serve 
patients in the future. When Dr Li and Dr Ding hear about the letter, they are more 
determined than ever to operate successfully. As the operation is proceeding, Dr Luo 
goes to the operating theatre where he is seen by Chen, who persuades him to join 
them. The operation on Lao Yang is successful. In the coda of the film, as Lao Yang 
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is pushed out of the operation theatre, Dr Luo admits that he was wrong and too 
conservative; this successful operation has taught him a lesson, he says, and he will 
wholeheartedly serve the workers, peasants and soldiers in the future. 
 The two main differences between the film and the play are that, first, in the 
mise-en-scène, four Shanghai monuments appear — the Bund, the Park Hotel, 
Shanghai Mansion and Nanjing Road. Although these have nothing to do with the plot 
of the film, they demonstrate the dynamic life of people in Shanghai and portray 
prosperity; the stage version in comparison is rather static, particularly when the 
ambulance goes from the factory to the hospital. Second, the scene in the operating 
theatre on film is quite real (omitted from the stage performance) because audiences 
wanted to know how acupuncture anaesthesia worked; while acupuncture had been 
used up to then, acupuncture anaesthesia was a new emerging form of anaesthesia 
being performed by many doctors in hospitals across China at that time. The change 
of medium in this case to film, therefore, provided a more realistic performance. 
 Another film, The Young Fellow, is quite similar on two counts to 
Acupuncture Needles Praised under a Shadowless Lamp: it is of similar length (about 
40 minutes long) and, although having the theme of class struggle, there is no overt 
political plot. The class struggle portrayed is between a teacher and students over how 
to implement Mao’s 7 May 1966 instruction: 
It is like this: students must learn first but they also have to learn various 
things. They must not only learn humanities, but must learn from workers, 
peasants and soldiers as well as learn to criticise the bourgeoisie. Schooling 
must be shortened; the education must be revolutionised; and the phenomenon 
of bourgeois intellectuals ruling cannot be tolerated any more. 
 
This instruction from Mao was sent in a letter to Lin Biao to indicate how to teach 
military cadets. Consequently, on 1 August 1966, the People’s Daily published an 
editorial reviewed by Mao entitled ‘The Whole Country Should Be a Universal 
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School of Mao Zedong Thought’ (ɜĐ°ͺäq˳ǭΤ¬ʮ̢̫́ ). 
When schools resumed their teaching in 1969, they all set up different kinds of 
factories, farms and military campuses. 
 The Young Fellow focuses on the Chinese education system during the 
Cultural Revolution. The film is located at a senior high school in Shanghai. A female 
student, Yang Bo (͔R), the protagonist, is not satisfied with her teacher Sun (ʿƬ
ʉ), the antagonist, who recalls students from their construction work in a school 
factory to take part in a mathematics competition in class. The students are recalled 
when they are busy building walls; a student Xiao Ma (̪ǧ), the sub-antagonist, 
builds a wall that is not straight and starts to read a book about how to enter the next 
school grade. His actions are noticed by another female student, Xiao Li (̪Ƶ), the 
sub-protagonist, who informs Yang Bo about Xiao Ma’s actions. Yang Bo indicates 
that she will deal with Xiao Ma after she has collected more bricks for the school 
factory building. 
 When Yang Bo returns with the bricks to the building site, there are no 
students to be seen; she finds out then that Sun has called them back to do a 
mathematics competition test. Yang Bo goes to the classroom and tells Sun that this 
sudden recall to the classroom is not fair to the students. She, with Xiao Li, 
consequently leaves the classroom without doing the test. When Sun notices they 
have left the classroom, she calls them back but they continue to refuse to do the test. 
 Xiao Ma obtains 99 points out of 100 in the test; he loses a point because he 
misses a word in the test although his calculations and equations are all correct. He 
argues with Sun that it is a mathematics test and not a Chinese language test. Sun 
agrees with his argument and changes his score from 99 to 100 points; Xiao Ma hence 
gains first place in the mathematics test. When the names of the winners of the 
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mathematics competition are about to be put on the ‘big character’ poster wall in the 
school, Yang Bo tries to stop them being put up; this enrages Xiao Ma and he accuses 
her of trying to stop the poster going up because her name is not on the winners’ list. 
Instead, Yang Bo puts a ‘big character’ poster on the message wall in which she 
claims that teacher Sun’s educational direction must be incorrect since it is only 
concerned with the quality of teaching and learning and ignores social and political 
education. This causes a considerable stir in the school and Sun and Yang Bo start 
arguing about the classroom education curriculum. 
 Sun tells Yang Bo that she should not come to her mathematics class; being 
the class monitor, she is setting a very bad example to other students. Yang Bo replies 
that she has a right to receive the education and no one can deprive her of her rights as 
she is the next generation of the working class. Chairman Mao and the Communist 
Party, she says, have given her the right to education. Sun reports Yang Bo to Li (Ʊ
ʉß), the head of school and the secretary of the Party branch (during the Cultural 
Revolution all schools across China had no principals but were managed by factory 
workers selected from the Communist Party). Li criticises Sun and points out that, 
through the Cultural Revolution, schools should train and develop students morally, 
intellectually and physically; they must not focus on the intellectual aspects of 
education only. Even though he openly supports Yang Bo, he also asks Yang Bo to 
talk to Sun. 
 After the conversation with Li, Yang Bo goes one night to Sun’s home and 
talks to her. Sun tells Yang Bo that the Cultural Revolution has already been 
implemented, the ethos of the educational system is appropriate and now it is 
necessary to develop the quality of teaching and learning. Just before Yang Bo arrives 
at Sun’s home, Xiao Ma, who is already there, tells Sun that he is going to put out a 
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critical article called ‘Better to have more knowledge’ as a critique of Yang Bo’s 
argument. When Yang Bo arrives, the conversation between Sun and Xiao Ma is 
terminated. Yang Bo tells Sun that her favourite student, Xiao Ma, not only snubs 
moral education but also reads feudal, bourgeois and revisionist books. When Yang 
Bo shows these books to her, Sun suddenly realises that she has been wrong and 
questions Xiao Ma. In the finale, Sun goes with Yang Bo to the school factory site to 
carry on their mathematics lesson by using the uneven walls built by Xiao Ma as an 
example for the lesson. 
 These key interpolated scenes in the film were different from the play; they 
increased the realistic mode of events taking place by using cinematic techniques such 
as long take and close-up shots. The first scene in the film shows 60 students in the 
classroom situation; this cannot be shown on stage. The second scene depicts students 
playing in the school playground. The third scene portrays Sun and Yang Bo having a 
mathematics class lesson at the school factory building site. All three scenes are not 
presented in the play but they become realistic active events in the film by using 
features which plays may not be able to use such as flashbacks and montage. 
 The film, Newcomers to a Mountain Village, is different from Acupuncture 
Needles Praised under a Shadowless Lamp and The Young Fellow in terms of the 
theme and length, although all three films extol new emerging events. The film is of 
the conventional feature length of 114 minutes and has a class struggle theme. It 
depicts Mao’s Red Guards, a group of Chinese youth who responded to Mao’s call to 
move to rural areas to continue their revolution and build socialism in the countryside. 
This film was directed by Jiang Shusen (ťʨɲ) andJing Jie(ſŰ) and produced 
by the Changchun Film Studio in 1976. It was transplanted from the play of the same 
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name, Newcomers to a Mountain Village, written by Zhao Yuxiang (ή΋̠), Wan 
Jie (˨ű) and Li Zheng (Ʊξ) in 1975. 
 The film is set in Jilin province in 1971. A group of Red Guards goes there to 
continue the revolution in response to Mao’s call from Beijing. One ardent educated 
female Red Guard, Fang Hua (Éĳ), the main protagonist, writes a criticism of the 
power station master, Wang Deshan (˪ɵ), the antagonist, over his personal 
handling of the electricity generator during the campaign ‘In Agriculture Learn from 
Dazhai’ (Ȟ́͠Χ). However, the head of the village, Zhang Zhenhe (άηĝ), 
dissuades Fang from continuing to criticise Wang because he fears the power station 
will not be built in time, thus creating problems for agricultural activities. Wang, in 
order to gain support from the villagers, tries to criticise himself. However, Fang does 
not give in and has a face-to-face confrontation with Wang, condemning him for 
using improper means to buy the generator. This class struggle between Fang and 
Wang clearly represents the class struggle between socialism and capitalism. 
 When the commune director, Zhao (ήϔɥ), learns about this confrontation, 
he removes Fang Hua from the position of political head of the village. However, 
Fang has the support of Zhang and other villagers as well as the youth group except 
for Liu Shinong (ǔʉȞ) who has a close relationship with Wang. She does not 
succumb and leads an investigation into Wang’s history. Wang tries to prevent any 
divulgence of his secret deal and shifts the blame for the power station failure onto 
Fang. He then attempts to kill his neighbour, Chen Guiqin (lČɍ), a daughter of a 
landlord, who knows his personal history. Fang also tries to convince Liu about the 
reason that Wang treats him differently. Finally, when Fang finds out that Wang was 
not a People’s Liberation Army soldier as he claimed but was instead an officer of the 
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Kuomintang army who also had a part to play in an improper deal concerning the 
electricity generator, she exposes Wang’s plot. As a result, Fang is reinstated as 
political leader of the village and she successfully leads the villagers in the building of 
a hydropower station to support their agricultural activities. 
 The mise-en-scène of the film is much more vivid than the stage scenes of 
the play. For example, Fang organises a village meeting to criticise Wang; the 
meeting comprises more than 100 villagers in the film, an unlikely number for a stage 
production; also a horse-drawn cart carries an electricity generator in the film — a 
scene that would be impossible on stage; and Fang and the Red Guards work with 
peasants side by side in the rice fields in the film, also impossible on the stage. All 
these and other realistic elements are depicted in the film but could not be shown or 
even described in the stage version. 
 What is demonstrated by these interpolated scenes is that the telling and 
showing of the class struggle are more effective in films particularly in terms of the 
interaction with the audiences. The films improve on the representations of stage 
performances and enhance the truisms articulated in the original manuscripts. The 
impact of transplanted films on the Chinese people was, in general, much greater than 
the impact of the original plays on which they were based, and certainly audience 
numbers for cinema far exceeded those for the stage; hence the films had greater 
popular appeal. 
 It is obvious, then, that the transplanted films were as important as the 
adapted films during the Cultural Revolution. The transplanted films interpolated 
more dramatic scenes from plays while the adapted films condensed dramatic scenes 
from novels. The filmmakers had to rely on intuition when choosing, through a 
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The films reproduced during the Cultural Revolution were as important and political 
as the adapted films and the transplanted films. There were six reproduced films: The 
Harbour (1973), Green Pine Ridge (1973), Fight North and South (1974), 
Reconnaissance across the Yangtze  (1974), Guerrillas Sweep the Plain (ȸΓ΂ňµ 
1974) and The Younger Generation (ȘɎ͢ 1976). The three war films, Fight 
North and South, Reconnaissance across the Yangtze and Guerrillas Sweep the Plain, 
were not changed significantly in terms of their length and narrative; some of the 
same actors and directors even worked on both the original and the reproduced films. 
For example, Chen Shu (lʧ ), a well-known actor, performed as an enemy 
intelligence director in both versions of the black-and-white Reconnaissance across 
the Yangtze in 1954 and the colour reproduction in 1974. Reconnaissance across the 
Yangtze has already been discussed in Chapter Three. Fight North and South 
produced in 1952 and reproduced in 1974 is a Chinese civil war-themed film 
portraying the Chinese People’s Liberation Army fighting the Kuomintang army in 
1947, and Guerrillas Sweep the Plain (produced in 1955 and reproduced in 1974) 
depicts Chinese guerrillas fighting against the Japanese invaders in the north of China 
in 1943 during the Chinese resistance war. The film Green Pine Ridge is different 
from Fight North and South and Guerrillas Sweep the Plain in that it is about class 
struggle in the rural area of China. It was produced in 1965, reproduced in 1973 and 
has been discussed previously in Chapter Three. 
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 The other two films, The Harbour and The Younger Generation, are also on 
the theme of class struggle but reflect city life in Shanghai, a dominant arts and 
cultural centre. The former is one of Jiang Qing’s eight model films and the latter is a 
conventional feature film. Both films also portray city youths who are not satisfied 
with their jobs due to bourgeois ideology. 
 The opera film, The Harbour, was first captured on celluloid from the 
Chinese opera performed by the Shanghai Chinese Opera Troupe and it was initially 
transplanted from the Huai opera, The Harbour at Dawn (ĔíΠj )9a local 
opera performed in the Shanghai region (Di 2006, 145). The first transplanted film, 
The Harbour, directed by Fu Chaowu and produced by the Beijing Film Studio was 
never released, having been dismissed by Jiang Qing immediately after its production 
in August 1972, as discussed in Chapter Three. The orders were then given for The 
Harbour to be directed by Xie Tieli and Xie Jin, and reproduced by the Beijing and 
Shanghai Film Studios in September 1972. However, the second version did not 
satisfy Jiang Qing, who put political pressure on the film directors, especially on Xie 
Tieli. On 14 January 1973, Jiang Qing convened a meeting with not only the film 
director, Xie Tieli, the cinematographer, Qian Jiang, and the main protagonist 
performer, Li Lifang, but also invited Premier Zhou and Politburo members such as 
Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Li Desheng (Ʊʇ) and 
Wu De (˿) to discuss how to produce a good version of The Harbour (Di 2006, 
157 - 1967). As discussed in Chapter Three, Mao changed the plot from a portrayal of 
small problems to a class struggle among stevedores. This was a serious political 
intervention and Jiang Qing seized the opportunity to press on with the reproduction 
of the opera film. Xie and Qian had no choice but to work on it in 1973. There is no 
doubt that the 1973 reproduced opera film, The Harbour, is more realistic than the 
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1972 second version. As the 1972 first version of The Harbour was never released, it 
will not be discussed here. 
 The 1973 version and 1972 second version of The Harbour are almost 
identical; not only were they directed by the same directors, Xie Tieli and Xie Jin, 
they were also performed by the same actors and the same opera troupe.  Although the 
film diegesis of the reproduced version of The Harbour in 1973 is essentially the 
same as that of the earlier version, the film is better in terms of the realistic scenarios 
in mise-en-scène and the opera music. 
 The film is set at a harbour in Shanghai. Fang Haizhen, a Party branch 
secretary, the female protagonist, helps a stevedore worker, Han Xiaoqiang, who, 
after graduation from a senior high school, does not like his job. He wants to be in the 
crew of a ship working internationally in order to support countries which are fighting 
against colonialism in Africa. Qian Shouwei, an antagonist portrayed as a class 
enemy, and who is a store clerk at the harbour, takes the opportunity to destroy the 
reputation of the Chinese aid goods by putting fibreglass into a hessian wheat bag 
which Han had accidently dropped on the ground, spilling its contents; Fang and other 
workers face the urgent task of loading all the wheat bags onto the ship before a 
looming storm and checking out which bag is contaminated before the ship sails. Fang 
finds out that Qian deliberately contaminated a bag of wheat. At the end of the opera 
film, Fang helps Han to realise that every job, including his own, plays an important 
part in socialist construction. 
 Despite using all the same or slightly reformed Chinese opera music such as 
‘Er Huang’ (Áļ) and ‘Xi Pi’ (̇ȳ) as well as songs in both the 1972 and 1973 
versions, the differences in mise-en-scène are that first, the whole background setting 
and the costumes of all the performers are different in the 1972 version from the 1973 
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version; second, the wind is used more prominently in the 1973 version to create a 
more dynamic harbour environment so that the stevedore team’s flag on the dock and 
trees on the working site and even the scarf on the shoulders of the main protagonist 
Fang Haizhen are all gently flapping, unlike the 1972 version in which, although the 
stevedore team flag is flapping, the trees at the work site and the scarf of the main 
protagonist, Fang Haizhen, are static; third, with regard to the cinematic aspects, Fang 
Haizhen is portrayed in more medium shots rather than medium close-up shots to 
avoid portrayal of the performer’s high cheek bones which would have made Fang 
Haizhen look more like a glorious proletarian worker. In a sense, the 1973 version of 
The Harbour film is more like a feature film with more realistic scenes. Thus it 
improves on the more static stage performances. These cinematic manoeuvres were in 
line with the political process called ‘Restore the plays on the stage but create the 
plays better than on the original stage into films’ (ĺΓ̂˄î΅̂˄), such that the 
artistic and aesthetic elements of the stage version were maintained and thereafter 
enhanced by using cinematic techniques to make the plays more realistic  (Gang 2006, 
183-185). 
 In the interests of stressing the political message, both versions of the opera 
films not only used popular Chinese opera music as the medium to promote the 
Communist ideology of class struggle but also at the beginning and ending of the 
films used the internationally well-known left-wing tune The Internationale 
composed by the Frenchman, Pierre De Geyter, in 1888. This tune was used to 
promote the cinematic revolution during the Cultural Revolution in a way similar to 
the use of voice-over quotations from Mao at the start of the opera film. 
 Another film, The Younger Generation, is similar to The Harbour in terms of 
the class-struggle narrative concerning a city youth who is not satisfied with his work. 
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The theme of the film is not overtly political, being similar to films such as 
Acupuncture Needles Praised under a Shadowless Lamp and The Young Fellow 
which depict class struggle inconspicuously. The 1965 version of The Young 
Generation was a transplanted film directed by Zhao Ming (ήǿ) and produced by 
the Tianma Film Studio (˓ǧ¤ͼχȴe), one of three film studios belonging to the 
Shanghai Film Studio. The 1965 film was transplanted from a play of the same name 
written by Chen Yun (lΙ), who was a scriptwriter for both films, and Xu Jingxian  
(̼ƃ̖), who was a political ally of the ‘Gang of Four’ and the Shanghai Mayor 
during the Cultural Revolution. The reproduced film, The Younger Generation, was 
directed by Ling Zhihao (Ǐρě) and Zhang Huijun (άłƔ), and produced by the 
Shanghai Film Studio in 1976, the last year of the Cultural Revolution. 
 The film is about two young male undergraduates of the Shanghai 
Geological Institute, Xiao Jiye (̧ŗ͠), the protagonist, and Lin Yusheng (ǍΏʇ), 
the antagonist, who have already been designated to work with a prospecting team in 
Qinghai province. However, Lin comes back to live with his parents in an affluent 
residential area in Shanghai claiming he needs medical treatment for his leg problems. 
During his stay of six months in Shanghai, he tries to get a job at the Geological 
Institute and finds a friend, Xiao Wu (̪˿), from a rich family who, like himself, is 
unwilling to go to the remote areas of China to work after graduation. Under the 
influence of Xiao Wu, Lin starts to listen to Western music; and with regard to work, 
he tries to use his parents’ relationship with the Party secretary of the Geological 
Institute to get a job at the Institute in order to pursue the material pleasures of city 
life. At the same time, he tries to convince his girlfriend to stay in Shanghai with him. 
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 When Xiao Jiye leaves Qinghai province and goes back to Shanghai for a 
conference on new practical geological prospecting methods, he is told by his leader 
to inquire about Lin Yusheng’s health problem and also to get treatment for his own 
leg problems. When Xiao seeks treatment for his leg problems at the hospital to which 
Lin goes, he finds out that Lin has presented a fake medical report about his leg 
problems to his work place in Qinghai. When Lin Yusheng’s parents discover this, 
they tell him who he really is — that he is their adopted son and his real parents are 
revolutionary martyrs. After Lin learns of his adoption and his real parents, he admits 
his wrongdoing and states he is willing to go back with Xiao to work in Qinghai 
province. 
 Although the narrative of both film versions of The Younger Generation was 
not significantly altered, the political tempo was changed quite dramatically from the 
1965 version to the 1976 version; in addition it was produced in colour in 1976. The 
changes were necessary in order to adhere to the political demands of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
 The first change involves the background of the work site: a huge red banner 
with a political slogan ‘Bravely strive for the year of 1962 and ferociously attack 
imperialism, revisionism and reactionaries’ (ÏΩ͢ƈǖÁȘĢĢň ̺Å) 
hangs on the rigger in the 1976 version of The Younger Generation; this is not in the 
1965 version. It is clear that adding the political slogan in the 1976 version is to suit 
the needs of the time. 
 The second change concerns the scene in the 1965 version where Xiao 
receives two cow horn cups from an old Tibetan man; Xiao wants to give Lin these 
two cups to wish him and his girlfriend great happiness when Lin leaves for Shanghai 
to have his leg problems treated. This scene was elided in the 1976 version of the film 
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in which Xiao instead gives Lin a bunch of medicinal herbs which he received from 
an old Tibetan man. The scene from the 1965 version was dropped because it extolled 





Figure 21: Top: still from the 1976 version of The Younger Generation (ȘɎ͢). Bottom: still 
from the 1965 version. Xiao Jiye (̧ŗ͠, right) is the protagonist and Lin Yusheng (ǍΏʇ, left) is 
the antagonist in both films; Xiao is performed by different actors but Lin is performed by the same 
actor Da Shichang (ʕc). 
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 The third change is that, in the 1976 version, there are no students 
performing Uighur dances about the romantic life of the students at the Geological 
Institute hall; also there is no mention of students’ dreams to be famous Uighur 
dancers in the future, although romantic dances were featured in the 1965 version. It 
was a political decision to cancel these scenes because the life of students in 1965 was 
completely different from the life of students during the Cultural Revolution. 
 A fourth change for political purposes was made in the 1976 version of the 
film. This version created a Professor Yan (͆ŭʠ) who wants Lin Yusheng to be his 
assistant lecturer and who therefore supports Lin’s wish to stay in Shanghai, whereas 
in the 1965 version, Lin himself contacts his mother’s colleague and old friend, the 
Party Secretary Wu (˿ʤŕ) at the Institute in order to procure work there — and 
there is no Professor Yan at all. This was a typical political manoeuvre during the 
Cultural Revolution to create ‘bad’ intellectuals and ‘good’ Communist Party 
members. However, this Professor Yan, like Xiao Wu, is an evil character who never 
appears on screen. 
 These major changes, interpolated scenes and elided scenes, shortened the 
1976 film version to 86 minutes from 107 minutes for the 1965 version to present a 
more politically suitable film for the Cultural Revolution. The reproduced film, the 
1976 version, seems to have lost the equilibrium it had in its juxtaposition of class 
struggle and love extolled in the 1965 film version. Despite an eleven-year gap, 
something that did not change was the actor chosen for the role of the antagonist, Lin 
Yusheng: Da Shichang, a very popular actor mentioned in Chapter Three, performed 
the role in both films. A significant change in the 1976 version, however, is that the 
antagonist is dominant on screen throughout. In other words, the 1976 version was the 
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only reproduced film to assign the dominant role to the antagonist, a unique cinematic 
phenomenon at the time of the Cultural Revolution. 
 Although there were few reproduced films during the Cultural Revolution, 
those which were reproduced were arguably among the finest classical class struggle 
and war-themed films of the period. The six reproduced films discussed here were the 
most popular; The Harbour and The Younger Generation were the best in terms of 
their realism and their social and political awareness as exhibited in their narratives. 
These reproduced films, through their accounts of the social and political realities of 
the Cultural Revolution, provided inspirational entertainment to Chinese audiences. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined film adaptation, transplantation and reproduction during the 
Cultural Revolution. The discussion shows that the Chinese film industry not only 
translated novels into films, transferred plays and operas into films, or remade old 
films into new films, but also reinforced the social and political messages of these 
films to fit the ideology of the Cultural Revolution. The film diegesis was political 
and the film images mainly displayed workers, peasants and soldiers (and sometimes, 
too, Chinese youth), portrayed as socialist heroes.  
 Adapted, transplanted and reproduced films comprised the largest proportion 
of the films produced during the Cultural Revolution and all, at that time, 
disseminated socialist ideology to the Chinese people. They were subject to a 
selective political process to determine which novels, plays, operas, and films were to 
be adapted, transplanted and reproduced as new feature films. Cinematic practices 
reinforced the political agenda by using idiosyncratic film patterns and homogenised 
interpolation and elision of film diegesis. 
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 Significant themes of cinematic realism reflected in Chinese cinema during the 
Cultural Revolution included the class struggle of the proletariat versus the 
bourgeoisie; Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (Chinese style) versus Revisionism (Russian 
model); the Chinese civil war; and the Chinese resistance war against the Japanese 
invasion. These themes will be analysed in the following chapter. The analysis will 
provide a further detailed account of cinematic realism involving ideological elements 




Significant Themes of Cinematic Realism 
 
The most notable and dominant themes of the 93 films produced during the Cultural 
Revolution were class struggle and war. The class struggle-themed films included 
those with industrial, agricultural, educational and medical subjects and the war-
themed films dealt with topics related to the Chinese civil war and the Chinese 
resistance war against the Japanese Invasion. Despite these realistic topics, Paul Clark 
(1987, 104) argues: 
The more typical revolution films made during the nine years before 1965, 
anticipated the aesthetic excess of the Cultural Revolution. Their emphasis on 
a stereotyped and often inauthentic heroism was a major element in the 
socialist mass culture in which film played a central part. 
 
In other words, the films made during the Cultural Revolution, as well as those made 
before it, used similar stereotypes; the protagonists, socialist heroes, were usually 
embellished and the antagonists, class enemies, were usually belittled. In this way, 
Chinese cinema espoused the same ideology before and during the Cultural 
Revolution. The contention of this chapter is that these film themes truthfully 
reflected historical moments of China from 1937 to 1976, but this is not to say that 
they did not embellish or romanticise the truth to serve Party interests. In order to 
provide evidence for this contention, four films have been specifically chosen for 
examination. 
 The chapter starts with an examination of Spring Seedling (	), a class 
struggle-themed film with a medical subject, directed by Xie Jin, a prominent and 
prolific filmmaker. The film depicts the lack of a basic medical and health system in 
rural areas of China and how the lack of a health system leads to a class struggle 
between poor peasants and a well-established doctor. This examination focuses on the 
 175 
cinematic structure and content of the film in order to demonstrate how it presented 
class struggle both politically and aesthetically. 
 The chapter then examines Jubilant Small Cool River (1976), another class 
struggle-themed film, a struggle against ‘capitalist roaders’, to establish the extent to 
which the film presented capitalist ideas in the socialist society and how these ideas 
were presented. The discussion of this film also considers the extent to which its 
theme epitomised the reality of Chinese society, especially peasant life in the rural 
areas of China. 
 The third film for discussion is Sparkling Red Star (1974), a war-themed film 
on the topic of the Chinese civil war. A critical comparative analysis is undertaken 
between the diegesis of this film and the Italian film Rome, Open City (1945); the aim 
here is to explain how political interference impacted on the presentation of the 
Chinese civil war with regard to the film’s realistic elements and cinematic 
techniques. 
 Finally, the chapter examines The Red Lantern (1970), another war-themed 
film on the topic of the Chinese resistance war against the Japanese invasion.  
Attention is given to the film narrative, in particular, the relationships among the 
family members in order to demonstrate personal survival, national survival and the 
survival of a valued social and political dimension. Furthermore, this chapter also 
discusses how Jiang Qing was involved in the creation and production of this film. 
 
Class Struggle on the Medical Front — Spring Seedling 
Spring Seedling, a film directed by Xie Jin in collaboration with Yan Bili (͊Cƶ) 
and Liang Tingduo (ǁ˘І) and produced by the Shanghai Film Studio in 1975, is 
claimed by some Mainland Chinese film scholars, such as Zhang Wei (2006) and 
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Yang Yuanying (2006), to be one of the most conspiratorial films produced by the 
Chinese film industry during the Cultural Revolution. The concept of the 
conspiratorial film could be derived from ‘The Political Report to the 11th National 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party’ (ϊĐû`ʌ͢ɜĐJŃ
ξω>ð ) by Hua Guofeng (ĳĐÒ 18August 1977), the Chairman of the 
Chinese Communist Party, who stated: ‘The literature and art they produced in the 
name of the “capitalist roader” turned into a real literature of conspiracy in order to 
make indiscriminate attacks vilifying the Party leadership’. The film sought to show 
how revisionism and capitalism overruled socialism and its proletarian dictatorship; 
this was achieved by using allegories to portray medical professionals who, although 
they worked at the socialist commune hospital, did not care about the poor and 
middle-class peasants in a rural area of China. 
 Despite the fact that this film was made during the Cultural Revolution, it 
follows a similar pattern to Xie Jin’s films made before and after the Cultural 
Revolution; it follows his stylistic matrix of ‘good people unjustly treated’  (ęɤǷ
ΐ), ‘social value discovered’ (ŝσÂ̙), ‘moral influence triumphant’ (èĴ) 
and ‘benevolence prevailing over malevolence’ (ɷDʈ») used in his many films 
such as Stage Sisters (1965) and Hibiscus Town (ϴɧθ 1986). These, then, were 
typical class struggle-themed features. In relation to these features Ma Ning (1992, 
259) concludes:
Xie Jin in his filmmaking inherited and transformed codes and conventions of 
leftist film melodrama and Maoist peasant melodrama. In using a yin-yang bi-
polar structuring device as a formal principle to organise different modes of 
representation, discourses, political/ideological values and concepts, and forms 
of subjectivity into a system of conflict, the story or fabula in his films usually 
attained a macro, social-historical dimension as well as a micro, personal and 
melodramatic dimension.  
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These key features dominated Xie Jin’s films in both the Maoist era and the post-Mao 
period.  
 There was also an interesting debate among Mainland Chinese film and 
culture scholars such as Zhu Dake (ϒƟ) and Shao Mujun (ɼȌƖ) and others 
about the constructivism of Xie Jin’s films. Zhu, an Australian-educated film critic 
and writer, published his article called ‘Deficient Modes of Xie Jin’s Films’ (̯ż¤
ͼȄʕɝ̛) in Wenhuibao on 18 July 1986. He concluded that the political nature 
of Xie Jin’s films was intended to cater for social and political power by means of an 
excessively pragmatic aesthetics which took the form of what Zhu labelled ‘tawdry 
cultural products’; he also declared that the films had inherited outdated modes not 
suited to the zeitgeist of Chinese society. Zhu argued that Xie Jin made similar kinds 
of films all his life, however, even after the Cultural Revolution. In response to Zhu’s 
critique, Shao, a well-known film critic, published an article called ‘A Defence of Xie 
Jin’s Films’ (˳̯ż¤ͼ͢H) in Wenyibao (˹ͩ>) on 9 August 1986. He, with 
another famous veteran film critic, Zhong Dianfei (ϋ¦), recognised that cinematic 
realism is about the praise and exposure of social phenomena and Xie Jin’s films did 
follow this trajectory. In addition, Zhong also praised Xie Jin in an article called ‘Ten 
Thoughts About Xie Jin’s Films’ (̯ż¤ͼʌʮ) in Chinese Movie Times on 13 
September 1986, saying that ‘the era had Xie Jin and Xie Jin had no era’ (ʎ΃̯ż
½̯ż˾ʎ) to pay tribute to Xie Jin’s contributions to the Chinese film industry. 
However, despite the debate about Xie Jin’s films among Mainland Chinese film 
scholars, the film Spring Seedling attracted little attention in regard to the impact of 
its political economy and aesthetics on the Chinese people during the Cultural 
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Revolution. Under these circumstances, Spring Seedling has been deliberately chosen 
for analysis here. 
 Even today, Spring Seedling cannot be viewed in official venues such as 
libraries and cinemas in Mainland China, but it can be watched on the Internet and 
bought from DVD hawkers in China, indicating how Chinese officials still currently 
deal with this film. The film realistically portrays the lack of basic medical facilities 
in the rural areas of China in order to describe the class struggle against revisionism 
and capitalism. The original film script, eulogising ‘barefoot doctors’ as a newly 
emerging phenomenon during the Cultural Revolution, was called ‘Barefoot Doctor’  
(vūͣʇ ). The script was initially completed in 1973 and incorporated the 
information from a research report entitled ‘Viewing the Direction of the Revolution 
in Medical Education from the Growth of Barefoot Doctors Movement’ (vū
ͣʇqdƛͣ́ŭΏòȃÉ̥ ) about a rural ‘barefoot doctor’, Li 
Honghua (Ʊħĳ), who serves the peasants wholeheartedly, and the head of a 
commune hospital, Du Wenjie (³˹Ű), who is also welcomed by the peasants after 
he changes his negative attitude to a positive one about the ‘barefoot doctors’ (Zhang 
2006, 248). 
 However, in 1974, after the 10th Chinese Communist Party Congress, Zhang 
Chunqiao, one of the ‘Gang of Four’, invited many worker-peasant-soldier ‘barefoot 
doctors’ and artists to a symposium to modify this script. Zhang instructed them to 
change the theme from being an apolitical one to a political one, to reflect how the 
Cultural Revolution protected the growth of the ‘barefoot doctors’ movement and 
how, were it not for the Cultural Revolution, these doctors would never have appeared 
in the first place (Zhang 2006, 249). It is important to note that the theme implied, in a 
subtle way, that the class struggle between proletarian socialism and capitalist 
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revisionism represented the political class struggle between the ‘Gang of Four’ and 
Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping during the Cultural Revolution. Thus, Spring Seedling 
undoubtedly was born as a result of the direct intervention of Zhang and Jiang Qing’s 
political allies in Shanghai. 
 Despite the political character of Spring Seedling as a conspiratorial film, Xie 
Jin, the main director of this film, did not experience political harassment after the 
Cultural Revolution. By contrast, even though Sparkling Red Star, another film 
produced during the Cultural Revolution, was not labelled a contentious film, Li Jun   
(ƱƗ), the main film director, sustained enormous political pressure from Chinese 
officials after the Cultural Revolution due to film modifications made according to 
Jiang Qing’s orders (Cui 2005, 156). Hence this study considers not only the filmic 
reality in regard to the film Spring Seedling, but also the political reality in the 
Chinese film industry generally. 
 The film is set in a rural village in Southern China and its narrative structure 
stretches about seven years from 1965 up to the time of the Cultural Revolution. A 
political leader of a women’s work team in the village, Tian Chunmiao (˕|ǽ, 
meaning ‘field spring seedling’), the main protagonist in her mid-twenties, helps her 
neighbour, A Fang ( È), to take her sick child, Xiao Mei (̪Ǵ), to Chaoyang 
People’s Commune Hospital (g͗ɤǾøʀͣΖ). A doctor in his mid-fifties in the 
emergency section, Qian Jiren (ɅŒɣ), one of the antagonists, is not willing to 
immediately treat Xiao Mei; instead he continues discussing his research project 
called Talk about Mediation and Treatment of Bodies (͘ʂǆÃɇ) with Mr Du 
Wenjie (³˹Ű), the hospital Head, the main antagonist. While they talk to each 
other, Mr Du receives a call from Li Ajiang (Ʊ(Ɉ), the Party Branch Secretary of 
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Hubin Village asking him to save Xiao Mei. Mr Du then asks Doctor Qian to see Xiao 
Mei right away. After Doctor Qian sees Xiao Mei, he decides not to perform any 
emergency treatment due to the hospital’s lack of medicine. He asks why Xiao Mei 
was not sent to this hospital earlier despite the fact that he knew Xiao Mei had been 
waiting some time in his consulting room. Before being transferred to the County 
Hospital at the request of Doctor Qian, Xiao Mei dies in the arms of Tian Chunmiao. 
A close-up shot shows Tian Chunmiao, desperate, angry and in tears, repeatedly 
calling Xiao Mei’s name. This scene really moved audiences because it highlighted 
the lack of medical services in rural areas as well as the attitude of Doctor Qian. The 
opening of the film depicts the under-developed medical system in the countryside, a 
real and universal problem in China still. The most advanced and well-equipped 
hospitals are always in the cities. However, the careless attitude of Doctor Qian was 
exaggerated in order to create the stereotypically negative image of the antagonist for 
the continuum scenes.
 When Tian Chunmiao is sent to study at the Commune Hospital to become a 
‘barefoot doctor’ following Chairman Mao’s directive ‘to place the key of health and 
medical work into rural areas’, Mr Du asks Doctor Qian, because he is the head of the 
medical treatment team, to take care of Tian. However, Doctor Qian does not allow 
her to study medicine and arranges for her to do all the cleaning work at the hospital. 
In Doctor Qian’s eyes, Tian is a peasant who can hold a hoe but cannot handle a 
syringe. At the same time, a new young male graduate doctor, Fang Ming (Éǿ), is 
designated to work at the Commune Hospital; when Tian starts studying there, he 
helps her from time to time with her medical studies. However, Doctor Qian is not 
happy with the arrangement and complains to Mr Du who shares his view that 
peasants are not fit for medical work. In addition, Mr Du emphasises that medicine is 
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scientific and concerns life and death matters, and advises Doctor Fang that he should 
not allow Tian to see patients although she has been sent to the hospital to study 
medicine. 
  Tian is thus unable to pursue her studies at the Commune Hospital and goes 
back to her village. Before Tian leaves, she says that this hospital is not for poor or 
middle-class peasants as Mr Du and Doctor Qian look down upon them. She argues 
loudly that since poor and middle-class peasants can use their hands to overturn the 
‘Three Biggest Mountains’ (feudalism, revisionism and capitalism), to change China 
from a feudal society into a socialist society, they are surely able to deal with 
syringes. The camera shot shows her confidence in a close-up and in an upwards shot 
the camera shows her disappointment but also hints at the arrival of a great political 
movement. 
  After she gets back to the village, Tian gives the villagers some preventative 
herbal remedies and also uses acupuncture and Chinese herbal medicine to cure Xiao 
Long (̪Ǘ, an older brother of Xiao Mei) who is suffering from pneumonia. Xiao 
Long’s grandmother asks Jia Yuexian (śΘ̕), a female antagonist, a traditional 
countryside medical practitioner who has a good relationship with Doctor Qian, to 
treat Xiao Long; she is stopped by Tian who exposes the fact that Jia was using 
sodium bicarbonate to treat Xiao Long. Subsequently, Tian, with the support of the 
Party Branch Secretary, Li Ajiang, Doctor Fang and the village people, establishes a 
small clinic in Hubin Village to treat common diseases. This infuriates Mr Du because 
he thinks the clinic has been set up in opposition to the Commune Hospital and he 
presents a notification from the County Medical Authority compelling Tian to close 
the clinic down. In addition, Mr Du confiscates her medication box; however, he 
cannot curb her enthusiasm to serve the peasants. All scenarios up to this point have 
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taken place just before the Cultural Revolution. Although the struggle between the 
peasant, Tian Chunmiao, and Mr Du with Doctor Qian is presented as apolitical, the 





Figure 22: The ‘Barefoot Doctor’ Tian Chunmiao (˕|ǽ) carrying a hoe and a medicine box goes to 
work in the fields so she can treat sick peasants. 
 
 When the Cultural Revolution begins, Tian becomes ‘a revolutionary rebel’ 
entering the ‘barefoot doctors’ training class at the Commune Hospital where Mr Du 
and Doctor Qian try to manage angry peasants who had previously wanted to become 
‘barefoot doctors’. However Tian insists all the medical lessons should be arranged by 
‘barefoot doctor’ trainees despite the promises of Mr Du and Doctor Qian to give 
some extra material incentives to the barefoot medical trainees. Tian also asks Mr Du 
and Doctor Qian why their attitude has changed from opposing the training of 
‘barefoot doctors’ just before the Cultural Revolution to supporting the training of 
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‘barefoot doctors’ at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution; she also asks after the 
purpose of this training class for the ‘barefoot doctors’. When political pressure starts 
to build up on Mr Du with regard to his intentions, he has no choice but to let Tian 
and Doctor Fang do whatever they want to do. 
  Tian suggests during the training class that Doctor Fang should receive a 
special patient, Uncle Shuichang (ʫaT), who has been suffering for some time 
from a spinal vertebra disease. Doctor Fang agrees to treat uncle Shuichang and so, 
with the help of Tian and other ‘barefoot doctors’, gives him a combination of 
Chinese and Western medicine. 
 When Doctor Fang and Tian are in the middle of treating Uncle Shuichang, 
Mr Du receives a letter from Mr Liang (ǀƌd), a bureau chief at the County 
Medical Authority who represents Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping’s political line, 
indicating that the Cultural Revolution will be short-lived. Realising that the duration 
of the Cultural Revolution is unpredictable, Mr Du seizes the opportunity to dismiss 
all the ‘barefoot doctor’ trainees despite his previous promises; furthermore, he 
suspends Doctor Fang’s work and makes him write a self-criticism. Mr Du also 
smashes a bowl of Chinese medicine made by Tian for Uncle Shuichang, saying that 
Tian is not a qualified doctor at the Commune Hospital. 
 In the final section of the film, Mr Du and Doctor Qian realise that Tian’s 
Chinese medicine has had a negative effect on Uncle Shuichang and they think this 
may be due to poisonous Chinese herbs. They try to save Uncle Shuichang in order to 
cover up their previous failure to carry out their responsibilities and they organise an 
ambulance to take him to the County Hospital. However, Doctor Qian, like Mr Du, 
realises, that if Uncle Shuichang dies, Tian and Doctor Fang will have to take full 
responsibility for trying out their combination remedy. Doctor Qian, who was born 
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into a landlord family and has therefore always hated peasants, deliberately asks a 
young nurse to inject Uncle Shuichang with improper medication and tries to shift the 
blame onto Tian. However, Tian stops the injection from taking place and asks what 
medication Doctor Qian is using. When the nurse tries to pass the syringe to Tian, 
Doctor Qian grabs it out of the nurse’s hand and smashes it on the floor. He then says 
he is a doctor and Tian has no right to see the medication he uses. Tian astutely uses 
her foot to cover a broken piece of syringe containing the medication. After Doctor 
Qian leaves, she picks it up and asks another nurse to check the medication. Tian and 
Doctor Fang subsequently learn that the medication is lethal. 
 When an ambulance comes to pick up Uncle Shuichang from the County 
Hospital, Doctor Fang stops Doctor Qian who is leading the way to the ward. Doctor 
Qian calls Mr Du for help. Mr Du then comes out and says he is the head of the 
Commune Hospital and he has the right to make the transfer decision, and continues 
to accuse Tian and Doctor Fang of making a mistake in treating Uncle Shuichang and 
not allowing him to rescue Uncle Shuichang. Tian responds that there is evidence that 
Doctor Qian was deliberately trying to murder Uncle Shuichang. Mr Du asks Tian for 
the evidence, yelling that Tian cannot incriminate Doctor Qian. Tian shows the result 
of the check, which causes the nurse who was trying to inject the medication into 
Uncle Shuichang to announce that she has one more injection ready. Doctor Fang 
grabs Doctor Qian and tells him that he is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Li Ajiang, the 
Party Branch Secretary, then reveals Doctor Qian’s secret diary entry about Mr Du 
occupying the Commune Hospital and stamping out ‘barefoot doctors’ so as to regain 
his privileged position over the people. 
 Faced with the evidence, Mr Du states that he did not realise what Doctor 
Qian had done. Tian rebukes Mr Du for saying that whoever is against him is against 
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the Party. She tells him that he is no longer a real Communist Party member because 
he has been protecting Doctor Qian, has attacked ‘barefoot doctors’, has banned their 
clinics, and has smashed the medication bowl for Uncle Shuichang. In addition, Tian 
declares that these people are the bourgeoisie who have tried to defeat the proletariat 
and Mr Du has forgotten who he really is. 
 When Uncle Shuichang hears what is being said, he surprises everyone by 
walking out of the ward into the corridor, and stating loudly that what Tian is saying 
is absolutely right. Mr Du, on seeing Uncle Shuichang, silently bows his head in 
shame. Uncle Shuichang continues to walk to the crowded courtyard of the Commune 
Hospital where everyone is watching him. After drinking another bowl of Chinese 
medicine brewed by Tian, he triumphantly chants the slogan ‘Long live Chairman 
Mao’! Everyone follows his lead, chanting ‘Long live Chairman Mao’! 
 Although they may be described by Paul Clark (1987, 104) as inauthentic 
heroisms, these final sequences of Spring Seedling depict the realities of the Cultural 
Revolution. This film was a political and cultural product of the Cultural Revolution 
resembling Western ‘New Wave’ films in the way they employ a youthful 
iconoclastic spirit to challenge established dogma or conventions. Thompson and 
Bordwell (2010, 407-408) describe this kind of film as ‘a combination of objective 
realism, subjective realism and authorial commentary to create a narrative ambiguity 
in the sense that a film engages with the social and political upheavals of the era’. 
Many Chinese filmmakers during the Cultural Revolution engaged with social and 
political upheavals by carrying out radical experiments with editing, visual style, and 
narrative as part of a general break with the conservative paradigm of cinema. 
 In other words, the deployment of spatial-temporal sequential scenes in Spring 
Seedling depicted the sharp contrast between the death of Xiao Mei, presented as a 
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reproach of the old, conservative medical system, and the survival of Uncle 
Shuichang, presented as praise for the emerging practice of ‘barefoot doctors’. Thus 
the film praised the new socio-political order of the Cultural Revolution and 
supported Mao’s agenda; this is why everyone chants ‘Long Live Chairman Mao!’ in 
the coda of the mise-en-scène. 
 Spring Seedling was the first film to portray anti-capitalist roaders when it was 
screened nationally in August 1975. The political allies of the ‘Gang of Four’ at the 
Ministry of Culture praised this film to the utmost because of its adherence to ‘three 
eulogies and one prominence’ (ɯñʵ ͢ˠw ): extolling Chairman Mao’s 
revolutionary line, praising the Cultural Revolution and eulogising the newly 
emergent socialist events and promoting proletarian heroes (Zhang 2006, 249).  
 Even after the Cultural Revolution, Guangzhou Daily (ĊϏɦ>) published 
an article ‘Seven Barefoot Doctors in Guangdong Province Honoured by the Ministry 
of Health’ (Η ˷vūͣʇņ˸ʇVJΫ ) on 16 February 2006, despite 
the fact that People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, 
issued an editorial ‘Do Not Use the Term “Barefoot Doctors” in order to Consolidate 
and Develop a Good Team of Medical Practitioners in Rural Areas’ (UΞʓ΁
vūͣʇȂo#úĂÂΨ̟ͣʇµ̃ ) on 25 January 1985. Although the 
accounts seem to contradict each other, it is important to observe from these 
newspapers that ‘barefoot doctors’ were welcomed during the Cultural Revolution. 
Many Chinese still feel nostalgia for ‘barefoot doctors’ today as portrayed in the film 
Spring Seedling. 
 Although Spring Seedling was heavily criticised immediately after the 
Cultural Revolution, it received the endorsement of high officials and inspired 
revolutionary audiences during the Cultural Revolution because it reflected the 
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intense political reality of the complex power struggle being waged within the Party 
and the medical authorities at that time. Tian Chunmiao is presented in the film as 
beautiful, bright and youthful, while Mr Du and Doctor Qian are portrayed as old, sly 
and gloomy. This contrast created a strong political message conveying the idea that 
the class conflict between peasants and intellectuals was a struggle between 
proletarian revolutionaries and bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, not simply between 
rebels and conventionalists. This trend contextualised many films of Xie Jin through 
the manipulation of the cinematic diegesis of melodramatic styles. 
 
Class Struggle against Capitalist Roaders — Jubilant Small Cool River 
Jubilant Small Cool River is another class struggle-themed film which, by comparison 
to Spring Seedling, attacked much more starkly and directly the ‘capitalist roaders’ 
such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who were opposed to Mao’s socialist 
revolutionary line. This film was directed by Liu Qiong (ǔɓ) and Shen Yaoting (ʅ
͝˙) and produced by the Shanghai Film Studio in 1976, the final year of the 
Cultural Revolution. The film was made in Shanghai, the political and cultural base of 
the ‘Gang of Four’, at the time when the power struggle in the Chinese Communist 
Party Central Committee was intensifying between the ‘Gang of Four’ and Deng 
Xiaoping. As a result of the power struggle, Deng, who virtually managed the Chinese 
government, was dismissed for the third time from his position as first vice premier; 
Mao made the decision at the Chinese Communist Party Politburo meeting on 7 April 
1976 ‘to revoke all Deng Xiaoping’s posts inside and outside of the Party but to retain 
Deng’s Party membership with his future to be advised’ (‘į̪ȸȓ˦͢ɋς
̅#<ǓŌ#ͨĆĨ̭’); this decision was published in People’s Daily on 8 
April 1976. Jubilant Small Cool River effectively highlights the kind of complex 
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political struggle represented by the slogan ‘In Agriculture Learn From Dazhai’; a 
seemingly insignificant event, the debate concerning how to change the course of a 
river which affected two agricultural villages demonstrates the class struggle between 
socialist agricultural production and capitalist self-regulated production at that time. 
 In order to analyse the deployment of the film’s diegesis, a brief outline of 
the melodramatic plot concerning the political struggle in regard to the agricultural 
production between two village heads is presented here. The film is set in rural 
southern China during the Cultural Revolution; a number of villages and the land of 
their inhabitants have been consolidated into a People’s Commune, a huge collective 
farm. Two small villages, the second and the ninth, are situated on Small Cool River. 
Zhou Changlin (ώaǍ), nicknamed Huo Shao Xing (Ņɹ̴) meaning ‘short 
tempered and rebellious’, is the head of the second small village and the main 
protagonist. He develops a plan for diverting the river to reclaim more land for 
socialist agricultural production for both villages. The head of the ninth village, Xu 
Zhencai (̼ηX), nicknamed ‘Tumbler’ (U˻) meaning ‘one, who despite blows 
that knock him down, always returns to stability’, is the antagonist; he creates a plan 
for his village called ‘rich and richer’. He does not want to change the course of Small 
Cool River because this change will affect his village’s fish farm. 
 Although the plan for diverting Small Cool River had been approved by the 
County Authority, the plan is not implemented because the two villages cannot reach 
agreement. Bai Hancheng (3Ęq), a bookkeeper for the commune brigade which 
includes the second, ninth and other villages, and who is the main antagonist, informs 
Mr Xia (̓àϔɥ), a deputy director at the County Authority, the antagonist and 
Bai’s distant cousin’s husband, at the commune brigade office about the lack of 
agreement as to how to implement the plan. After hearing this report, Mr Xia asks Bai 
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to bring Zhou into the office; Mr Xia tells Zhou that he supports Xu’s opposition to 
the proposed change and he warns Zhou that if a Party member fails to follow his 
decision he or she will be expelled from the Party and if a cadre fails to follow his 




Figure 23: Main protagonist Zhou Changlin (ώaǍ), nicknamed ‘Huo Shao Xing’ (Ņɹ̴), left, 
talks about the plan to divert the course of Small Cool River to sub-antagonist Xu Zhencai (̼ηX), 
nicknamed ‘Tumbler’ (U˻), right. Main antagonist Bai Hancheng (3Ęq), a bookkeeper for the 
commune brigade, listens behind them. 
 
 However, Zhou not only argues with Mr Xia but continues with his plan. 
Eventually, Zhou persuades Xu to implement it by reminding him of a time when they 
were both exploited by a landlord before China’s Liberation in 1949. He reveals the 
unfair contract between Xu’s nephew, Yao Mengtian (͛Ǹ˕), and Bai Hancheng; he 
also exposes improper business deals involving Bai Hancheng and Ruan Fugang (ɫ
âé), the second sub-antagonist, in the name of the ninth small village. These deals, 
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in the name of socialist construction, took place without the knowledge of the 
villagers. 
 From this summary it is clear that the melodramatic diegesis of Jubilant 
Small Cool River unfolds within a political spectrum illustrated by a small agricultural 
event that reflects (albeit inconspicuously) current political agendas. The film was 
adapted from a novella of the same name by Wang Lixin (˪ƹ̳) and published in 
the influential Shanghainese literature and art periodical Zhaoxia (g̐) in March 
1975. The intense political struggle revealed in the film closely mirrored the 
atmosphere of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo at that time. Some cinematic 
sequences were depicted like stage plays in which the political dialogues about class 
struggle between the protagonist and the antagonists were strongly emphasised, but 
with simple cinematic settings as shown by the mise-en-scène. According to Zhang 
Wei (2006, 250), a Chinese film scholar at Beijing Film Academy, the ‘Gang of Four’ 
forced film crews to work on the film day and night in order to screen it nationally 
before 1 July 1976 — the anniversary of the foundation of the Chinese Communist 
Party; as a result the film was released as an anniversary gift with fewer than sixty 
shots. This film, like Spring Seedling, was labeled a conspiratorial film because it 
depicts Mr Xia, Deputy Director of the County Authority, as a representative of the 
‘capitalist roaders’ in the Communist Party Central Committee as well as the regional 
leader of the Communist Party. 
 This is demonstrated at the beginning of the film when camera work changes 
from mid-shots to close-up shots or vice versa to depict Bai Hanchen, the main 
antagonist, with Xu Zhencai, the sub-antagonist and the head of the second small 
village; at his home, Bai gives Xu a present of a toy tumbler and praises Xu for being 
like a revolutionary ‘tumbler’. This metaphor implicitly indicates that Xu, who has 
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experienced many social and political movements, has never had any trouble before 
and like a ‘tumbler’ always stands back up. The background of the mise-en-scène is 
very simple. Bai and Xu sit at a table in a family dining room and converse about the 
life of peasants in the two villages, how to change the irrigation system of Small Cool 
River and the plan, ‘rich and richer’. Bai tells Xu that the Cultural Revolution has 
been going on for many years and it is time to allow peasants to take work 
opportunities to improve their lives rather than diverting the river. Xu responds that, 
even during the Cultural Revolution, the peasants’ work productivity has improved 
and he says he agrees with Bai and Mr Xia that the peasants should be encouraged to 
improve their lives. Bai says he is afraid that Zhou Changlin may not agree with Mr 
Xia because Zhou thinks the plan, ‘rich and richer’, is a move designed to encourage 
peasants to march on the capitalist road in opposition to socialist construction.  Bai 
also reminds Xu that his nephew, Yao Mengtian, who lives in the second small 
village, worries about how he can afford to build brick rather than mud walls for his 
house. 
  Although there are no dramatic shots and only Bai and Xu appear in these 
early sequences, they not only portray the conversations that most peasants involved 
with village agricultural field work experience, but also more importantly portray the 
class struggle around the agricultural activities between the second village and the 
ninth village. These opening sequences set the layout for the whole film structure. 
 The following sequence consists of a long take of about nine and half 
minutes, portraying a fierce face-to-face class struggle between Mr Xia and Zhou 
Changlin about whether or not it is necessary to change the irrigation system of the 
river. In the eyes of both Mr Xia and Zhou, the issue, whether to change or not to 
change, is the class struggle between the ‘capitalist roaders’ and socialist 
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constructionists. Mr Xia tells Zhou that he knows he wants to divert the river but that 
Xu is against it; Mr Xia, therefore, tells Zhou that he considers it unnecessary to 
straighten and widen the river because it will affect the ninth village’s fish farm and 
damage their economy. However, Zhou insists that the proposed changes will reclaim 
more land and lead to greater agricultural production. Mr Xia, mimicking Deng 
Xiaoping’s voice and manner, states that it is time to implement the Four 
Modernisations (agriculture, industry, national defense, science and technology). Mr 
Xia responds by saying that, in accordance with instructions from the top, Zhou just 
has to ensure good agricultural productivity and opportunities to improve the lives of 
the peasants. He continues that Zhou should not criticise Xu’s plan, ‘rich and richer’. 
Zhou responds that, since the Cultural Revolution, agricultural productivity has 
improved and the lives of peasants have also improved; however, Xu’s plan is a 
money-making scheme that is not in line with China’s socialist construction. 
 The camera work then changes from mid-shots to medium close-ups. It 
shows Mr Xia laughingly saying that, even if it is a money-making scheme, the 
money does not go into personal private pockets and does not go overseas; more 
importantly, it takes them on the road to collective wealth, which does not violate the 
new Constitution. Zhou reprimands Xia saying that the new Constitution asks people 
to take the socialist road, and to criticise capitalism, and if all engaged in money-
making schemes, then capitalism would prevail all over China. Class struggle should 
not be forgotten in socialist construction, he forcefully adds. Mr Xia retorts that, 
whenever Zhou opens or closes his mouth, all he speaks of is class struggle and class 
struggle cannot provide food or clothes, adding that people have already had enough 
of class struggle through the years of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou rebuts Xia’s 
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argument by questioning whether he is being logical in seeking to reinstate capitalism 
in China so that Chinese people will have food to eat and will have clothes to wear. 
 Mr Xia raises his voice saying that he has worn this kind of political hat as a 
‘capitalist roader’ for many years; he warns Zhou that anyone wishing to increase 
production will be criticised and if this kind of situation continues, the Party and 
nation will soon disappear; and that if it reaches the stage of capitalism, the nation 
will be better off. Zhou asks, ‘How about now?’ Mr Xia answers that it is too difficult 
to correct the problems now. Zhou asks Mr Xia who has said so, and Mr Xia answers 
that it was the Communist Party Central Committee. Zhou persists and asks Mr Xia 
who at the Central Committee said as much and Mr Xia replies that it was said by 
Deng Xiaoping, the representative of the Central Committee. Zhou states that a 
member of the Central Committee can also become revisionist, but he believes that 
Chairman Mao’s Central Committee would not have made statements such as Deng is 
claimed to have made. 
  Mr Xia explains that the Central Committee has already implemented the 
new policy, ‘Three Instructions as the Key Outline’ (to learn the theory in order to 
counter revisionism and prevent revisionism; to stabilise and unite; to put the national 
economy forward. ɯ̤τʖ˳ë́̌͜ưǡÅ̺Ê̺͜+«ˤų͜1ĐǾƂ
Œïɸə). Any member of the Communist Party opposed to this policy, he 
continues, should be expelled from the Party according to the instructions of the 
Central Committee; if a cadre, this person should be sacked from his cadre position. 
Zhou Changlin, on hearing these words, murmurs that they are very familiar. 
 Interestingly, this part uses a long-take cut in a new sequence by dissolve, 
fading in on Mr Xia holding a fan, wearing summer clothing but not the ‘Chinese 
Zhongshan Suit’ (named after Sun Yat-Sen, ʿϊɵ, an earlier revolutionary leader 
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who wore that style). The mise-en-scène also changes — many peasants are shown 
seated in the office when Mr Xia and Zhou Changlin have a fierce face-to-face 
debate. In this case, Mr Xia reveals to peasants that a few years before, some people 
acted foolishly during the Great Leap Forward; as a result, many people sacrificed 
their lives toiling for nothing. He continues that if this kind of situation had not been 
changed, the Party and nation would have been wiped out; however, the Central 
Committee has now taken measures to allocate farmland to each person and fix the 
farm output quotas for each household (Î˕ɤ:`ı). On hearing this, Zhou 
tells Mr Xia that, if this is similar to the past, the People’s Commune will disappear 
— that is no different to the individual work done in the past; hence Zhou does not 
think that, as a member of the Party, Mr Xia should be advocating this. Mr Xia retorts 
that even his superiors say, ‘it does not matter whether a cat is black or white, if it can 
catch mice, it is a good cat’ (Uć˃ʚġǫĺʚ3ǫ, Ƌ͜ϗƬʥƋʚęǫ). 
This is a well-known catchphrase of Deng Xiaoping — a catchphrase for which he 
was criticised from the moment he said it. This scene was deliberately added to the 
film because Deng Xiaoping had been dismissed from the Party Politburo. In order to 
add what Deng Xiaoping had said previously, as Zhang (2006, 250) indicates, the 
political allies of the ‘Gang of Four’ in Shanghai forced film crews to interpolate 
some scenes directly to highlight the then current situation in order to criticise Deng 
Xiaoping. Mr Xia once again states that any member of the Party who is opposed to 
the Central Committee instructions, will be expelled; if a cadre opposes the decisions, 
this cadre will also be sacked from the position. 
 Here the camera work cuts back to the original setting; the dissolve-in shows 
everyone wearing the same clothes as before. Zhou reminds Mr Xia of the time when, 
as the head of the county, he came to their village to promote Liu Shaoqi’s policy of 
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‘three-selves and one-package’ (ɯϟ͢:: free plots, free markets, self-financing and 
a household responsibility system) after the Great Leap Forward. Xu Zhencai 
interrupts saying that these were things in the past and, as Mr Xia had written a self-
criticisim about them, Zhou should not mention them. However, Mr Xia responds that 
it is necessary to mention things from the past as they will be judged to be good or 
bad in the future. He reminds Zhou, too, that, in the past, Zhou had shown petty-
bourgeois fanaticism in seeking to divert the river despite its being a time of economic 
difficulty for the nation; and as a result he failed. Mr Xia maintains that this should 
teach Zhou a lesson that he should not forget. Zhou says that, because he did not have 
enough zeal for the change at that time, the plan was destroyed by Mr Xia. Zhou says 
that he will never forget this lesson. 
 The shots rotate to show Zhou walking towards Mr Xia saying that Mr Xia is 
angry because he does not like the Cultural Revolution on account of being criticised 
as a ‘capitalist roader’; consequently he blamed revolutionary rebels of the Cultural 
Revolution when he had just come back to work as a Deputy Director of the County 
Revolutionary Committee during the Cultural Revolution. Zhou then points out that 
Mr Xia is in danger, prompting Mr Xia to ask, ‘What is dangerous?’ He says he is not 
afraid of being sacked again. Becoming angrier he reminds them that he participated 
in the revolution in 1938 and once bled while fighting the Kuomintang and Chiang 
Kai-shek (Ũŷʍ); he once sweated for the land reform; he has worked diligently 
since and does not know why he is called a ‘capitalist roader’ for working for a 
socialist society. Zhou responds that it is clear Mr Xia’s heart is with landlords and 
capitalists because he removed the poor and middle-class peasants’ mutual aid teams, 
cut agricultural cooperatives, cursed the People’s Commune, opposed the Cultural 
Revolution and suppressed revolutionary rebel factions. Therefore, Zhou says, if Mr 
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Xia is sacked again he cannot blame anyone but himself. Mr Xia reminds Zhou that 
they have both been sacked from their positions: he during the Cultural Revolution 
and Zhou in 1960. He now wonders who will be dismissed again in the future. Xu 
listens to their argument and, becoming worried about Zhou’s behaviour, chants at 
him that ‘rebels, rebels will be incarcerated or decapitated’. 
 This long take which makes up about one seventh of the film covers the 
political dialogues between Mr Xia and Zhou Changlin, a dialogue with which 
Chinese audiences at the time would have been very familiar, especially the 
catchphrases which Deng Xiaoping used during the socialist construction. At the time 
of the film’s release, rebels like Zhou Changlin were everywhere in China during the 
Cultural Revolution because of Mao’s theory of grasping the spirit of class struggle    
(Ůŏ¯λ͢ϗƋǐ). The ‘Gang of Four’ also used this particular theory of class 
struggle for the political purpose of gaining control of the Party Politburo.  
 Following the political dialogue scene, the camera shows Zhou Changlin 
going to Xu Zhencai’s home to convince him of the importance of diverting the river. 
Zhou points out that Xu did indeed do some good things for his village during the ‘in 
agriculture learn from Dazhai’ campaign several years before but, nowadays, it seems 
he wants to sacrifice cultivated land for the fish farm and allow peasants to work 
outside of the village to make extra money. These ideas, according to him, are not in 
line with socialist construction and are instead taking the capitalist road. Xu asks 
himself why he is a ‘Tumbler’, always confronting Zhou, a ‘Huo Shao Xing’. Zhou 
continues that the Cultural Revolution is now in its ninth year; if the river is not 
radically changed, they will be letting Chairman Mao down. This is typical of the 
exaggerations employed during the Cultural Revolution and hence commonly heard in 
almost all the films produced at that time. Zhou also convinces Xu that if they really 
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care about people’s livelihoods it is necessary to uphold socialism and not let 
capitalism be reinstated. In the end, Xu agrees with Zhou that Small Cool River 
should be made straighter and wider. Zhou then presents a spade to Xu as a symbol of 
the work they will do together to change the course of Small Cool River. 
 When Bai Hancheng hears about the decision, he immediately informs Mr 
Xia in the next scene. Bai tells Mr Xia that Xu agreed with Zhou on how to change 
the course of the River. Metaphorically speaking, Xu is a fallen ‘Tumbler’ because of 
this agreement. Mr Xia wants Bai to tell Xu that what the ninth village is doing is in 
line with the Central Committee’s ‘Three Instructions as the Key Outline’. He also 
tells Bai that he will be promoted soon. 
 After Bai comes back from Mr Xia’s place, he tells Xu that Mr Xia supports 
him and he should not give in to Zhou. The river diversion would mean that his 
village would lose a huge amount of money because the fish farm would be lost 
forever. Bai points out that Xu is a good model peasant for the county but Zhou is not; 
he asks why Zhou wants him to change the river’s course and whether Zhou wants to 
be a model in order to destroy Xu. Despite Bai’s provocation, Xu keeps quiet. Bai 
also says that whatever Xu does, Zhou follows and goes further; for instance, Xu 
writes ‘getting rich and richer’ on his door and Zhou writes ‘continuing revolution’ on 
his wall. Zhou always suppresses Xu politically. 
 The day arrives when the work on the river is supposed to start. However, the 
camera rolls on to show Xu is still at home, and even when the deputy head of the 
ninth village, Yu Zhifang (ΆφÈ), comes to call Xu to go to work on the river, Xu 
tells her not to worry about it. Yu, nevertheless, says that she is going to lead the 
peasants to work on the diversion. As Yu arrives at the riverside, Zhang Erquan (άÁ
ɜ), a young man from the second village, sarcastically asks Yu why her model 
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villager is late for work. When all the peasants from the second and ninth villages are 
ready to work, Xu runs in to tell them to stop; if the fish pond is filled up, he says, it 
will affect the income of his ninth village. He will not, he adds, help implement the 
plan any more. 
 As the argument goes on between Zhou and Xu, the camera cuts in and 
shows a village girl calling out that Mother Yao wants to beat Yao Mengtian because 
he will not come to work on the diversion as he wishes to work elsewhere to earn 
extra money. On hearing this, Xu challenges Zhou saying that if the peasants in his 
village who go out to work are capitalists, what about the peasants in Zhou’s village 
who go out to work, referring to his own nephew, Yao Mengtian, who is a young 
peasant in the second village. Wishing to prevent Yao Mengtian from going out of the 
village to work, Zhou picks him up in a boat and gets him home. The scene then cuts 
in at Yao Mengtian’s home where Zhou, Mother Yao, Yao Mengtian and Jiang 
Chunmei (ŧ|ǰ), a girlfriend of Yao, are at the scene. Zhou and Mother Yao start 
telling Yao about the origin of his name through flashbacks of Yao’s father who was 
beaten to death by a landlord for a small piece of land which Yao’s father had dug out 
next to Small Cool River. After hearing this, Yao says to his mother that, although he 
knows it is wrong to go out to work, he still wishes to. His mother wants to slap him 
but Zhou stops her, realising that Yao must have a reason; he asks Yao what that 
reason might be. Yao eventually takes out the contract between Bai Hancheng and 
himself. Zhou then realises that Yao wants to build a brick-walled house for his 
fiancée; Bai has already paid for the bricks and Yao has to go out to work to repay Bai 
the amount plus commission. 
 Once Zhou has obtained this contract, he goes to ring the village bell to get 
all the villagers over so that he can commence a class-struggle meeting to counter the 
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‘capitalist roaders’. He shows the contract to the village people. When Bai Hancheng 
learns from Ruan Fugang that Yao Mengtian has returned, Bai realises that this means 
trouble; he therefore decides to destroy the fishpond first to make more trouble for 
Zhou Changlin. Zhang Erquan, on seeing the fish flowing out of the pond, goes down 
to repair the fences. Ruan Fugang arrives and stridently accuses Zhang Erquan of 
deliberately destroying the pond. 
 All the peasants from the second and ninth villages arrive at the fishpond as 
Ruan is yelling. Zhang accuses Ruan of being blind. Bai Hancheng, emerging from 
the crowd, says that Zhang Erquan is a young man and all the peasants should 
therefore excuse him, but nevertheless he should confess that he destroyed the fence 
of the fishpond. Zhang insists that he did not sabotage the fishpond. Zhou, who has 
also gone down to repair the fences of the fishpond, finds a shoe in the pond. He 
realises that someone has tried to make trouble for him by setting up this 
conspiratorial trick — but the person responsible is not Zhang. 
 Xu Zhencai thinks that the person who damaged the fishpond must belong to 
the second village. Xu throws the spade, given to him by Zhou as a goodwill gesture, 
on the ground in front of Zhou. He then says that he is not going to change the 
direction of Small Cool River and walks away. However, Zhou is very patient and 
follows Xu to the side of Small Cool River. 
 The scene cuts to Xu Chengcai, Zhou Changlin, Mother Yao and Yao 
Mengtian under a large tree near the river. Xu faces Zhou and says that he works hard 
for his village and not only wants to improve the agricultural harvests but also to 
reward his villagers for organising the outsourcing of the labour; it is not wrong to 
want to make a better life for the peasants. Zhou tells Xu that Ruan Fugang and Bai 
Hancheng have been using him to cover their illegal activities; and that Mr Xia has 
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been using him to execute his capitalist line. They want to reinstate capitalism. Zhou 
continues that Xu uses sideline businesses to suppress agriculture and his second 
village is the last one carrying out agricultural activities now. Zhou gives their 
indenture paper (ǩʂɃ) to Xu and then pulls out the contract between Bai Hancheng 
and Yao Mengtian from his pocket to show Xu, who becomes furious when he finds 
out that Bai Hancheng has exploited his nephew, Yao Mengtian. Consequently, 
Mother Yao, a sister of Xu, criticises her brother’s words, ‘rich and richer’, as they 
are not those of a Communist Party member. 
 At this moment, Xu’s deputy, Yu Zhifang, brings Ruan Fugang to see Zhou 
and Xu. Yu takes out her investigation report to show both Zhou and Xu. When Xu 
reads it and finds out that Bai Hancheng has used the outsourced labour of the ninth 
village for the purpose of making extra money for himself, he realises he has been 
wrong. Then Ruan also exposes Bai’s dishonest business deals. 
 The next sequence shows Xu, Zhou, Ruan and many peasants at Bai 
Hancheng’s brigade office. Xu asks Bai if the shoe he has found in the pond belongs 
to him. Ruan Fugang accuses Bai of taking a spade with him to sabotage the fishpond 
when he was supposed to be catching eels. Faced with the evidence, Bai bends his 
head quietly, accepting the charge. The scene then shows that Xu is upset; he goes 
home to tear down his plan, ‘getting rich and richer’, from the wall of his family home 
and also throws away the ‘tumbler’ given to him by Bai Hancheng. 
 In the coda of the film, Zhou Changlin and Xu Zhencai work with the people 
from both villages to change the course of Small Cool River. Xu tells Zhou that he 
will always use this special spade to strive for socialism. Zhou replies that using only 
a spade to strive for socialism is not enough, adding that more Marxism, Leninism 
and Mao Zedong-Thought is needed. The camera then cuts in using close-up shots to 
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show Xu saying that the masses state correctly that the capitalists still march on and 
socialists have to continue to fight. Eventually the tolling of the village bell in this 
sequence replaces the song being sung. 
 There is little doubt that this film is unique despite the mediocre quality of 
the visual and aesthetic output, not only because it was made during the last year of 
the Cultural Revolution but also because no such film had previously been made with 
political dialogues directly and explicitly referring to the Central Committee’s 
leadership of socialist China. In comparison with Chunmiao in Spring Seedling, Zhou 
Changlin in this film is an authentic socialist hero; he realistically represents the 
characteristics of Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution by rebelling against 
superior authority and seeking to create a new social and political environment by 
using Mao’s theory of class struggle in socialist society. 
 
Chinese Civil War — Sparkling Red Star 
A war-themed film depicting the Chinese Civil War is Sparkling Red Star; it is quite 
different from Spring Seedling and Jubilant Small Cool River, though all were 
produced at the time of the Cultural Revolution. Not only did Sparkling Red Star 
depict the Chinese Civil War, thus reflecting a different theme, it was also a film 
made for Chinese children with an educational purpose in mind. Strictly speaking, 
Sparkling Red Star is also a film about class struggle, and like Spring Seedling and 
Jubilant Small Cool River, it portrays the struggle of the poor against the rich or more 
precisely, the Communist Party against the Kuomintang in the 1930s. This film, like 
Undertaking, eulogises the Communist Party but in a realistic and factual way; it is 
neither radical in its propaganda nor implausible as entertainment for Chinese 
children or even for Chinese adults, and its historical subject provides an opportunity 
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for contemplation of the past (one of the features of realism that Stanley Cavell 
identifies, as discussed in the Introduction). 
 Sparkling Red Star, directed by Li Jun and Li Ang (Ʊ.), was produced by 
the August the First Film Studio in 1974. It was adapted from the novel of the same 
name written by Li Xintian (Ʊ̲˕), a prolific and famous writer, in 1972. The 
syuzhet (the employment of narrative) and the fabula (the chronological order and 
number of the events), to invoke a distinction used by the Russian Formalists (Culler 
1981), were greater in the novel than in the film due to the time limitations of feature 
films. However, the film does depict the development of a child hero, Pan Dongzi (ȥ
­Ϟ), growing up as a poor boy to become a Red Army scout, then a child craftsman 
and a young apprentice, and finally to become a young Red Army soldier under the 
care and education of the Communist Party. 
 Sparkling Red Star is a distinctive feature film produced in a style similar to 
the Western genre of neo-realism. In particular, it is quite similar to the Italian 
realistic film, Rome, Open City (1945), portraying a group of children growing up 
during wartime in Italy. For example, the scenes of the deaths of Pang Dongzi’s 
mother in Sparkling Red Star and Marcello’s mother, Pina, in Rome, Open City are 
similar as both mothers die in front of their sons. The death images of both mothers in 
these two films had an enormous impact on audiences and each was the climax of the 
film’s narrative in chilling but inspirational ways. 
 More importantly, the internal pattern of the verbal and visual scenes in the 
film in regard to political communications, realistic elements, cinematic techniques 
and valid political interferences, highlighted particularly in the introduction, can be 
further explored in the film. Sparkling Red Star is set in Liuxi village in southern 
China in 1931. Pan Dongzi, a child carrying some firewood, passes the house of a 
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local tyrannical landlord, Hu Hansan (ĪĘɯ), who is fleeing his house as the Red 
Army is liberating his village. Hu stops Pan and forces him to reveal where his father, 
Pan Xingyi (ȥ̷ͯ), is. Consequently, Hu ties Pan Dongzi to a tree and beats him 
almost to death. The Red Army, under the guidance of Pan Xingyi, liberates Liuxi 
village, and rescues Pan Dongzi. After the revolutionary power has been established 
in Liuxi, Pan Dongzi participates in the struggle against the landlord by redistributing 
land; at the same time he also learns about self-sacrifice from his father who refuses 
anaesthetics during an operation because other wounded soldiers might need them for 
their surgery. However, in the autumn of 1934, most of the Red Army is compelled to 
evacuate the liberated areas. Pan Xingyi has to move with the Army. On leaving, Pan 
leaves his son a shining red star. 
 When the Red Army leaves Liuxi village, Pan Dongzi and his mother also 
have to leave and move to the forested mountains; Hu Hansan comes back to take 
control of Liuxi again. Wu Xiuzhu (˿̺ϓ), a Red Army cadre, stays behind in Liuxi 
and continues to lead the continuing battles of the revolutionary guerrillas and the 
masses. He informs them of the decision of the Zunyi Meeting (ϧͯŃͱ) that Mao 
be confirmed as the leader of the Communist Party; this news encourages Pan Dongzi 
and his mother as well as the revolutionary guerrillas and the masses. Pan Dongzi’s 
mother heroically sacrifices her life to ensure the safe retreat of the people. When Pan 
Dongzi witnesses his mother’s death, he becomes much braver and, under the 
inspiration of the sparkling red star, he actively participates in battles with the enemy; 
he deliberately destroys a suspension bridge in order to cut off the retreat of the 
enemy; he cleverly dissolves salt into water and soaks his cotton clothing in it because 
the salt then does not need to be declared at the enemy check point and he can thus 
take it to the guerrillas in the mountain. In addition, he organises with another child, 
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Chunyazi (}ϮϞ), to gather intelligence to pass to the guerrillas so as to sink the rice 
boats of the enemy; Pan Dongzi eventually kills Hu Hansan with an axe and leads the 
Red Army and the guerrillas in an attack on the enemy in Yaowan town (͛˧θ) 
where he works in a rice shop as an apprentice. Yaowan is liberated again. 
 In 1938, Pan Xingyi is chosen by his leader to meet Wu Xiuzhu and his 
mountain guerrillas in Liuxi district. The guerrillas and the Red Army, on the orders 
of the Communist Party Central Committee, are ready to move on to the front to fight 
the Japanese invaders in the north of China. Pan Dongzi eventually meets his father, 
Pan Xingyi. He puts the sparkling red star on his hat and becomes a real fighter of the 
Red Army, thus embarking on a new journey. 
 The film depicts a rather straightforward outline of the Chinese civil war 
from 1931 to 1938, the seeming lack of embellishment serving to mark the film as 
realistic. The Chinese Communist Party had only been established since 1921 and 
operated underground in many regions of China. In terms of the political 
communication there are several sequences in the film. The first sequences are the 
dialogues between Pan Xingyi and his wife, Pan Dongzi’s mother. Before Pan and the 
Red Army retreat from Liuxi district he asks his wife whether she has handed in her 
application for membership of the Party, saying that, as he is a member of the Party, 
wherever he goes he will fight for the Chinese revolution. When his wife answers 
‘yes’, Pan says, ‘I feel reassured, our Party will have one more new member’. His 
wife confirms, ‘Yes, so long as the Party is here, we can cope with the difficulties and 
problems’. These political dialogues serve to demonstrate hope for China and show 
the determination of the Chinese Communist Party to fight for poor Chinese people. 
 The next sequences depict Pan Dongzi’s mother when she is sworn in as a 
member of the Party by Wu Xiuzhu; she stands, facing the red Party flag with its gold 
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hammer and sickle on the wall while The Internationale plays. She swears she will 
‘comply with the Party constitution, abide by the Party discipline, execute the 
decisions of the Party, strictly maintain Party secrecy, sacrifice personal life, never 
betray the Party and fight for the cause of Communism to the end’. Pan Dongzi 
watches his mother’s swearing in and tells his mother, ‘You are a member of the Party 
and I am now the child of a Party member’. These political dialogues not only 
influence Pan Dongzi but also affect audiences because ordinary people were not 
aware of these procedures. 
 The sequences which follow show that Pan Dongzi fully believes in 
communism and when the Red Army retreats and Hu Hansan comes back to control 
their homeland, he proudly tells people that his mother is a Party member and she will 
not let people suffer. He also persuades people not to save his mother because it is too 
dangerous. 
 These three sequences, through political dialogues, portray Pan Dongzi’s 
mother from the time she joined the Party to the time she heroically sacrificed her life; 
they are included purely to extol the Communist Party. Pan Dongzi’s mother is a 
nameless hero because the film refers to her only as Pan Dongzi’s mother and her 
name is never used in the film. This reflects the reality of China before 1949 when 
most women’s names were unimportant in the strongly patriarchal rural society. As 
many unnamed females and males may have died for the Communist China, the new 
Chinese regime built the Monument of the People’s Heroes in Tiananmen Square in 
Beijing just after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. 
 In terms of the cinematic techniques of this film, the directors used voice-
over and music, a common documentary method, to realistically set up the image of 
Pan Dongzi as a little revolutionary hero. For example, at the beginning of the film, a 
 206 
voice-over is used to describe Pan Dongzi’s childhood together with a montage 
showing firstly mountains in the countryside, then Pan Dongzi who has to work 
collecting firewood in the mountains: 
Everyone has a childhood. My childhood began in bitter class suppression and 
was spent in fiery class struggle. That was more than forty years ago. It was 
the stormy year of 1931. I was then only seven years old. I heard the grown-
ups say that the Chinese workers and peasants’ Red Army led by the 
Communist Party and Chairman Mao had reached the south hills and had 
started the revolution there. The Red Army would soon come to our village. 
 
A seven-year-old boy, Pan Dongzi, who should be at school studying, is, because of 
the cruelty and unfairness of society before 1949, working in the mountain forest. The 
voice-over also portrays the thoughts of Pan Dongzi about what kind of society he is 
in. Furthermore, this voice-over introduces the film to the audience without portraying 
every aspect. 
 The second voice-over describes the Red Army’s difficult military position 
in the south of China in 1934: 
Father went away and the Red Army left. Only many years later did I learn the 
reason. The Red Army’s withdrawal was one of the grave consequences 
caused by the third left opportunist line. The opportunists would not let 
Chairman Mao be leader. They took away his command of the Red Army. 
Thus, we failed to defeat the enemy’s first fifth encirclement and suppression 
campaign and had to give up the central base area set up personally by 
Chairman Mao. 
 
The scene shows Pan Dongzi with his mother saying goodbye to his father and 
watching the Red Army marching away. The directors use very simple cinematic 
techniques to present the complex historical event which Pan Dongzi had 
experienced.  
 The third voice-over portrays grief. It states, ‘Hu Hansan returned. The class 
enemy made a comeback. All the fruits of victory and the happy life we had won by 
following Chairman Mao’s correct line were lost on account of the erroneous line of 
the then Party leadership’. This voice-over explains the revolutionary bases that were 
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lost because Mao was expelled from the Party leadership. These simple words once 
again reinforce the reality of history and also extol Mao’s wise decision to first take 
the rural areas, then surrounding cities (ϣȞ:˲pʜǛ); this decision was 
crucial in defeating the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang regime. 
 The final voice-over appears in the coda of the film. It confidently explains: 
‘Although the revolutionary road has many twists and turns the future is bright. I 
spent my childhood in the war period under the sparkling red star, and from now on I 
continue to march on a new path of struggle’. While none of these voice-overs may 
add to the film aesthetically, they all provide the historical background of Chinese 
society at that time — a society in which the little hero, Pan Dongzi, grew up. They 
add to the realistic elements by deploying documentary approaches although the 
Chinese civil war is not re-enacted in any detail. In this way the voice-overs do in fact 
serve the film’s aesthetics, given that realism’s distinctive feature is to appear natural 
or unmediated; the seeming lack of aesthetics is thus the very definition of realist 
aesthetics.  
 The music is another technique which was deployed by the directors of 
Sparkling Red Star. The music and songs were selected not only for their popularity, 
but because they appealed to children. There are five songs interpolated in the film: 
the main theme song is also called Sparkling Red Star played at the beginning and at 
the end of the film; the second is a lyric of the Children’s Corps; the third is a lullaby; 
the fourth is a martyr’s song and the last is an expressive song called The Red Star 
Guides Me to Fight (ħ̴ί˼əΩ¯).  
 Each song is accompanied by appropriate visual images which express what 
the song is about, in particular, the first and the last song. For instance, the first song 
is the main theme song about a sparkling red star emitting bright and colourful lights, 
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how the sparkling red star warms hearts, and is the heart of workers and peasants and 
how the glorious Party will shine for many generations. The mise-en-scène is about 
the peasants and the Red Army establishing the local Liuxi government after 
defeating Hu Hansan, the tyrannical landlord in the village; Pan Dongzi passes on the 
local people’s government sign to his mother to hang outside of the house formerly 
owned by Hu Hansan; this is done in a festive atmosphere with firecrackers being set 
off, drums beating and cymbals clashing. Although the first song is sung by a 
children’s choir, the sound fades as establishment of the local government unfolds. 
This melody is also the main musical theme of the film. 
 The last song, The Red Star Guides Me to Fight, is accompanied with images 
of beautiful scenery to illustrate the purifying emotion of this song in mise-en-scène. 
The audiences were not only moved by this song but also by the stunningly beautiful 
background. The camera work rolling from the side to the back and then to the front 
from long-shots to close-ups, depicts the bamboo raft in which Pan Dongzi and 
Grandpa Song (ʷ͞͞) make their way on the surging river through the bamboo 
forest on a bright sunny day. This scenario is aesthetically soothing and tranquil; it is 
arguably the peak of the camera work in the film. This is how Pan Dongzi is sent to 
work as an apprentice at a rice shop in Yaowan where he kills Hu Hansan with an 
axe; he sends this information to the Red Army guerrillas in the mountain and assists 
them to defeat the Kuomintang armies. 
 As film tickets were relatively cheap at the time and most Chinese families 
did not have radios or televisions, they flocked to cinemas to watch the film. An 
unknown singer, Li Shuangjiang (Ʊʪŧ), after singing the song, The Red Star 
Guides Me to Fight, became a household name in China. Anecdotal evidence suggests 




Figure 24: Top: Main protagonist Pan Dongzi (ȥ­Ϟ) is sent away to work in the rice shop in 
Yaowan town (͛˧θ) by his guardian, Grandpa Song (ʷ͞͞), and the playback of this scene is the 
song called The Red Star Guides Me to Fight (ħ̴ί˼əΩ¯). Bottom: Pan pours kerosene on the 
quilt while Hu Hansan (ĪĘɯ), a local tyrannical landlord and Kuomintang official, is sleeping after a 
banquet at the rice shop. Pan then lights a fire and immediately uses an axe to kill Hu. 
 
 But while Sparkling Red Star — the first children’s feature made during the 
Cultural Revolution — was undoubtedly entertaining, it was also heavily politicised. 
According to Di Jiannong (2001, 259), the political inspiration first came from Jiang 
Qing after she watched the Yugoslav film The Railway Children (˗¾˝). 
Following a Party Politburo meeting in October 1972, she encouraged filmmakers to 
serve the interests of the Cultural Revolution by creating some children’s films. The 
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film crew of Sparkling Red Star at the August the First Film Studio stated that the aim 
of the film was to spread knowledge of revolutionary Model Films and to promote the 
revolutionary film art; and so the birth of the film had the direct support of the Party 
(Sparkling Red Star 1975, 1). 
 Although Sparkling Red Star was not Jiang Qing’s ideal type of Model Films, 
she not only watched the finished production but also viewed some of the rushes. She 
was said to be very satisfied with the completed production. While she was watching 
the scene with the song The Red Star Guides Me to Fight Jiang Qing is said to have 
commented: ‘Let those bourgeois bastards look at how beautiful our proletarian film 
is!’ (Di 2001, 271). In addition, when she met the film director, Li Jun, she not only 
praised him highly but also offered 34 suggestions on how to modify the film. The 
film directors and the film studio felt that the suggestions were excellent and helped to 
produce an improved version of the film. The suggestions were very detailed in 
relation to images, lighting, film languages and costumes (Di 2001, 273), 
demonstrating that Jiang was not a novice in film production (as noted in Chapter 
One). Her fourth suggestion, for example, pointed out a visual continuity problem: 
Pan is beaten on his face while he is tied to the tree but immediately after the beating 
there is no bruise, although later he has one. However, the director, Li Jun, did not 
completely follow Jiang’s instructions regarding all 34 suggestions because some of 
them were too difficult to implement due to time constraints and the availability of 
material. 
 Interestingly, according to Di Jiannong (2001, 280), Liu Qingtang, the deputy 
Minister for Culture, once followed Jiang Qing’s instructions to organise a written 
criticism of Sparkling Red Star in relation to three problems: the first was why the red 
star, red scarf and book could not be brought out of the mountain when Pan Dongzi 
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was leaving there; the second was why Hu Hansan, if not drunk, could not recognise 
Pan Dongzi; and the third was that the death of Pan Dongzi’s mother was not realistic. 
Although the critiques were completed, they were not published because Jiang was 
busy fighting for her political position at the Party Central Committee. 
 Relations between Jiang Qing and the film directors and the film studio were 
extremely tense over this film. For instance, the well-known female director, Wang 
Ping, was the consultant director for Sparking Red Star but her name was not listed on 
this film’s credits because the leaders of the August the First Film Studio were 
worried that, if Jiang Qing saw Wang Ping’s name, she would scrutinise the film more 
closely because she and Wang had not enjoyed a good relationship in the 1950s (Song 
2006, 194; Di 2001, 268).  Film censorship and film production were clearly managed 
by Jiang personally. Being in a position of authority, Jiang could pursue her ideas of 
artistry and aesthetics and this led to improvements in techniques and skills in view of 
her criticism in areas such as lighting, filming, and even costumes. Consequently, 
Jiang was able to promote her ‘Three Prominences’ (see Chapter Three) for the glory 
of Mao and the Party. 
 Sparkling Red Star was very successful politically and financially. Not only 
did the film directors and the August the First Film Studio publish articles about how 
to manage film production but so, too, did many official newspapers and magazines. 
Zhu Xinyun (ϖ̱Λ), the performer of the main protagonist Pan Dongzi, a cute, 
astute and brave eight-year-old boy, was awarded an apartment for entertaining many 
foreign visitors and he consequently published his article called ‘Act like Dongzi, 
Learn from Dongzi and Become a Good Child of the Party’(͌­Ϟ́­ϞϪ
ęēϞ ) in the Party’s official magazine Red Flag in issue 11 in 1974. People’s 
Daily published Fang E’s (ÉЈ) critique called ‘A Lovely Little Hero’ (͢óƟ*
 212 
̪ͷ̹ ) on 22 October 1974; the Shanghai newspaper Wenhuibao published Du 
Yu’s (°΍) assessment called ‘The Flashing Art Image: about the Film Sparkling 
Red Star’ (ɶĉͩʦ̶̦ ) on 25 October 1974; Liberation Army Daily 
published Jing Yanjing’s (ƃ͈Є) analysis called ‘Enthusiastic Praise of Chairman 
Mao’s Revolutionary Line: about the Film Sparkling Red Star’ (ɢɐñʵǭϔ̋
òȃǛ̜ ) on 13 November 1974 and almost all newspapers around China, one 
way or another, published a piece in honour of the film. All in all, the general view 
was that it was a successful example of a Model film. 
 However, the political interference to which Sparkling Red Star was 
subjected did not stop during the Cultural Revolution and continued afterwards. This 
time the interference was negative towards the film director, Li Jun, because he had 
received special attention and praise from Jiang Qing for this film during the Cultural 
Revolution. Although Jiang’s 34 suggestions for Sparkling Red Star mostly involved 
the aesthetic and artistic elements, because Li had met Jiang several times, he was 
under political pressure immediately after the Cultural Revolution to give an account 
as to why Jiang Qing had wanted to see him and how Jiang had given him instructions 
and so forth (Di 2001, 281). Li stated to those political interrogators that he never 
went to see Jiang Qing alone, never said anything to her and just listened to her 
instructions about the film, Sparkling Red Star. From this film, what can be gleaned is 
that the politics involved within it and beyond it reflect the ephemeral nature of 
political decisions relating to processes of the Cultural Revolution. 
 Sparkling Red Star is a distinctive feature film produced in a style similar to 
the Western genre of neo-realism. Due to its unique actuality, the film had more 
entertainment value than political propaganda appeal. However, the film does extol 
the Communist Party but in a realistic and factual way. What is important to note, 
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though, is that political interference was evident in this film. Di Jiannong reports that 
Sparkling Red Star is still welcomed by Chinese audiences today. In the mid 1990s, it 
was selected for the Chinese film retrospective exhibition in Shandong province; each 
cinema session of this film was full and it received the Children’s Film Art Award at a 
Chinese national film art competition twenty years after it had been produced (Di 
2001, 281). 
 
Chinese Resistance War against the Japanese Invasion — The Red Lantern 
Unlike Sparkling Red Star which was a Chinese civil war film, The Red Lantern, the 
first film made during the Cultural Revolution, portrays the Chinese people fighting 
against the Japanese invaders. The Red Lantern was not only an opera film but also a 
translated film. The origin of the Chinese opera film, The Red Lantern, was a feature 
film, More Generations Will Come (ϟ΃ĨƦɤ), directed by Yu Yanfu () 
and produced by the Changchun Film Studio in 1963. The film scriptwriters used the 
pseudonyms Chi Yu (uΈ) for Shen Mojun (ʅȆƖ) and Luo Jing (ǣƄ) for Luo 
Guoshi (ǣĐʗ) on the film credits. The script was originally written by Shen Mojun. 
The title was changed three times, from The Red Lantern (ħŕ) to The Three 
Generations (
	) and then to More Revolutionary Generations Will Come (òȃ
ϟ΃ĨƦɤ ) because the connotations of the first two titles were not as 
‘revolutionary’ as the third one which was eventually published in Film Arts (¤ͼ˹
́) in September 1961 (Sun 2009, 11-12). The story for the film script was developed 
by Shen Mojun when, as a ‘rightist’, he was sent to a reform camp in Heilongjinag 
province. There he heard from the locals how three generations had fought against the 
Japanese invasion in 1939. When he had finished the feature film, the studio changed 
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the title once again from More Revolutionary Generations Will Come to More 
Generations Will Come. Due to the success of this film nationally, it was then adapted 
by many different performing art troupes.  
 According to Sun Guofan (ʿĐÄ 2009, 13), the Harbin Chinese Opera 
Troupe (ĒÀMƀƐˤ) and the Shanghai Aihua Shanghainese Opera Troupe ()
*ĳİƐˤ) adapted the film More Generations Will Come into a successful opera. 
The Harbin Chinese Opera Troupe adapted the film into Chinese opera under its 
original title More Revolutionary Generations Will Come and their performance 
achieved outstanding results in July 1963. Yun Yanming (Κ͎ȁ), who performed 
the role of Li Tiemei (#˗ǰ), gave the opera script as a thank-you gift to a number 
of important people in the audience, one of whom was (unknown to her) Liu Shaoqi, 
the President of the People’s Republic of China. Some time later she received a letter 
from Premier Zhou Enlai, praising her excellent performance and encouraging her to 
strive to modify the opera; suggestions concerning the reality of the settings were 
given by Liu at the end of the letter (Sun 2009, 14-15). 
 The most successful adaptation of the film into an opera, however, was not 
undertaken by the Harbin Chinese Opera Troupe, but by the Shanghai Aihua 
Shanghainese Opera Troupe, a small performing arts group (Sun 2009, 17), in June 
1963. The Troupe translated the film into the Shanghainese opera, The Red Lantern, 
which was performed in the local dialect and therefore was only popular in the 
Shanghai region. After seeing the performance Jiang Qing asked Zhang Chunqiao, a 
political secretary at that time for Ke Qingshi (Ɲɒʋ), the Communist Party leader 
in Shanghai, for the script (Sun 2009, 17). 
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 When Jiang Qing obtained the script, she summoned the extremely well-
known Chinese opera artists Li Shaochun (Ʊɺ|), Yuan Shihai (ΒʘĔ), Du 
Jinfang (³ŽÈ) and A Jia ( Ŝ) from the National Chinese Opera Troupe (ϊĐƀ
Ɛˤ) to Zhongnanhai, the central headquarters of the Communist Party and the State 
Council, to discuss how to adapt the Shanghainese opera, The Red Lantern, into a 
Chinese opera (Sun 2009, 21-22). Thus, the modern version of the Chinese opera, The 
Red Lantern, was created in October 1963 but not without resistance from A Jia who 
had spent much time re-writing the play script. Because of A Jia’s resistance to her 
instructions, Jiang Qing deprived him of his rights to the Chinese opera script. On 6 
November 1964, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping went to watch the 
Chinese opera performed by the National Chinese Opera Troupe at the Great Hall of 
the People, and on 1 April 1965 Mao went to see it again, in a small theatre there (Sun 
2009, 134-138). In this way, Mao showed his support for his wife’s endeavours to 
reform Chinese opera so that it would reflect the realism and the zeitgeist of socialist 
China. 
 Chen Yao (l͚), a member of the revolutionary committee at the August 
the First Film Studio, asked whether or not the model operas could be filmed as 
movies despite the initial reluctance of Jiang Qing (Di 2001, 99). She gave a 
confirmatory nod but asked Cheng Yin (qͲ), a prolific film director from the 
Beijing Film Studio, to produce The Red Lantern because she thought the film 
directors at the August the First Film Studio were not good enough (Di 2001, 99). 
This was how The Red Lantern, the first of eight Jiang Qing’s model opera films, was 
born in 1970. 
 The Red Lantern is set in the north of China in 1939 (and again the historical 
setting invites contemplation of the past). By this time the resistance to the Japanese 
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had been under way for two years. This anti-Japanese war had been preceded by nine 
years of civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, due above all to 
the Kuomintang leader, Chiang Kai-shek’s belief that the Communists were a greater 
enemy than the Japanese. He was reputed to have said: ‘The Japanese are a disease of 
the skin, the Communists are a disease of the heart’. He then had been forced to 
cooperate with the Communists when two of his own generals kidnapped him in 
December 1936 in Xi’an and forced him to officially end the civil war. In fact that 
struggle continued at an underground level. A family of three generations consisting 
of grandmother, father and daughter participate in the Chinese resistance war against 
the Japanese invaders. The grandmother is called Grandma Li (ƱȐȐ), the father is 
Li Yuhe (ƱΌĝ) and the daughter is Li Tiemei (Ʊ˗ǰ). The relationship among 
them is both interesting and extraordinary. Li Yuhe is an adopted son of Grandma Li 
who is his master’s wife and Li Tiemei is an adopted daughter of Li Yuhe who is her 
real father’s workmate. They are not related by blood but they are all bound together 
in the war fighting against the Japanese. 
 Li Yuhe, the main protagonist who works as a rail track switchman, sees an 
injured person jumping from a train. Li carries this person to his home with the help 
of Wang Lianju (˪Ƽƍ), a police inspector in the railway station and a secret 
Communist Party member. Li then finds out this injured person is a Communist Party 
liaison person with whom he should be in contact. After they confirm their identities 
through the exchange of secret passwords, the Communist Party liaison person passes 
a secret electronic code booklet (ǻ¤Ǧ) to Li and asks Li to hand it to the knife-
grinder; he then leaves. Hatoyama (Љɵ), a chief of the Japanese military police and 
the main antagonist, searches for the Communist Party liaison person and tries to 
obtain the secret electronic code booklet. He forces Wang to confess that Li is a 
 217 
Communist Party member who has received the code booklet from the Communist 
Party liaison person. Hatoyama then invites Li to his headquarters for a banquet and 
tries to persuade Li to hand the code booklet over to him. Li denies having it. 
Hatoyama tortures Li and makes Wang persuade Li to hand in the booklet. Hatoyama, 
because Li could not be persuaded to hand in the booklet, has no choice but to invite 
Grandma Li and Li Tiemei to his headquarters in order to use them to convince Li to 
give him the code booklet. However, Grandma Li and Li Tiemei are as strong as Li 
Yuhe and they do not give in to Hatoyama. Eventually, Hatoyama orders soldiers to 
shoot Li Yuhe and Grandma Li and releases Li Tiemei. He tries to follow Li Tiemei 
to find out where the code booklet is, but fails. Li Tiemei, being astute, sends the code 
booklet to the guerrillas in the mountains. The guerrillas eventually defeat Hatoyama 




Figure 25: Grandma Li (ƱȐȐ) in the middle, father Li Yuhe (ƱΌĝ) on the left and daughter Li 
Tiemei (Ʊ˗ǰ) on the right. The still shows that they would rather die than surrender the secret 
electronic codes (ǻ¤Ǧ) to Hatoyama (Љɵ), a Japanese invasion force commander, in the final act 
of The Red Lantern (ħŕ). 
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 The Red Lantern and the feature film, More Generations Will Come, did not 
need to adhere strictly to reality because audiences of the time understood the pre-
existing history. For instance, historical events sufficiently prove that the Xi’an 
Incident (̇+ʙG) on 12 December 1936 forced Chiang Kai-shek to change his 
national policy in order to resist the Japanese invasion through joining with the 
Communist Party. In the Nanjing Massacre after December 1937, Japanese invaders 
killed some 300,000 Chinese people (Chang 1997, 83-87). Clearly, the national 
survival issues were whether the Chinese people or the Chiang Kai-shek government 
should join the Communist Party to defend the Chinese nation at that time. Believing 
that ‘the Japanese are a disease of the skin [and hence not a serious problem] and 
Mao’s Communists are a disease of the heart’, Chiang Kai-shek did not, at that time, 
choose to fight the Japanese invasion. 
 When comparing these two films, the intense realism reflected in The Red 
Lantern is notably different from More Generations Will Come due to a political pre-
disposition towards a combination of revolutionary romanticism and revolutionary 
realism during the Cultural Revolution (see Clark 1987; Semsel 1987; and Berry 
2004). Politically and aesthetically, moreover, Jiang Qing’s theory of ‘Three 
Prominences’ was implemented in different ways regarding opera films and feature 
films produced during the Cultural Revolution, with the latter tending to be more 
realistic than the former. For example, in the opera film The Red Lantern, Li Yuhe 
does not drink. He does drink before he goes to see Hatoyama in Act 6: Hatoyama Is 
Defied (Ü͒¯Љɵ). This drink is offered by his mother, Grandma Li, as a farewell 
drink because she knows her son may have a problem with Hatoyama at the Japanese 
military office; the offering of the farewell drink by Grandma Li led to the 
composition of a very famous Chinese opera song ‘Thank You, Mother’. In the feature 
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film, More Generations Will Come, Li Yuhe likes to drink and often drinks behind his 
mother’s back. As in the opera film, Grandma Li does offer her son a drink as a 
farewell drink before he goes to see Hatoyama. But while Li Yuhe’s habit of drinking 
is shown in the feature film, it is not included in the opera film because drinking was 
seen as a bad habit that would therefore weaken the image of Li Yuhe as a hero 
during the Cultural Revolution. 
 In some respects, however, The Red Lantern is more realistic than More 
Generations Will Come. In Act 5: Family’s Revolutionary History (˞ʭŚʒ) of The 
Red Lantern, Grandma Li tells her grandchild, Li Tiemei, that the two of them are not 
related by blood to the child’s father, and she explains how they became a family. 
This version seems more believable than its equivalent in the feature film where Li 
Yuhe tells his daughter, Li Tiemei, that Grandma Li is not his real mother and she is 
his master’s wife; and also that Li Tiemei is not his biological daughter but the 
daughter of his workmate, Zhang Daxi (ά̍), who died in a workers’ strike in 
Dalian City (Ƽʜ) in 1925. He gives this family information just before he and 
Grandma Li are killed by the Japanese invaders. These two scenes are related to 
personal and national survival, but it would appear that the nostalgic or more overtly 
sentimental elements were removed from the opera film because nostalgia is seen as 
feminine in nature and would therefore have weakened the heroic status of Li Yuhe. 
 The most important change between the two films, however, concerns the 
ending of The Red Lantern. Mao Zedong disliked the original ending and suggested it 
be altered to leave a more positive impression (as discussed briefly in Chapter Three). 
Scenes were added showing Li Tiemei leading the guerrillas and the Red Army down 
from the mountains and fighting against the Japanese invaders; the scenes also 
showed the eventual defeat of Hatoyama and the Japanese soldiers. These scenes 
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differ from the feature film, More Generations Will Come, where Li Tiemei goes to 
the mountains and finds the knife-grinder, the revolutionary guerrilla, and hands the 
secret code booklet to him, thus ending the film. The addition of this final scene, 
depicting the victorious revolutionary guerrillas and the Red Army, had a profound 
effect on audiences at that time because it gave the Chinese people hope — a hope 
that was desperately needed during the Cultural Revolution; the ending of the feature 
film, More Generations Will Come, is less action-oriented and less nationalistic. 
 The Red Lantern not only received Mao’s attention, but also established 
Jiang Qing’s position in literature and art circles as well as in the Party Politburo. 
Clearly, the political elements are much greater than the film’s social and artistic 
codes because both Mao and Jiang were involved. Jiang Qing spent a considerable 
amount of time at the production of the opera film The Red Lantern. She directed the 
creation of the hero, Li Yuhe, in mise-en-scène, and discussed what settings should be 
built for the opera film, analysed the camera and lighting work and even instructed Li 
Yuhe to wear a white shirt as a symbol of revolutionary purity (Di 2001, 101). Under 
the influence of Jiang Qing, for example, Zhang Dongliang (ά­ƿ ), a 
cinematographer, followed Jiang Qing’s instruction that the proletarian hero must be 
tall and strong with eyes that shine; he installed a light on the camera for this purpose 
when he was filming; consequently, the image of Li Yuhe in mise-en-scène is much 
brighter and more sharply focussed than in the initial filming (Di 2001, 105-106). 
That is why Dai Jiafang (1995, 230) comments that, because Jiang Qing was very 
demanding of the film crews under her control, the quality of these opera films was 
superior to those made afterwards without her involvement. 
 Thus The Red Lantern supported the rise of Jiang Qing and Qian Haoliang in 
politics as well as providing entertainment. Not only did Jiang Qing rise to be a 
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Politburo member with the support of her husband, Mao Zedong, but so, too, did Qian 
Haoliang (Ʌěǀ), a Chinese opera actor with the stage name Haoliang (ěǄ) who 
performed Li Yuhe; he was promoted to Deputy Minister of Culture during the 
Cultural Revolution; and in the entertainment field, the Chinese opera music and 
songs became popular throughout China. The film music could be heard in every 
household and the lyrics were also widely familiar. For example, in the scene where 
Grandma Li asks Li Tiemei to bring a shot of gin to her for Li Yuhe to drink before he 
goes to see Hatoyama, Li Yuhe sings the song Thank You, Mother to the tune of ‘xi pi 
er liu’ (̇ȳÁǖ) played by Chinese and Western musical instruments:  
I drink your wine at parting 
And it fills me with courage and strength. 
The Japanese are offering me a feast, 
Well, I can manage even a thousand cups. 
This is stormy, treacherous weather, 
Be ready for squalls. 
 
This song should be taken metaphorically. The last two lines, for example, do not 
refer to actual weather but indicate that Li Yuhe is ready to face the cruelty of the 
Japanese invaders. This opera song was so popular that arguably more Chinese people 
at the time could sing this song than the Chinese national anthem. 
 The opera song I Have More Uncles than I Can Count (˼ŚJʡʩUɏ) 
was also well liked at the time. Li Tiemei sings this song in the first scene in the film 
when Li Yuhe asks his daughter to tell her Grandma Li that an uncle is coming. After 
Li Tiemei gets home, she asks her grandma which uncle is coming, and suddenly 
realises that even her father does not know his identity because this uncle is a 
Communist Party liaison person. She then sings to the tune of ‘xi pi liu shui’ (̇RǕ
ʫ) also played by Chinese and Western musical instruments:  
I’ve more uncles than I can count; 
They only come when there’s important business. 
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Though we call them relatives we have never met, 
Yet they’re closer to us than our own family.  
Both you and dad call them your own folk; 
Well, I can guess the secret —  
They’re all men like my dad, 
Men with fine, loyal hearts. 
 
Due to the popularity of this opera film, these two songs continue to be performed 
today. Many famous Chinese singers such as Song Zuying (ʷϤͷ), a contemporary 
singer, and Wang Rongrong (˪ɧɧ), a well-known Chinese opera actress, still sing 
songs from The Red Lantern from time to time. Chinese opera usually possesses a 
highly elaborate form of drama and music theatre combined with singing, acting, 
recitation and acrobatics, with roots going back many years. However, one notable 
difference in The Red Lantern from traditional Chinese opera is that, in the film, there 
is no traditional opera singing, acting, recitation and acrobatics due to its subject. The 
film concentrates instead on singing rather than traditional styles of acting. This is 
another factor contributing to its popularity: most Chinese people cannot recite in the 
operatic fashion nor can they perform acrobatics, but they can sing and ‘act’ in a 
seemingly naturalistic fashion.  
 The camera work of this film is quite straightforward and simple, adding to 
the power of its realism. Most scenes are static compositions as it is a filmed stage 
performance. Sometimes, point-of-view shots are used to depict the proletarian heroes 
such as Li Yuhe, Grandma Li and Li Tiemei and are always brightly lit. By contrast, 
Japanese invaders such as Hatoyama and his soldiers are captured in a dimly lit stage 
environment. The visual rhythm of this opera film conformed to the requirements of 
the totalitarian society that was China during the Cultural Revolution. 
 In addition, the script of The Red Lantern was translated into several 
languages as educational materials and the opera film version was also transplanted 
into a Turkic opera film of the same name. This Turkic version was also directed in 
 223 
1975 by Cheng Yi and produced by the August the First Film Studio. All the actors in 
this version of the film are Uighurs. The music and songs are distinctly different from 
Chinese opera films but the style is similar to the Chinese opera film, The Red 
Lantern. 
 Audiences responded to The Red Lantern as a haunting evocation of the 
courage and unquenchable spirit displayed by the Chinese people during the war 
against Japan. It is among the best of Jiang Qing’s model opera films, having a 
modern theme revolving around three people of three different generations, who are 
unrelated by blood but welded together into one family by the events of the Chinese 
revolution. Their family ‘treasure’ is a red lantern which is more than just a lantern; it 
is a symbol of resistance against the Japanese invaders. Consequently, after the 
railway worker, Li Yuhe, a member of the Chinese Communist Party, and his mother 




The significant themes of films produced in the Cultural Revolution include class 
struggle on the medical front, class struggle against ‘capitalist roaders’, the Chinese 
civil war and the Chinese resistance war against the Japanese invasion. Each theme 
portrays the social and political space and the times, since 1937, in relatively realistic 
ways. The films chosen for discussion in this chapter reflected those themes. 
 Spring Seedling depicts the lack of medical facilities in rural China. It 
describes a class struggle revolving around the attitudes of a well-established doctor 
and a ‘barefoot doctor’ of peasant patients in a rural hospital. The film demonstrates 
how ‘barefoot doctors’ willingly treated peasant patients, unlike established doctors. 
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Were it not for the Cultural Revolution, these ‘barefoot doctors’, an emerging socialist 
phenomenon of the time, would have been sabotaged by established doctors who 
represented capitalism and revisionism. This film thus epitomises the class struggle on 
the medical front during the Cultural Revolution. 
 Jubilant Small Cool River describes the class struggle against ‘capitalist 
roaders’ by showing what capitalism meant in agricultural villages in a socialist 
society, namely peasants wanting to make extra money from outside of the collective 
agricultural production — a desire considered to derive from capitalist ideology. The 
film portrays the class struggle between the heads of the two villages and with the 
deputy director at the county authority about how to manage socialist productive 
forces to achieve a better life for the people. By describing the discussion surrounding 
the changing of the course of Small Cool River, the film captures the ideological 
struggle between socialism and capitalism. 
 Sparkling Red Star, a war-themed film for children about the Chinese civil 
war, was adapted from a novel of the same name. Using neo-realism, it portrays a 
young boy named Pan Dongzi and describes how, under the Communist Party 
leadership, he grows up to become a Red Army soldier. This film demonstrates how, 
under Mao’s leadership, the Chinese Communist Party defeated the Chiang Kai-Shek 
Kuomintang government during the period of the Chinese civil war. The cinematic 
techniques of this film, although achieving outstanding results for one produced 
during the Cultural Revolution, also suffered political interference by Jiang Qing, 
causing trouble for the film director, Li Jun, after the Cultural Revolution. 
 The Red Lantern was the first film produced in 1970 during the Cultural 
Revolution and is one of Jiang Qing’s eight model films. She spent a considerable 
amount of time assisting with its production and created it not only for the political 
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propaganda purposes of the Communist Party, but also to aid her promotion to 
membership of the Party Politburo during the Cultural Revolution. It was transplanted 
from the Shanghainese opera, The Red Lantern, which itself was transplanted from 
the feature film, More Generations Will Come, produced by the Changchun Film 
Studio in 1963. The film also portrays the themes of personal and national survival, as 
well as the survival of a valued social and political justice system through the film’s 
dramatisation of the Chinese resistance war against the Japanese invasion. 
 As noted by many Chinese film scholars including Paul Clark, Chris Berry, 
Rey Chow and Ma Ning, the significant film themes of the Cultural Revolution 
presented ‘a combination of revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism’ 
through the use of different cinematic codes and elements. These themes — class 
struggle between the poor and intellectuals; class struggle against ‘capitalist roaders’; 
the Chinese civil war; and the Chinese resistance war against the Japanese invasion — 
it may be said, reflected the history of modern China under the Communist Party 





Through various textual comparisons and filmic analyses, this study has sought to 
provide an understanding of the political and aesthetic impact on cinematic realism 
during the Cultural Revolution. It has highlighted several features of the political 
formations of the films produced and shown at that time, in relation to the different 
historical content and contexts of socialist China. 
 The study began by examining cinematic realism from the perspectives of 
French film critic, André Bazin, and American film theorist, Siegfried Kracauer, as 
well as from the perspectives of film scholars such as Paul Clark, Chris Berry and 
Zhang Junxiang. What can be construed from their assessments is that cinematic 
realism is understood to depict the reality of the history of the world. Cameras can 
physically record actuality unfolding before the eyes of people, and the ensuing 
scenes can be powerfully persuasive. In this way cinematic realism (but also literary 
and other forms of realism) can seem to be ‘unmediated’, as though offering a direct 
window onto the world without any intervention on the part of artist-producers. While 
it has not been the purpose of this study to critique realism’s ontology, as it were, 
nevertheless the study has drawn attention to certain realist techniques of production, 
thus undercutting the notion that cinematic realism is simply a form of unmediated 
documentary-making. The study has also shown the many ways in which realist films 
in socialist China were politically manipulated, especially in the production phase, 
during the Cultural Revolution, further undercutting the notion that realism is an 
unmediated artform.  Socialist regimes do not, of course, have sole prerogative when 
it comes to the use of cinematic realism for propaganda purposes. In fact, filmmakers 
from around the world use cinematic realism to deal with explicit and implicit 
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historical events relating to democracy, human rights, moral values, socio-political 
issues and military affairs. While cinematic realism is not therefore unique to socialist 
regimes, the mode was certainly used to promote the political agenda of the 
Communist Party in China during the Cultural Revolution. 
 Following this contextual outline, the study went on to examine how the social 
and political policies of the Cultural Revolution affected the Chinese film industry. 
The Cultural Revolution was launched by Mao Zedong for personal and socio-
political reasons to re-consolidate his leadership in the Communist Party and of the 
nation. He wanted to perpetuate the socialist revolution in China; however, while 
working towards that goal, he created turmoil in the socio-political environment and, 
in the process, affected people from all walks of life and especially in the realm of 
literature and arts. The Chinese film industry was one of the hardest hit areas 
especially with regard to creativity and productivity. Not many films, let alone good 
ones, were produced during the Cultural Revolution. In addition, in the film arts 
community, many film directors, scriptwriters, actors and all kinds of film crews 
suffered from persecution, imprisonment and fatal attacks during that time. It is clear 
that, were it not for the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese film industry would have 
been more productive and creative. 
 In Chapter Two the study moved to a discussion of Jiang Qing’s theory of The 
Three Prominences and the major types of films produced during the Cultural 
Revolution such as Chinese opera films, feature films and other films of stage 
performances. It is evident that this theory significantly influenced literary and artistic 
outcomes, especially film production, with its use of embellished film protagonists 
and socialist heroes, and belittled film antagonists presented as class enemies. The 
most important films produced during the Cultural Revolution were Jiang Qing’s 
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eight model films on which she spent a considerable amount of time perfecting their 
ideological content and mode of presentation. These Model Films were screened all 
over China and had a tremendous political impact on the Chinese people by spreading 
the message of the proletarian revolution. Not only did they possess unique aesthetic 
and artistic characteristics, but they also, more critically, emphasised strategic social 
and political aspects of Party ideology in order to strengthen the Cultural Revolution. 
Film diegesis and film censorship during the Cultural Revolution were 
discussed in Chapter Three. The most notable phenomenon of the period was that 
political narratives and political figures were changed dramatically from elite classes, 
rulers, bureaucrats, landlords, gentrified scholars and merchants to workers-peasants-
soldiers associated with the Chinese Communist Party. In other words, workers-
peasants-soldiers were dominant in Chinese films and impacted significantly on 
Chinese audiences by encouraging them to embrace the revolutionary spirit and the 
political ideology of the Cultural Revolution. Political figures such as Mao and other 
leaders of the Communist Party were always depicted in radiant colours accompanied 
by glorious music in order to show their heroic status in socialist society, thus also 
demonstrating the required pedagogical realism. 
 All the films produced and shown were severely censored in order to serve the 
political needs of the Cultural Revolution, despite the lack of any official blueprint for 
film censorship. The intuitive censorship of Jiang Qing and her political allies kept the 
films in line with the spirit of the Cultural Revolution. This explains why there were 
intricate and fierce film censorship battles among Chinese Communist leaders such as 
Mao, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing over the release of some films, for 
example, Songs of Teachers (1974) and Undertaking (1974). Uncensored, these films 
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would not have adhered as closely to the socio-political ideology of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
 The study moved to an analysis of film adaption, transplantation and 
reproduction during the Cultural Revolution in Chapter Four. The Chinese film 
industry selected themes such as class struggle and war, which were incorporated in 
adaptations from novels to films, transplanted from plays to films and reproduced 
from older films to new films. The adapted, transplanted and reproduced films 
appeared more realistic than in their previous formats due to the application of 
specific techniques such as colour, positioning and use of close-ups. The adapted 
films mostly retained the essence of their counterparts, the novels from which they 
came. Some transplanted films, although appearing to be apolitical, comprised content 
and contexts that were implicitly about class struggle. Only a few films were 
reproduced but, in terms of filmic diegesis and artistic characteristics, they were more 
realistic than their previous versions, most notably in terms of such techniques as 
montage and flashback. These film adaptations, transplantations and reproductions 
were integral to the film industry and realistically portrayed the history of China (at 
least according to Party ideology) before and during the Cultural Revolution. 
 Finally, this study explored significant themes depicted in the films during the 
Cultural Revolution. These themes included class struggle on the medical front, 
opposing ‘capitalist roaders’, the Chinese civil war and the Chinese resistance war 
against the Japanese invasion. Each of these four themes did indeed seem to represent 
realistically such historical events as the Chinese civil war and the Chinese resistance 
war against the Japanese invasion, and, in so doing, emphasized to audiences that the 
Chinese Communist Party was always victorious. The films were realistic, then, to the 
extent that they conformed to a version of history approved by the Communist Party, 
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and represented that history in effective ways. The analysis of these films indicated 
that the political themes demonstrated in the films were dualistic, consisting of a 
positive image of the ‘socialist heroes’ or ‘good new China’ and a negative image of 
‘class enemies’ or ‘bad old China’. The representation of, for example, ‘barefoot 
doctors’ and the opposition to ‘capitalist roaders’, encouraged nation building among 
audiences through the films’ use of socialist construction and dualism. 
 By employing a diagnosis blended with Rosenbaum-Combs’ method of 
political realism to examine how political films occupy the utopian space and time as 
well as controlling the choice of ideas, and Walsh-Taylor’s method of factual 
narrative analysis to focus on the presentation, entanglement, influence and aesthetic 
and political thinking, this study has arrived at certain overall conclusions from the 
filmic analyses and textual comparisons: 
1. In the ten-year period of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese film industry 
including the ten major film studios such as Beijing, Shanghai, Changchun and 
August the First, produced only 93 films in total. Through cinematic realism, 
these films not only manifested historical reality as perceived by the 
Communist Party, but also reflected the political reality and pedagogical 
practicality of the time. 
2. However, the Chinese film industry was quite severely damaged in terms of 
creativity and productivity during the Cultural Revolution. The 93 films were 
strictly scrutinised by Jiang Qing, the ‘great flag bearer of literature and art’ 
during the Cultural Revolution, with her political coteries using their political 
intuition despite the absence of any blueprint of film censorship to guide them. 
3. What is clear is that the film diegesis and artistic discourse were altered from 
humanistic products to political outcomes through distanciation, explicating 
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political messages and propaganda embedded in the films. This trend created a 
combination of revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism in the 
production of films that served the interests of the Cultural Revolution. 
4. The most interesting feature films were Jiang Qing’s eight model films. These 
were popular as they defied convention and portrayed many positive and 
bright images of workers-peasants-soldiers while simultaneously exposing the 
negative and ‘darker’ sides of the so-called class enemies. 
5. These strongly politicised films all bear the hallmark of the Cultural 
Revolution. Not only were they the vehicle for promoting the Communist 
Party’s political ideology, but they also constituted the entertainment 
repertoire during the years of the Cultural Revolution. Due to the political 
circumstances, all the films produced during the Cultural Revolution had 
aesthetic and artistic discourses different from other periods in the history of 
Chinese cinema. The protagonists in the films were embellished in order to 
bring to life the theme of class struggle in socialist society. They were 
portrayed as more politically expressive and, at the same time, more ‘realistic’ 
— where the realism derived from conformity to the Party’s ideal socialist 
society. Most films made earlier, and shown during the Cultural Revolution, 
were also quite politicised, but to a lesser extent in that they did not exaggerate 
the political roles in mise-en-scène as ‘wholesome, handsome and brightsome’ 
figures. Ironically, to a certain extent, it was precisely this exaggeration that 
marked the films of the Cultural Revolution as realistic in Party terms. 
6. A further extraordinary and unprecedented aspect of the Chinese film industry 
during the Cultural Revolution is that the Chinese Communist Party leaders 
such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Qing and other 
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Politburo members participated intensively in the process of film production. 
These leaders not only involved themselves directly or indirectly in film 
production and censorship, but also overtly and enthusiastically assisted with 
script editing and the filming process as they understood the importance of 
visual culture in a socialist society. 
 
 Overall, then, what is important to note is that the Chinese Communist regime 
always ensured that the film industry obeyed its literature and art policy, the principal 
aim of which was to serve the needs of the Chinese people and the Communist Party. 
This policy, based on Mao’s dictum in Yan’an in 1942 that ‘Literature and art must 
serve the people’, was implemented by the Communist Party even before the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. From Mao criticising the 
film Wu Xun in 1951 and Jiang Qing condemning most films made before 1966, to 
Deng Xiaoping reproaching the film Bitter Love in 1980, this study has shown that the 
overarching goal of the Chinese film industry during the Cultural Revolution was to 
promote the Chinese socialist system and to encourage the Chinese people to 





Note: This appendix is based on my categorisation of the films viewed for this 
research. 
 













1966 2 3 1 1 5 12* 
1967 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1968 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1969 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1970 1 1 0 0 0 2 
1971 0 1 1 0 0 2 
1972 1 1.5 1 1.5 0 5 
1973 0 0.5 3 0.5 0 4 
1974 2 4 5 4 2 17 
1975 4 6 5 6 3 24 
1976 4 8 7 13 6 39 
Total 12 22 22 25 11 93 
* These 12 films were not produced during the Cultural Revolution. 
 
Major themes of films produced from 1966 to 1976 
Class struggle-themed films War-themed films 
61 32 
 
Major film types from 1966 to 1976 
General Children Musical 
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Note: This list is organised into two groups: the first comprises films produced during 
the Cultural Revolution, listed chronologicically; the second comprises films shown 
during the Cultural Revolution and the films discussed or referred to in this thesis, 
listed alphabetically.  
 
 
Films Produced from 1966 to 1976 
 
1966 -1969 (No films produced in this period.) 
 
1970 (2 films produced) 
 
Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy (ψɘ˯Įɵ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Xie Tieli 
s: Beijing Chinese Opera Troupe 
 
The Red Lantern (ħŕ), August the First Film Studio. 
d: Cheng Yin 
s: China Chinese Opera Troupe 
 
1971 (2 films produced) 
 
The Red Detachment of Women (ħɱȚϞƕ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Pan Wenzhan and Fu Jie 
s: China Dance Drama Troupe 
 
Shajiabang (ɳŚϺ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Wu Zhaodi 
s: Beijing Chinese Opera Troupe 
 
1972 (5 films produced) 
 
The Harbor (Ĕí), Beijing and Shanghai Film Studios. 
d: Xie Tieli and Xie Jin 
s: Shanghai Chinese Opera Troupe 
 
Long Jiang Song (Ǘŧʵ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Xie Tieli 
s: Shanghai Chinese Opera Troupe 
 
The White-Haired Girl (+%), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Sang Hu 





The Red Detachment of Women (ħɱȚϞƕ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Cheng Yin 
s: China Chinese Opera Troupe 
 
Raid the White-Tiger Regiment (8.7), Changchun Film Studio.
d: Su Li and Wang Yan 
s: Shandong Chinese Opera Troupe 
 
1973 (4 films produced) 
 
The Harbor (Ĕí), Beijing and Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Xie Tieli and Xie Jin 
s: Shanghai Chinese Opera Troupe 
 
Bright Sunny Skies (͍͗˓), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Ling Nong 
s: Collectively adapted from the Hao Ran novel 
 
Zhan Hong Tu (ΩĤˡ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Su Li and Yuan Naichen 
s: Lu Shu 
 
Green Pine Ridge (ɎʴǑ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Liu Guoquan and Jiang Shusen 
s: Zhang Zhongpeng 
 
1974 (17 films produced) 
 
Azalea Mountain (³Ƒɵ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Xie Tieli 
s: Beijing Chinese Opera Troupe 
 
Scouts (ε_N), Beijing Film Studio. 
d, s: Li Wenhua 
 
Fighting North and South (ȑκ?Ω), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Cheng Yin, Wang Yan and Tang Xiaodan 
s: Shen Ximeng 
 
On the Way Delivery (ʶŇǛɸ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Zheng Guoquan 
s: Liu Guoxiang 
 
The Fiery Year (ŅħȘ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Fu Chaowu, Sun Yongping and Yu Zhongying 





Reconnaissance across the Yangtze (´ŧε_ŕ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Tang Xiaodan and Tang Huada 
s: Ji Guanwo, Gao Xing and Meng Senhui 
 
Safety Belt (͢Ø<̘), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Zhao Huanzhang and Song Ningqi 
s: Collectively transplanted from Shanghai Jiading County Amateur Literary and Art 
Group and Shanghai Hui-Opera Troupe 
 
Acupuncture Needles Praised under a Shadowless Lamp (˾ͼ̒ʵ͵δ), 
Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Sang Hu 
s: Collectively transplanted from the same name play created by Shanghai Chest 
Hospital Literary and Art Amateur Group. 
 
Fighting on the Plains (ȸΓϫΩ), August the First Film Studio. 
d: Cui Wei and Chen Huaikai 
s: China Chinese Opera Troupe 
 
Sparkling Red Star (ɶɶħ̴), August the First Film Studio. 
d: Li Jun and Li Ang 
s: Wang Yuanjian and Lu Zhuguo 
 
Undertaking ({͠), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Yu Yanfu 
s: Zhang Tianmin and others 
 
Iron Giant (ê˗Ǝɤ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Yan Gong 
s: Iron Giant writing group 
 
Guerrillas Sweep the Plain (ȸΓ΂ňµ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Wu Zhaodi and Chang Zhenhua 
s: Guerrillas Sweep the Plain writing group 
 
Sunny Courtyard Story (34, ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Yuan Naichen 
s: Collectively adapted from the Xu Ying novel 
 
Half a Basketful of Peanuts (7ƨĲʇ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Zhu Wenshun 
s: The Half of Basketful Peanuts writing group 
 
Sha Jia Bang (&(), Pearl River Film Studio. 
d: Yu Deshui 





Songs of Teachers (Δªρñ), Central News Records and Beijing Film Studios. 
d: Sha Dan and Zheng Guoquan 
s: Hunan Xiang-Opera Troupe 
 
1975 (24 films produced) 
 
Seaside Rosy Cloud (Ĕ̐), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Qian Jiang, Chen Huaikai and Wang Haowei 
s: Xie Tieli 
 
Hong Yu (ħΈ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Cui Wei 
s: Yang Xiao 
 
Breeaking Up (Ɠǋ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Li Wenhua 
s: Chun Chao and Zhou Jie 
 
Beacon-fire Youth (ÔŅɺȘ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Dong Kena 
s: Yan Yiyan 
 
Prairie Children (\Γ¾ȡ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Fu Jie 
s: China Dance Troupe 
 
Ferry Spot (´Ƥ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Ma Erlu 
s: Feng Yukun 
 
Fighting at the Berth (Ωz˄), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Fu Chaowu 
s: Du Yeqiu and Liu Shizheng 
 
Spring Seedling (|ǽ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Xie Jin, Yan Bili and Liang Tingdu 
s: Zhao Zhiqiang, Yang Zhiqiang and Cao Lei 
 
The Second Spring (Áó|˓), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Sang Hu and Wang Xiwen 
s: Liu Chuan, He Baoxian and others 
 
Young Fellow (̪Ŧ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Zhong Shuhuang 
s: Yin Dunhuang and others 
 
Old with a Kind Heart (ɤƬ̲ħ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Yu Zhongying 
s: Shanghai Huai-Opera Troupe 
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Collecting Cinders (şǱΦ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Wu Zhennian 
s: Shanghai Huai-Opera Troupe 
 
Ode to Yimeng (ͥǷʵ), August the First Film Studio. 
d: Li Wenhu and Jing Mukui 
s: China Dance Troupe 
 
Fierce Combat near the Nameless River (ŊΩ˾Ȃx), August the First Film Studio. 
d: Hua Chun and Wang shaoyan 
s: Zheng Zhi and Huang Zongjiang 
 
The Red Lantern (ħŕ), August the First Film Studio. 
d: Cheng Yin 
s: Adapted by the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Song and Dance Troupe 
 
Before the Looming Thunderstorm (ƮΈρɆ), August the First Film Studio. 
d: Li Wenhu 
s: Gao Hong and Sang Ping 
 
Golden Road (Ÿĉ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Lin Nong and Sun Yu 
s: Collectively adapted from the Hao Ran novel 
 
Rolling Wheels (hǠĎĎ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Yin Yiqing 
s: Xue Shouxian 
 
New Tune of the Great Wall (dp̱ɖ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Zhao Xinshui 
s: New Tune of the Great Wall writing group 
 
Yellow River Youth (ļğɺȘ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Lu Jianhua and Li Guanghui 
s: Yan Yi 
 
Spring Days in the Desert (ɳȇ|˓), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Zhu Wenshun 
s: Mara Qinfu 
 
Blue Sea Red Waves (CĔħR), Xi’an Film Studio. 
d: Liu Bin 
s: Han Guang 
 
Brave Lad ( ΀), Xi’an Film Studio. 
d: Sun Jing and Yan Xueshu 




Little Conch (̪ǢĚ), Pearl River Film Studio. 
d: Liu Xin and Wu Ping 
s: Liu Xin 
 
1976 (39 films produced) 
 
Counterattack (Åň), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Li Wenhua 
s: Mao Feng and Counterattack writing group 
 
Mountain Flowers (ɵĲ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Cui Wei and Sang Fu 
s: Sun Qian and Ma Feng 
 
Ebullition Mountains (Ìːɟɵ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Gan Xuewei, Li Wei and Chen Fangqian 
s: Tao Zhonghua and liu Zhongwei 
 
The Lotus Lantern (=ƻɸ̒ō), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Chen Huaikai and Chen Fangqian 
s: Adapted from an ancient myth 
 
Fiery Youth (Ɏ|ʳŅ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Dong Kena and Xin Jing 
s: Ma An Shan Culture Bureau Creation Group of Youth Resembles Fires 
 
Cowhorn Rock (ȝŬʍ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Shi Yifu 
s:Cao Shuolong 
 
Bright Pearls over the Sea (Ĕɸǿϑ), Beijing Film Studio. 
d: Lin Yang and Wang Haowei 
s: Zhang Xianglin 
 
Jubilant Small Cool River (Ĺː̪ƿğ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Liu Qiong and Shen Yaoting 
s: Wang Lixin and Gao Xing 
 
The Young Generation (ȘɎ͢), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Ling Zhihao and Zhang Huijun 
s: Chen Yun and Zhao Ming 
 
Boulder Bay (Ȧʍ˧), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Xie jin and Liang Tingduo 
s: Ah Jian 
 
The Journey (κˣ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Yan Bili and Bao Qichen 
s: Gao Xing, Xue Yaoxian and Zhao Qingrui 
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Unforgettable Battle (ȒˮΩ¯), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Tang Xiaodan and Yu Benzheng 
s: Sun Jingrui and Yan Li 
 
The Surging River (ŧʫˍˍ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Shu Shi and Zhao Hongbin  
s: Shi Min and others 
 
The Chair on Trial (ʆͦϞ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Liang Tingduo 
s: Ah Jian 
 
New Wave Songs (̱Óñ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Zhao Huanzhang and Lu Ren 
s: Zhang Youde, Duan Quanfa and Fan Junzhi 
 
Jin Suo (Ÿˀ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d, s: Da Shibiao 
 
The Secret of Axia River ( ̓ğǺǻ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Yan Bili, Shen Fu and Wu Zhennian 
s: Cao Zhonggao 
 
Well Managed (ćę), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Zhao Huanzhang 
s: Xin Xianling and others 
 
Moving from the Railway (ɯ«Ϛ), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Sun Yongping 
s: Wu Ruying and others 
 
Early Spring Comes to a Small Shop (̪¥|Π), Shanghai Film Studio. 
d: Deng Yimin and Xu Jihong 
s: Wang Cunshun and Wang Shouzhi 
 
Songs of the Long March (dκϥñ%ħƕUȣΕκȒ), August the First Film 
Studio.
d: Wang Ping and Huang Baoshan 
s: Xiao Hua and others 
 
Storm in the South China Sea (ȑĔÓΚ), August the First Film Studio.
d: Jing Mukui and Zhang Yongshou 
s: Lu Zhuguo 
 
The Red Clouded Hillock (ħΚì), August the First Film Studio.
d: Li Ang and Li wenhu 




The South China Sea Great Wall (ȑĔdp), August the First Film Studio.
d: Li Jun and Hao Guang 
s: Kiang Xin and Dong Xiaohua 
 
By the Yanming Lake (͏ȀĬȧ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Gao Tianhong 
s: Zhang Xiaotian and Wang Weichen 
 
Songs of Mangoes (Ǫđρñ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Chang Yan and Zhang Puren 
s: Zheng Quan and others 
 
Chinese Air Force (dƣ̹͹), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Wang Feng and Wang Yabiao 
s: Chen Lide 
 
Dragon-Locked Lake (ˀǗĬ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Zhou Yu 
s: Yan Fengle 
 
A Newcomer to Mountain Village (ɵ̱ɤ), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Jiang Shusen and Jing Jie 
s: Zhao Yuxiang 
 
Golden Road (Ÿĉϊō), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Sun Yu 
s: Collectively adapted from the Hao Ran novel 
 
Half the Sky (7E˓), Changchun Film Studio. 
d: Liu Wenyu and Zhang Hui 
s: Shandong Lu-Opera Troupe 
 
Maple Valley (Ñʨ˧), Pearl River Film Studio. 
d: Lu Jue, Lin Lan and Liu Xin 
s: Chen Jianqiu 
 
Red Plums in the Mountains (ɵƲħǰ), Pearl River Film Studio. 
d: Si Meng 
s: Qiao Dianyun 
 
A Myriad Sunset Clouds (ħ̐˨º), Pearl River Film Studio. 
d: Chen Gang and Li Ming 
s: Anqing Culture Bureau of Sunset Clouds Glow Ten Thousands writing group 
 
Mountain Quarry Men (ƙɵɤ), Xi’an Film Studio. 
d: Wei Rong 




An Important Lesson (ϔƢ), Guangxi Film Studio. 
d: Erji Guangbudao 
s: Collectively transplanted from the same name of the play 
 
Expectation (œ˥), E’ Mei Film Studio. 
d: Ye Ming and Zhang Yi 
s: Gao Ying, Yin Chi and Yang Yingzhang 
 
Two Charts (ǃάˡυ), Central News Records Film Studio. 
d: Sha Dan 
s: Hunan Yiyang Prefecture Culture Creative Group 
 
 
Films Discussed or Mentioned 
 
A Spring River Flows East (͢ŧ|ůʫ̥¬Ǖ, Kunlun Film Studio, 1947, d, s: Cai 
Chushen and Zheng Junli. 
 
A Tale of Wind (Une Histoire de vent), Capi Films & La Sept Cinéma, 1988, d, s: 
Joris Ivens and Marceline Loridan. 
 
A Trip to the Moon (Le Voyage dans la Lune), Star Film, 1902, d: Georges Méliès, s: 
Georges Méliès and Gaston Méliès. 
 
Bitter Love (ƥƽor ˅͗ĝɤ), Changchun Film Studio, 1979, d: Peng Ning, s: Bai 
Hua and Peng Ning. 
 
Bridge (ɉ), North-East Film Studio, 1949, d: Wang Bin, s: Yu ming. 
 
Chung Kuo, Cina, 1972, d: Michelangelo Antonioni, s: Michelangelo Antonioni and 
Andrea Barbato. 
 
Citizen Kane, RKO Radio Pictures, 1941, d: Orson Welles, s: Herman Mankiewicz, 
Orson Welles. 
 
Crow and Sparrow (˽ͅΉǥɞ,  Kunlun Film Studio, 1949, d: Zheng Junli, s: Chen 
Baichen and others. 
 
Die Nibelungen, Decla- Bioscop Film Studio, 1924, d, s: Fritz Lang. 
 
Dr Norman Bethune (3ɕ¼×), Haiyan and August the First Film Studios, 1964, 
d: Zhang Junxiang, Li Shutian and Gao Zheng, s: Zhang Junxiang and Zhao Tuo. 
 
Early Spring in February (Π|ÁΘ), Beijing Film Studio, 1963, d, s: Xie Tieli. 
 
Family (Ś), Shanghai Film Studio, 1956, d: Chen Xihe  and Ye Ming, s: Chen Xihe. 
 
Fighting South and North (ȑκ?Ω, Shanghai Film Studio, 1952, d: Cheng Yin and 
Tang Xiaodan, s: Shen Ximeng, Shen Mojun and Gu Baozhang. 
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Five Golden Flowers (́ºŸĲ), Changchun Film Studio, 1959, d: Wang Jiayi, s: Ji 
Kang and Gong Pu. 
 
Forced Recruitment (ϗϛª, August the First Film Studio, 1963, d: Chen Ge and 
Shen Shan, s: Chen Ge and Wu Xue. 
 
Fugitive (͔ǵȡŦ,Beijing Film Studio, 1960, d: Cui Wei and Chen Huai’ai, s: Fan 
Junhong and Lü Ruiming. 
 
Gone with the Wind, Selznick International Pictures, 1939, d: Victor Fleming, s: 
Sidney Howard. 
 
Growing up in Wartime (Ω¯Ʋqd), August the First Film Studio, 1957, d: Yan 
Jizhou and Sun Min, s: Hu Ke. 
 
How Yugong Moved the Mountain, 1976, France, d, s: Joris Ivens.  
 
Jane Eyre, 20th Century Fox, 1943, d: Robert Stevenson, s: John Houseman, Aldous 
Huxley and Robert Stevenson. 
 
Knife in the Water (Nóz w wodzie), Zespol Filmowy, 1962, d: Roman Polanski, 
s: Jerzy Skolimowski, Roman Polanski and Jakub Goldberg. 
 
Lenin in 1918, Moscow Film Production Unit, 1939, d: Mikhail Romm, E.Aron and I. 
Simkov, s: Aleksei Kapler and Taisiya Zlatogorova. 
 
Lenin in October, Moscow Film Production Unit, 1937, d: Mikhail Romm and Dmitri 
Vasilyev, s: Boris Shchukin, Nikolai Okhlopkov, Vasili Vanin and Nikolai Svobodin. 
 
Li Shizhen (Ʊʎβ, Shanghai Film Studio, 1956, d: Shen Fu, s: Zhang Huijian. 
 
Lin Zexu (ǍΣ̼, Haiyan Film Studio, 1957, d: Zheng Junli and Cen Fan, s: Lü 
Dang and Ye Yuan. 
 
Mine Warfare (ƮΩAugust the First Film Studio, 1962, d: Tang Yingqi, Xu Da 
and Wu Jianhai, s: Liu Qihui, Qu Hongchao and Chen Guangsheng. 
 
More Generations Will Come (ϟ΃ĨƦɤ), Changchun Film Studio, 1963, d: Yu 
Yanfu, s: Chi Yu and Luo Jing. 
 
Myriads of Lights (˨ŚŅ), Kunlun Film Studio, 1948, d: Shen Fu, s: Yang 
Hansheng and Shen Fu. 
 
New Biography of A Veteran (ƬṈy),Haiyan Film Studio, 1958, d: Shen Fu, s: Li 
Zhun. 
 




Nosferatu, German Film Arts Guild, 1922, d: F. W. Murnau, s: Henrik Galeen. 
 
Paisan (Paisà), Arthur Mayer and Joseph Burstyn, 1946, d: Roberto Rossellini, s: 
Sergio Amidei, Klaus Mann, Federico Fellini, Marcello Pagliero, Alfred Hayes and 
Vasco Pratolini. 
 
Pandora’s Box (Die Büchse der Pandora), Süd-Film, 1929, d: Georg Pabst, s: Georg 
Pabst and Ladislaus Vajda. 
 
Plains Guerrillas(ȸΓ΂ňµ, Changchun Film Studio, 1955, d: Su Li and Wu 
Zhaodi, s: Xing Ye and Yu Shan. 
 
Railway Guerilla (˗΂ňµ), Shanghai Film Studio, 1956, d: Chao Ming, s: Liu 
Zhixia. 
 
Rather Die Than Surrender (ȜʱUɗ), 1969, Albania Film. 
 
Rome, Open City (Roma, città aperta), Minerva Film Spa, 1945, d: Roberto 
Rossellini, s: Sergio Amidei and Federico Consiglio. 
 
Saving Private Ryan, Amblin Entertainment Mutual Film Company, 1998, d: Steven 
Spielberg, s: Robert Rodat. 
 
Seahawks (Ĕ͹), August the First Film Studio, 1959, d: Yan Jizhou, s: Lu Zhuguo, 
Zhang Yimin, Wang Jun and Wen Da. 
 
Serfs (Ȟȟ), August the First Film Studio, 1963, d: Li Jun, s: Huang Zongjiang. 
 
Shangganling (ɸçǑ, Changchun Film Studio, 1959, d: Sha Meng and Lin Shan, s: 
Sha Meng, Lin Shan, Cao Xin and Xiao Yu. 
 
Stage Sisters (̂˄ŵǴ, Shanghai Film Studio, 1965, d: Xie Jin, s: Lin Gu, Xu Jin 
and Xie Jin. 
 
Song of Youth (Ɏ|ρñ), Beijing Film Studio, 1959, d: Cui Wei and Chen Huai’ai, 
s: Yang Mu. 
 
Ten O’clock on National Day (Đɒʌ¡ϋ), Changchun Film Studio, 1956, d, s: Wu 
Tian. 
 
The 400 Million, 1939, History Today Inc., d, s: Joris Ivens. 
 
The Battle of Algiers, Rizzoli, Rialto Pictures, 1966, d: Gillo Pontecorvo, s: Gillo 
Pontecorvo, Franco Solinas. 
 
The Battleship Potemkin, Goskino, 1925, d: Sergei Eisenstein, s: Nina Agadzhanova, 
Nikolai Aseyev, Sergei Eisenstein, Sergei Tretyakov. 
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The Birth of A Nation, David W. Griffith Corp., 1915, d: D.W. Griffith, s: D.W. 
Griffith, T. F. Dixon (Jr.), Frank E. Woods. 
 
The Girl Who Sells Flowers (ǨĲþȚ), 1972, North Korean film. 
 
The Great Gatsby, Paramount Pictures, 1949, d: Elliott Nugent, s: Richard Maibaum, 
Cyril Hume. 
 
The life of Wu Xun (̀̓y),Kunlun Film Studio, 1951, d, s: Sun Yu. 
 
The Lin Family Shop (ǍŚȻϞ), Beijing Film Studio, 1959, d: Shui Hua, s: Xia Yan. 
 
The Red Shoes, Eagle-Lion Films, 1948, d: Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger, s: 
Michael Powell, Emeric Pressburger and Keith Winter. 
 
The Savage Heart (Corazón Salvaje), Mexico, 1968, d, s: Tito Davison. 
 
The Sentry Under the Neon Light (ȕģ̒ɻN), Tianma Film Studio, 1964, d: 
Wang Ping and Ge Xin, s: Shen Ximeng. 
 
The Vagabond (Awaara), RK Films, Chembur, 1951, d: Raj Kapoor, s: Khwaja 
Ahmad Abbas. 
 
The War Game, BBC, 1965, d, s: Peter Watkins. 
 
Triumph of the Will, Reichsparteitag-Film, 1935, d: Leni Riefenstahl, s: Leni 
Riefenstahl, Walter Ruttmann. 
 
Tunnel Warfare (ΩAugust the First Film Studio, 1966, d: Ren Xudong, s: Ren 
Xudong, Pan Yunshan, Wang Junyi and Xu Guoteng. 
 
Unwind Trinidad (ȗÓɄƲ, Pearl River Film Studio, 1964, d: Fang Huang, s: Zhou 
Wancheng and Fang Huang. 
 
White Haired Girl (3ǭȡ), North-East Film Studio, 1950, d: Wang Bin and Shui 
Hua, s: Shui Hua, Wang Bin and Yang Renshen. 
 
Zhang Ga the Soldier Boy (̪Nάã), Beijing Film Studio, 1963, d: Cui Wei and 
Ouyang Hongying, s: Xu Guangyao. 
